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China’s economic statecraft at the contemporary stage
and its role in national security
ChenchenWu, Durham University
Abstract: This thesis explores China’s economic statecraft in the 20 years since the
Tiananmen crisis and its role in China’s approach to national security. It examines the
intertwined relations between the strategy of economic statecraft and the service of this
strategy in China’s national security interests. It takes a regional focus of this relationship,
usingChina–Africa andChina–ASEAN as comparative examples.
The thesis is structured in three parts. Part I first presents the theory of national security
(Chapter Two) and the study of economic statecraft (Chapter Three). On the basis of the
theoretical frameworks it raises two hypotheses respectively: first, for a rapidly-growing
economy, like China, the focus on economic development affects its security concept,
which makes China pursue national security by means of economic security; and second,
on the pursuit of security interests, the strategy of peaceful rising leads to the preference
on economic diplomacy, instead of military instrument, though the specific approach of
economic diplomacy may vary by region.
To verify these hypotheses, Part II starts with the analysis on China’s security concept
(Chapter Four) and its mode of economic statecraft in diplomacy (Chapter Five). The
scenario of the security situation in China indicates the importance of economic security
14
due to the significant relevance of China’s political security and social stability –
supporting the first hypothesis (Hypothesis I) – but military security in the neighbouring
area is still prominent. The arguments on the role of economic statecraft in China’s
diplomatic history since its founding in 1949 lead to the conclusion that, since the
Chinese government largely defines its security concept as economic security with
regional diplomacy predominating, the model of economic statecraft has shifted towards
pragmatic security concerns and away from the ideologically based strategy of the past.
Part III further demonstrates the inter-linkage between security interests and economic
statecraft in China’s external relations, by exploring the strategic relations between China
and Africa and between China and ASEAN. Chapter Six on China–Africa engagement
identifies that the significance of Africa for Chinese security rests in the continent’s
increasing role in resources supply to Chinese economy. The primary motivation behind
the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation is to foster economic exchanges in resources
through massive incentive strategies, foreign aid in particular. In comparison, Chapter
Seven on China–ASEAN engagement argues that the relations with ASEAN are crucial
for Chinese economic security and regional security especially. The China–ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement is an approach of economic statecraft that seeks to minimise the
negative effects of the South China Sea dispute with the maritime ASEAN states and to
produce a transportation corridor for energy supplies through the continental members,
bypassing the ‘Malacca Dilemma ’ of the sea lanes. These arguments entirely support the
second hypothesis.
15
The thesis concludes that economic statecraft, being the strategy of economic diplomacy,
has been playing an impressive role in service for China’s national security interests,
illustrated in safeguarding regional security in the Southeast Asian area and economic
security in the far African continent. However, China’s economic diplomacy towards the
two areas is debatable: the aid policy towards Africa needs to be improved and the free
trade agreement with ASEANmay not be effective in solving the disputes on the South
China Sea.
16
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Research topic and objectives
The thesis is concerned with ‘China’s economic statecraft at the contemporary stage and
its role in national security’, and will explore the intertwined relations between the
strategy of economic statecraft and the service of this strategy for national security
interests. The thesis takes the rising economy of China as the central research object, and
considers the application of the theories of economic statecraft and national security to
the strategic partnerships with ASEAN and Africa, since the two scenarios are of
strategic significance to China’s emergence.
The thesis has three fundamental research objectives. The first objective is to make clear
how the nexus between economics and security interests contributes to the framework of
new security theory. The second objective is to understand the pursuit of the security
interests of nations and people by states through what is termed ‘economic statecraft ’.
The third objective is to test the application of the previous theories on the nexus
between economy and security and between economic statecraft and national security
through an examination of China’s relations with its Southern strategic partners, ASEAN
and Africa. These two cases are relevant due to the importance of ASEAN to China’s
regional security and that of Africa to China’s economic security.
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1.2 Research questions and hypotheses
1.2.1 Research background
In 1943, Edward Earle noted that the relationship between economics and security is an
important part of state-building (Mastanduno, 1998: 825, cited from Earle, 1943: 117). But
in security studies this relationship has not been paid as much attention as the link
between military statecraft and the security issue. Mastanduno (1998) proposes that ’we
should expect scholarship that links economics and security to become increasingly
prominent in the post-Cold War IR literature’ (Mastanduno, 1998: 853). The thesis
considers this proposition to have two aspects: research should pay more attention to the
impact of economics itself on security studies, and more focus should be paid to the role
of economic statecraft in the service of security interests. This is particularly needed in
China’s security studies and is of increasing importance given China’s emergence as both
an economic and security actor.
i. The impact of economics on Secur ity Studies and the relationship between International
Political Economy and Secur ity Studies
Security studies is a sub-field of International Relations. Traditionally, security is
generally considered to be a precondition of ordered human existence, and its pursuit is
a matter of the highest priority. For states, the majority of governments would agree that
18
‘the maintenance of national security is a fundamental duty, the satisfaction of which is
directly linked to their claims to legitimacy andpublic loyalty’ (Mangold, 1990: 1-2). Only
if security is assured can states safely seek such other goals as economic interests and
social stability.
During the early period between the First and Second World Wars, scholars of
International Relations perceived democracy, international understanding, disarmament
and collective security as the most important ways to promote international peace and
security. After the Second World War, great progress in security studies was witnessed.
Numerous courses on international politics were introduced to universities and
academic institutions, and research in this field began to recognise the role of military
instruments of statecraft in ensuring security, which shaped a common understanding on
conventional security studies. In the following decade, from the year 1955 to the year
1965, which was called the golden period, the agenda of security studies was dominated
by how to use a particular set of weapons, such as nuclear weaponry and related
concerns on arms control. The renewal of Cold War tension since the Afghanistan War in
the late 1970s affected both the level of activity and the substantive focus of research on
security, which paid attention to nuclear strategies, East-West relations, and to the
security problems of the United States and Western Europe. Since then, the primary goal
of national security was clearly defined in military terms, and how to use particular
military instruments of statecraft became the central concern of security expertise. This
differed from earlier research, which just considered what security was, and how
19
important it was relative to other goals. Krause and Williams (1996) concluded that
politicians believed that security, in essence, should focus on ‘safeguarding the core
value of a state from external military threats, principally through the use of force, or the
threat to use force’ (Krause andWilliams, 1996: 230).
However, traditional security studies, defined as the phenomenon ofwar or the nature of
military force, have been challenged by gradual changes in the global situation.
Remarkably, international economic relations following the post-war economic recovery
imply interdependence among states and increase the integration of security and
economics. National security is not confined to the security of political or military
interests, and the international struggle for economic interests should be included. The
breakup of the Soviet bloc and the subsequent end of the Cold War in the 1990s further
paved the way for economic liberalisation, enlarging the sphere of international trade
exchange and expanding the membership of the institutions that promote the exchange.
When states over the world liberalise their economies andwork to attract investment and
increase exports, economic issues appear to gain precedence over military concerns,
especially in the current background of economic globalisation where the integration of
financial markets and the increasing dispersion of production have deepened the
interdependence and interpenetration of national sectors. Through an international
system of production, trade and finance structures, the international economy itself
becomes a significant political issue when it rises in importance as a factor in the wealth
of states.
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Taking the emergence of non-military threats, such as illegal immigration, drug-
trafficking and international criminals into consideration, we may conclude that the
discipline of International Relations has turned out to be inadequate in dealing with the
new global changes, which suggests the need for another analogous, broadening
definition of national security. In 1998, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde published a very
influential book: ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’. According to this
framework, security should be a multi-faceted notion in five sectors: military, politics,
economics, society, and environment. In the new context of national security, the nexus
between economics and security is addressed. Although military force has not vanished
as a major element of national security, it has declined in importance relative to other
non-conventional issues like economic security. National wealth could be generated not
only by production and exchange through the promotion of international trade, but also
by predation through seizing the resources and economies of other nations. From this
perspective, the effects of economics on security are embodied in access to resources,
capital andmarkets necessary to keep a sustainable development and state power.
Indeed, the new security concept is not just about tacking the word ’security’ onto
economic, environmental and societal, but about dissolving the unhelpful boundary
between Security Studies and International Political Economy. Much of the agenda that
emerges from the new framework, especially the interaction between economics and
security, lies in the realm of International Political Economy, not least because of the
21
propensity of liberal economics to spill security issues over into other sectors. For this
reason, the neglect of economics-security linkages partly results from the disintegration
of the boundary between International Political Economy and International Relations
studies. In the post-Second World War period, the rapid emergence of the Cold War led
to the most pressing international concerns being placed on the security sector. The
questions of war and peace became truly high politics in the minds of many policy
makers and IR specialists. Plus, post-war international economic relations were relatively
stable under US leadership so that scholars viewed economic matters as low politics.
Realists, who held prominence in International Relations, developed their theories by
drawing mainly on politics instead of economics, and they focused considerably on
security rather than on economic issues.
However, the incapability of the discipline of International Relations to deal with the
changing global situation resulted in International Political Economy emerging as a
research program that would offer explanation for these variables. The core issue in the
study of International Political Economy is seen as the politics of international economic
exchange. In Gilpin’s view, the central issues of International Political Economy are the
impact of the world market economy on the relations of states and the ways in which
states seek to influence market forces for their own advantage (Gilpin, 1996: 22). It
appears that states not only have a strong incentive to take actions that safeguard their
own economic values and interests, but also attempt to manipulate market forces to
increase their political power and influence over one another.
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ii. The role of economic statecraft in the pursuit of secur ity
In current security studies, relational dynamics, such as security dilemmas, power
balances, and security regimes, have been stressed; but little concern has been paid to the
implications of economic statecraft on national security. Indeed, there is little doubt that
military force plays a key role in protecting national integrity and furthering national
interests in a world which is heavily armed, but the possibility of other less-threatening
routes should be considered, as the destructiveness of military force has been greatly
developed and become so dangerous. In the current global climate where economies are
closely linked to one another, economic interdependence offers a new type of soft
solution instead of hard force. As Keohane & Nye (1989) note in their text ‘Power and
Interdependence’, ‘asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power…a less
dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant political resource’ (Cohn, 2005:
97, cited from Keohane & Nye, 1989: 24-27). Economic statecraft has been one area of
foreign policy where governments can practise such asymmetrical interdependence.
Both Baldwin’s ‘Economic Statecraft’, and Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot’ s ‘Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered’ are fundamental books for the analysis of the impressive
employment of economic statecraft. According to Baldwin (1985), statecraft involves the
application and interplay of multiple instruments, including military, economic, and
diplomatic capacities, to achieve the multiple objectives of states, such as national
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security, economic prosperity and political influence. Economic statecraft, which
includes economic sanctions and incentives, refers to influence attempts relying
primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of
money (Baldwin, 1985: 13-14, 30). Sanctions, viewed as the deliberate government-
inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal of trade or financial relations, by limiting
exports, imports or financial movements, have been applied in many scenarios with the
purpose of forcing the target country to submit to the sanction sender’s objectives.
Lindsay (1986) further investigates that policy-makers might have one or more of five
aims when enacting sanctions: compliance, deterrence, subversion, and international or
domestic symbolism (Lindsay, 1986: 153). Also, economic incentives refer to the
provision, denial, promise and threat of goods and services in an attempt to influence the
attitudes and behaviour of another actor (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990: 2; Crumm,
1995: 313, cited fromBaldwin, 1985).
It appears that both sanctions and incentives are not treated simply as an economic
policy, but economic leverages for political ends or other national objectives. In ‘The
Changing Relationship Between Economics and National Security’, Friedberg (1991)
argues that economic statecraft could play a central role in situations where relatively
weak states seek to use their control over scarce resources to influence the policies of the
comparatively strong andwealthy, where strong states use trade and financial assistance
to shape the political preferences of the weak, and where strong countries could begin
with increasing frequency to use economic instruments against one another (Friedberg,
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1991: 272). In comparison to incentives, trade sanctions are more suitable to the countries
that depend highly on imports or exports; financial controls are targeted to certain
countries or specific groups, which rely heavily on loans or credits from the international
capital markets to maintain economic development; economic engagement may be used
to increase political leverage by maximising economic linkage with trade partners; and
foreign assistance is mostly granted to potential political allies with the promise of future
cooperation.
iii. China’s International Political Economy
As International Political Economy studies the politics of international economic
activities, most of the research objectives of International Political Economy focus on the
industrialised regions of the world, wheremost of the economic activity occurs. However,
the states of the developing world―also called the Global South―should have received
more attention due to their impressive economic growth and their increasing economic
exchanges and functions, in relation to the industrialised economies, but also within
themselves, in the post-Cold War era. It is reported that South-South trade more than
tripled between 1996 and 2006, and the trade exchange within the South shows two
significances: it is dominated by developing Asia anddriven by the large and expanding
economies of China and India, and the export of natural resources is flowing from
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developing Africa to the developing Asian regions, notably China.1 It appears that China
has become an important actor for the organisation and interaction of South-South
economic exchange.
Therefore, the thesis will shift its focus on the international political economy of China’s
external relations away from the industrialised economies and onto that of China’s
Southern counterparts. It will examine this shift of orientation within the understanding
of contemporary International Political Economy, which considers the interaction of both
state and market actors; and contemporary security studies, which examine the role of
economic factors in shaping security choices in the specific case of China.
1.2.2 Research questions
The three aspects of background research lead to three research questions:
Question 1: how should we understand China’s thinking on security in its contemporary
stage; andwhat role does economic security play in China’s national security thinking?
Question 2: what is distinctive about the Chinese model of economic statecraft?
1 The Asianmarket now receives more than a quarter of Africa’s exported ores and minerals,
and 20% of its exported fuel. In 2004, China alone took around 40 percent of total African
exports, mainly petroleum and raw materials like ores and metals, and agricultural raw
materials.
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Question 3: how does China merge its economic statecraft and security objectives in
practice and how do these objectives vary by region when comparing its differing
approach in diplomacy towards Africa and Southeast Asia?
1.2.3 Hypotheses
Hypothesis I: for a growing economy like China, economic development is always the
primary concern of government work, as Deng Xiaoping and his successors consistently
advocated. The central position of economic development affects China’s security
thinking andmakes China pursue national security by means of economic security at the
contemporary stage.
Hypothesis II: for a new rising international player like China pursuing a peaceful rise
policy, which never favours a military approach in seeking its security interests, security
objectives and economic diplomacy can never be separated, though the means of
economic diplomacy will vary greatly from region to region.
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1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 Case studies
In social science, there are five major types of research design, namely experimental
design, cross-sectional design, longitudinal design, case study design and comparative
design. Case studies are an extremely popular form of research design and are widely
used in research that requires hypothesis testing by generating data through the process
of case analysis which then leads to wider generalisations. A case study design can be
based on single or multiple cases. Carefully selected multiple cases may provide a more
robust test of a theory and can specify the conditions under which hypotheses and
theories may ormay not be held.
As the thesis will explore the international political economy of China’s external relations
with its Southern counterparts by studying the role of economic statecraft in security
interests and contrasting the application in different scenarios, the approach of multiple
case studies will be adopted and the thesis will consider ASEAN and Africa as two
research objectives.
The selection of Sino-African and Sino-ASEAN relations as case studies is justified for the
following reasons. Firstly, in the current global climate, it is hardly conceivable that
China would form a reliable allied-relationship with the West, since the fundamental
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conflict between them is beyond ideological divergence, and increasingly lies in the
struggle over resources. Following China’s rapid expansion, it is unavoidable that it will
take part in the struggle for global distribution of resources in order to feed domestic
demands. In the present international order, the developed states, which account for one-
quarter of the world population, consume three-quarters of global resources. If China,
the unit accounting for one-fifth of the world population, wants to become a middle-
income state (4,000-5,000 USD income per year per person), as their national target is set,
they must engage in the scramble for control of resources, meaning a shrinking share for
the West. The struggle will continue unless the Chinese economy shifts its reliance onto
renewable resources, and away from traditional energy and other natural resources.
Taking note of the widespread accusation of Chinese investments in Africa, one knows
how the West could not tolerate a Chinese challenge on resources. As a counterstrategy,
strengthening unity and cooperation with other Southern nations, including ASEAN,
Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Caribbean states, is and will be a steadfast
standpoint of China's foreign policy, especially with the former three regions are much
notable.2
Secondly, China’s national security thinking is one of the research focuses of this thesis.
2 According to the data from CRS Report 2009, of the loans, infrastructure projects and other
aid provided by China between 2002 and 2007, 44% was allocated to Africa, 36% to Latin
America, and 20% to Southeast Asia (Lum, Fischer, Gomez-Granger & Leland, 2009: 9).
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From a national security perspective, China has the territorial disputes with Japan in East
Asia, with certain ASEAN states in Southeast Asia, and with India in South Asia; the US
military influence circles a great part of China, such as the military bases in China’s East
side—Japan and South Korea, forcing exercises with the countries along China’s coastline,
including the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and to a lesser extent
Vietnam, as well as the US military cooperation on anti-terror with India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan to China’s South. If China desired to become a global player in the future, it
would have to begin by building a safe regional foundation. Moreover, before China is
able to successfully open alternative channels from Pakistani ports, more than 80 percent
of Chinese cargo has to be shipped through the Indian Ocean, across the Malacca Strait,
along the South China Sea to Chinese coastal cities. The disputes on the South China Sea
with some ASEAN states make the route’s security uncertain. Especially since 2008 the
involved ASEAN states have intensified their actions on the South China Sea, and the US
navy confrontations with the Chinese in the disputed water have occurred more
frequently, the already tense situation has been exacerbated. From this perspective, the
significance of the neighbouring states, especially theASEAN states, for Chinese regional
security, is prominent in comparison to other regions.
Also, the economic security of the new security theory refers to access to resources,
capital and markets necessary to keep a sustainable development and state power. In the
case of China, its global hunt for energy is a wide-known phenomenon, and Chinese
economic security is mainly concerned with maintaining a sustainable energy supply.
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The Middle East area so far is the biggest energy supplier for China, followed by Africa,
which supplied more than one third of total oil imports in 2006, increasing from less than
10 percent in the 1990s. Considering the unstable situation in the Middle East and rising
investment in the African energy sector, the supplies from Africa are expected to increase
in the coming years. Angola replaced Saudi Arabia to be the top oil exporter to China in
2006. Taking into consideration that Africa also contributes to the Chinese economy in
supplying other natural resources such as ores, slag, ash and wood and so on, it becomes
clear that Africa is of greater importance to China’s economic security than other trade
areas.
Thirdly, as the thesis studies the strategy of economic statecraft in terms of China’s
security interests, engagements with Africa andASEANare typical examples that the role
of economic diplomacy plays in national security. There are a number of different
motives behind this cooperation: the political intention of shaping a multi-polar system,
the security consideration of creating a safe environment for development, and the
economic motive of building a modernised country. These multiple objectives are
pursued under the establishment of such mechanisms as the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement respectively. The differences
lie in the varied approach of economic diplomacy and the primary driver behind these
engagements. In the African case, the widespread use of foreign aid indicates an aid-for-
economic security approach, whereas in the ASEAN scenario, the regional free trade
agreement connects the Chinese with ASEAN economies, demonstrating a trade-for-
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regional security strategy.
1.3.2 Research Methods
There are numerous approaches to collecting sources, such as using documents and other
secondary sources by means of library and internet searches, conducting interviews,
surveys and questionnaires, quantitative analysis through statistics, and so on. The
selection of research methods is determined by the study itself. Since the nature of this
research is from theoretical to empirical, the method adopted also varies, including the
use of documentary,questionnaire, and basic statistical data.
i. Documentary
Documentary material constitutes a vast daunting resource in political science, which
may provide an account of previous research and form frameworks within which the
research can be placed. In order to build a comprehensive literature review of economic
statecraft as well as national security, I will be employing documentary data as the main
method of research in the theoretical framework of the thesis. The procedure of
documentary research is composed of searching for related literature from sources
including influential books, journals, magazines, newspapers, and websites of both
Western and Chinese origin, not only accumulating the materials, but also integrating
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different arguments systematically and developing new ideas about the theories in a
creative andpractical way.
In particular, Barry Buzan, Ole Waver & Japp de Wilde’s ‘Security: A New Framework
for Analysis’ (1998) and Barry Buzan’s ‘People, States and Fear: An Agenda for
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era’ (1991) are two fundamental
books that will be used to form the framework of security studies, while David Baldwin’s
‘Economic Statecraft’ (1985) and ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current
Policy’ by Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. & Elliott K. A (1990) contribute significantly to that of
economic statecraft.
For the Chinese perspective, governmental and academic documents provide a limited
source of information on China’s foreign policy. In China the highest official body, the
Political Bureau, has the authority to make a final ratification on foreign policies. In
general, researchers have a limited way to assess primary sources. An example of this
would be what Beijing’s standpoint on foreign policy is and how these policies come to
the table. In this scenario, the most important source of empirical data on China has to
come from official documentary materials such as the policy papers released by the
Beijing government, the top leaders ’ speeches, and the information unveiled in the party-
controlled media such as the People’s Daily and Xinhua News. In this thesis, policy
papers such as China’s Africa Policy, some quotations from the state leaders’ speeches
such as that of President Hu and Primer Wen in international settings, and the column
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released in the state media are adopted as secondary sources to analyse China’s foreign
policy towards its Southern counterparts, especially Africa and ASEAN.
There is very little significant Chinese literature to offer any insight into China’s security
policy. Security related subject is a less developed area of China Studies, and most of the
current literature on this subject either describes the historic diplomatic evolution or
repeatedly addresses the importance and wider application of the new security theory in
comparison to traditional security theory. But none of them deeply or precisely defines
the situation andpriority of the Chinese security agenda at the contemporary stage. After
the former President, Jiang Zemin, initiated the new approach to security, a policy
paper—China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept—is the only reliable
secondary source concerning China’s security approach from a government perspective.
ii. Questionnaire
The questionnaire is a critical methodological tool in social research and it is widely used
to collect factual data. A well-designed questionnaire is highly structured to allow the
information to be collected from a number of people and for data to be analysed
systematically. When the second hypothesis on the China-ASEAN case is examined,
which is more complicated than China-Africa relations due to historical reasons and
territorial disputes, standpoints from other scholars as well as officials are rather useful
for conducting the research. There are several ways of conducting a questionnaire. It can
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be done in a face-to-face interview, over the telephone or by mail. Considering the
economic costs and efficiency, the method of self-administered questionnaire through e-
mail is adopted and the second hypothesis (Hypothesis II) is translated into a series of
questions.
The questionnaire, with a total of 18 questions, is clearly set out with a logical sequence
going from general to particular. Most of the questions are closed-ended with a list of at
least four or five choices. The final question is open-ended as it aims to explore the
respondent’s personal view on China-ASEAN relations. The crucial questions associated
directly with the thesis such as the motivations behind the China-ASEAN engagements,
the biggest obstacle for the cooperation, the role of the US in this area, the nature of the
Chinese andASEAN economies, and the prosperity of bilateral relations, are raised later.
The people interviewed satisfy two requirements: they are knowledgeable about China’s
security concerns or China-ASEAN relations, and they represent different perspectives
from Chinese, ASEAN, and Western standpoints. The groups targeted are those
reputable scholars and diplomats working in the field of China-ASEAN relations,
however a low response rate is the biggest problem. The reasons for this are varied:
researchers are too busy to concern themselves with questionnaires from people
unknown; Chinese scholars do not traditionally reply to questionnaires and it is
impossible to access diplomatic staff without having a personal acquaintance. Therefore,
out of a total of 30 questionnaires, including 10 to Chinese military officials distributed,
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only 16 were returned. The final respondents were Chen Shaofeng from the East Asian
Institute, National University of Singapore, Termsak Chalermpalanupap from ASEAN
Secretariats, Jorn Dosch from Leeds University, John Weiss from the University of
Bradford, John Ravenhill from Austrian National University, Liu Xuecheng from the
China Institution of International Studies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC,
and ten officials from the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.3
Since the questionnaires were used for research purposes and not for statistical analysis,
the resulting data still delivers some interesting results which have been applied to this
thesis. None of the respondents considers economic competitiveness between the two
economies as an obstacle to bilateral relations. This to some extent suggests that the
intention behind China-ASEAN cooperation is beyond economic. Only four out of
sixteen thinks China’s military modernisation is motivated by the South China Sea
disputes, whereas most think the disputes in the South China Sea are the biggest threat to
China-ASEAN relations. This thesis also recognises the South China Sea issue as a
3 The PLA is organised in accordance with a system whereby the General Political
Department, General Logistics Department, the General Staff Department and General
Armament Department are placed under the leadership of the Central Military Commission.
The General Staff Department leads the building-up of the nation’s armed forces, and directs
the military operations.
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challenge to the prosperity of bilateral relations, but it defines the US intervention, the
role of Japan, and economic competitiveness of the two unities as the primary obstacles.
Also, none of the respondents suggests that ASEAN should take an isolationist or
encirclement strategy to deal with China’s rapid growth, while ten Chinese military
officials consistently consider China to be a reliable and capable state to lend support
when ASEAN is in crisis. The thesis argues that ASEAN is taking dual strategies: trading
with China while engaging militarily with external powers, while China sees itself as a
trustworthy neighbour and expects to exclude the interference of external powers by
economically allying itself with ASEAN. Furthermore, the comments from Termsak
Chalermpalanupap, the ASEAN secretary, are particularly interesting. His standpoint
somewhat represents ASEAN mainstream policy on current China-ASEAN cooperation
and indicates ASEAN’s willingness to strengthen its coordination with China for mutual
benefit, since the two sides share similar concerns over economic development.
iii. Basic statistical data
Descriptive statistics are a range of basic statistical tools for describing data, and offer a
powerful and clear way of measuring, analysing and presenting data. In the thesis some
statistics and factual data in the form of tables are presented to assist the arguments,
especially in the two case studies.
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The section on China-Africa provides a number of tables which introduce data on world
oil reserves and production by region to indicate the strategic importance of Africa in the
world energy market. Besides the data on trade, China’s regional resources of imported
crude oil and the exported volume of raw material from Africa to China are presented to
address the significance of the African continent in terms of China’s economic security,
while the FDI and foreign aid outflow from China to the African countries are listed to
highlight China’s foreign aid strategy.
In the section on China-ASEAN relations, statistical figures and dynamics, including
trade volume and value, are employed to measure the extent and improvement of
bilateral economic development. The top export markets of China and ASEAN are listed
to indicate the similar export destinations. Similarly, the trade volumes of ASEAN with
the US, Japan and China, and FDI net inflow to ASEAN are presented to show the
unchallenged US economic influence in the area.
1.4 Research structure
The thesis is presented in three parts: theories of national security and economic
statecraft in Part I, China’s concept of national security and China’s model of economic
statecraft in Part II, and the application of the interaction between China’s security
concept and its diplomatic tools of economic statecraft employed in its engagements with
Africa and ASEAN respectively, in Part III. Also, the whole thesis is structured by the
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three research questions and two hypotheses, by raising hypotheses in the first part and
testing them in the second and third parts.
Part I is a literature review. Chapter Two presents the study of international security,
which emerged at the end of World War Two and which had not been given a precise
definition. Despite the lack of conceptual analysis, security studies have still evolved
from conventional security to take in the new security theory. The former only addresses
the employment of military force to safeguard national integrity, whereas the latter
shows the involvement of multiple factors. These include non-conventional issues such
as economy in addition to traditional military concerns, as a result of the increasing
economic interdependence and the emergence of non-military threats. This leads to the
first hypothesis: for a growing economy like China, the core of economic development
may affect China’s security theory and make China focus on economic security at the
contemporary stage.
Chapter Three introduces the specific means of economic diplomacy through economic
statecraft. Based on Baldwin’s definition that economic statecraft may be considered as a
combination of economic incentives and economic sanctions, Chapter Three further
specifies that economic incentives are primarily composed of foreign aid, economic
engagement and free trade agreements, while economic sanctions includes both
traditional sanctions, such as embargo, boycott and financial controls, and smart
sanctions, including transportation and communication control, and humanitarian
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exemptions. Furthermore, extensive literature not only reveals the limited role of
economic sanctions in achieving initial objectives, but also suggests the preference of
economic incentives or the mix of sanctions with incentives. This chapter results in the
second hypothesis: for an emerging international actor like China, which claims to adopt
the strategy of peaceful rising, it may favour the approach of economic diplomacy rather
than military means, to support and advance national security interests, but the specific
approach may vary by region.
Part II traces the theories of security and economic statecraft in China’s scenario. Chapter
Four (China’s National Security Studies) aims to testify Hypothesis I by analysing the
specific Chinese security situation. The rise of multiple factors has not undercut the
significance of military security, as the territorial integration with Taiwan, the East China
and the South China Sea, the internal chaos in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the US
encirclement in the Asia-Pacific area require a robust military force. At the same time,
economic security, energy security in particular, shows its increasing importance since
the sustainability of economic development is directly associated with China’s political
security, which is vital for the continuous ruling of the Communist Party. Furthermore,
China’s concept of security stresses the means of cooperation and the end of mutual
benefits. The arguments verify Hypothesis I, but notably, military security has not been
undermined.
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Chapter Five explores the Chinese model of economic statecraft and its intertwined
relations with China’s security concept, by taking a four-stage chronology: from 1949-
1978, from 1978-1989, from 1989-2001, and from 2001 until now. This considers the years
1978, 1989 and 2001 as turning points in Chinese modern diplomatic history, referring to
the open policy of 1978, the Tiananmen incident of 1989, and the WTO membership of
2001 respectively. Each stage corresponds to a different focus of the Chinese security
agenda, but embodies the consistent policy of economic statecraft. The diplomatic efforts
experienced the protection of national independence in the earliest period, the provision
of conditions for economic development in the 1980s, the breakthrough of Western
political isolation in the 1990s, and the securing of regional and energy security
nowadays. Correspondingly, prioritising the security agenda has evolved from the
military security of the past towards the regional and economic security of nowadays. In
spite of the change in priority at every stage, economic statecraft always works as a
complementary foreign policy to assist the achievement of national strategy. This, in
principle, proves that China prefers the employment of economic diplomacy to realise its
national interests.
Part III further tests Hypothesis II by analysing the interaction between China’s concept
of security and China’s use of economic statecraft on its empirical external relations with
Africa and ASEAN. In Chapter Six, three impressive policy shifts in China-Africa
diplomatic relations are defined: the ‘Eight Principles’ on Zhou Enlai’s Africa Tour in
1963, ‘Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982 and ‘a New Strategic
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Partnership’ in 2006. These shifts reveal at least three major features of China’s foreign
policy towards Africa: the mode of their engagement has moved away from
unconditional one-way economic assistance towards pragmatic transaction based on
mutual benefits; in the Chinese sense, mutual benefits do not just refer to political mutual
support or economic mutual prosperity, but to the mutual strategic interests achieved
through multidimensional cooperation; and the cooperation on multiple sectors is
mainly driven by the employment of positive incentives, foreign aid in particular.
The study further argues that the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation represents the achievement of China’s strategic objectives through the
promotion of bilateral all-round engagement. The focus on Africa today is not only
driven by oil and other resource needs, but also the strategic importance of the African
continent. This lies in three considerations, with commercial factors and diplomatic
issues standing alongside the primary resource imperative. Furthermore, in
confrontation with US interest in African resources and the potential economic shocks
that China presents to the less-developed African economies, the Beijing government
ought to expand the coverage of its continuous strategy of economic incentives to push
forward their energy interests with a win-win consequence. The incentive strategy not
only serves for the success of bilateral economic transaction at the current stage, but also
forms a preferable foundation for their long-term strategic cooperation.
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In the ASEAN case, the most impressive engagements between China and ASEAN are
considered to be the proposals of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the
Great-Mekong Program. Chapter Seven argues that economic statecraft of the free trade
agreement shoulders three objectives: to promote bilateral economic prosperity, to
undermine the conflict on the territorial struggle over the South China Sea with some
maritime ASEAN states, and to open a strategic land corridor through the continental
ASEAN members for cargo transportation. Similarly, the study defines three major
factors that might hamper the smooth cooperation of the two sides: the US strategic
interests in this area, including the control over the Malacca Strait and restriction on the
rising influence of China; the role of Japan in Southeast Asia; and the nature of
competitiveness of the two economies. Confronted with these challenges, Beijing
attempts to ease regional anxieties about China’s increasing prominence and counter US
ambition towards the Southeast Asian states. The strategy of free trade agreement is
expected to motivate the ASEAN states to intensify China-ASEAN bilateral interaction
for mutual economic benefits and to reduce the reliance of ASEAN on the US, which in
turn ensures China’s regional stability. From these perspectives, these arguments in the
two cases entirely verify Hypothesis II that China has been using economic diplomacy in
ways that advance its economic security in the Africa case and support regional security
in theASEAN case, though the specific means of economic diplomacy varies: foreign aid
in Africa whereas trade agreements with ASEAN.
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Chapter Eight will make a brief contrast of the two studies. The scenarios of ASEAN and
Africa appear to differ from other counterparts of China, on the one hand, because the
two destinations mark the target audience for China’s South-South ambitions; on the
other hand, because in a significant way they may effectively prove that Chinese
economic statecraft has come into play for security objectives in the absence of an explicit
approach to national security. The difference lies in that the strategy of foreign aid is
visible in various cooperative fields on the China-Africa framework, while the free trade
agreement is an example of China-ASEAN engagement.
Chapter Nine will summarise the whole thesis in the first section, and in the second
section the findings for the three research questions will be systematised. At the end,
recommendations to further researches on China’s economic diplomacy towards Africa
and ASEAN will be made: the aid policy towards Africa needs to be improved and the
free trade agreement with ASEAN may not be effective in solving the disputes on the
South China Sea.
1.5 Research contribution
This thesis aims to make a contribution to Chinese International Political Economy and
differs from earlier work in three clear ways. Firstly, in Chinese literature, both the
studies of security theory and economic statecraft are rather new ideas. In the year 1997,
the Chinese government initially called for a new security concept. In 2002, ‘China’s
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Position Paper on the New Security Concept’ was released, and in the policy paper
Beijing decided to work actively to put the new security concept into practice, and the
experience conversely gave evidence to the feasibility of the new security concept. This is
to say, China’s new security theory is still in the experimental stage, and the thesis is
expected to define the priority and significance of China’s new approach to security at
the current time.
Secondly, Wu Baiyi, one of the most influential Chinese experts in the field of national
security, argues that the economic diplomacy of nation-states has two areas of execution:
either using economic leverage to promote political objectives, or mobilising diplomatic
resources to advance trade and commercial objectives. This thesis not only introduces
economic statecraft as the means of economic diplomacy, but also explores its practical
employment in Chinese foreign policy for political and security objectives.
Thirdly, the thesis offers a robust framework to trace the use of economic statecraft in the
service of security interests. In current literature on China-Africa relations, we frequently
see the definition of ‘aid-for-oil’, but neither of them upgrades the strategy as ‘economic
statecraft for national security’. In related literature on the China-ASEAN relations,
scholars refer to the political intention behind the Free Trade Agreement, but most of
them always address the South China Sea issue with the exclusion of the land
transportation corridor through continental ASEAN states. In contrast, the thesis directly
identifies the free trade proposal in service of China’s regional security.
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Part I: Theories of National Security and Theories of Economic Statecraft
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Chapter Two: Theories of National Security
Theories of international security are a relatively new field of study, conceived following
the SecondWorld War. The definitive intellectual history of the field is yet to be written
(Nye & Jones, 1988: 8). In terms of existing security studies, there are two competing
schools. The first set is the novel one, proposed by innovators, which emphasised the
interplay of multi-sectors with regard to security. The old school, espoused by the
traditionalists, instead places focus on military security alone. The debates between the
two schools have reached the consensus that a notion of security which focuses on
military issues alone is inadequate, and the improved ‘new security studies ’ is more
suitable to the changing international circumstances. However, abundant criticism exists
with regard to the fact that little literature attempts to either define the concept of
security or delineate its boundaries.
This chapter does not set out to fill this gap by exploring the precise meaning of security,
but rather to provide a brief review of national security theory—by comparing the
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traditional military-security view with the new multi-sector-security perspective.
Traditional security theory is an ambiguous concept, which only focuses on military
security. The new theory has not made any breakthrough in conceptual reform, but it
offers a broader theoretical framework, which suggests that threats may derive from
various sources, including economy, environment, culture and so on, as a result of the
increasing economic interaction between states and the emergence of non-traditional
threats. In addition, as an important component of the new security framework,
economic security will be clarified independently. Based on this theoretical framework,
the first hypothesis will be presented at the end of this Chapter.
2.1 Conventional security studies
Following the Second World War, one of the most striking developments in social
science has been the emergence of Security Studies. The impetus for the emergence was
primarily contributed to two factors in the international environment: the urgent
atmosphere generated by the Cold War and the emergence of new technologies of war,
which required new conflict resolution methods (Bock & Berkowitz, 1966: 122). The
establishment of the National Security Council under the National Security Act of 1947 in
the US marked the beginning of government concern with this new subject in social
science. Since governmental organisations alone were not capable of dealing with all
aspects of national security, the facilities of academia were targeted onto this discipline:
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universities began to offer security programs and scholarly work on national security
issues grew rapidly.
According to the literature on this topic, Walter (1943) noted that security referred to
some degree of protection of values previously acquired: ‘a nation has security when it
does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoidwar and is able, if challenged, to
maintain them by war’ (Walter, 1943: 51). Therefore, Walter suggested that security
rested on the ability of a nation to respond to an attack. Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988)
identified the subjects that formed the central focus of security studies and listed the
general issues, such as the causes of wars and alliances, policy-oriented research on
military issues, and other threats confronting particular countries (Nye & Lynn-Jones,
1988: 6). In Nye’s opinion, the core of security studies lay with the notions of threat, use,
and control of military force. In Buzan’s view, the study of security was perceived as ‘the
pursuit of freedom from threats and the ability of states and societies to maintain their
independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they
see as hostile’ (Buzan, 1991a: 432). Similarly, Krause and Williams (1996) concluded that
politicians believed that security, in essence, should focus on ‘safeguarding the core
value of a state from external military threats, principally through the use of force, or the
threat to use force’ (Krause and Williams, 1996: 230). Romm (1993) summarised various
types of organisations’ understanding of security in his book ‘Defining National Security’.
In general, these institutions perceived security as the ability of a nation to protect its
internal values from external threats (Romm, 1993: 5).
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These studies suggested that the security theories were indeed about the phenomenon of
war. The focus on the use of military force was largely shaped by the international
security situation during the period spanning the end of World War II to the end of the
Cold War. International security was dominated by the militarised and polarised
confrontation between America and the Soviet Union. Not only did the hostilities within
these two core states divide the world into the Western camp and the Soviet bloc, they
also had the effect of transmitting the intense rivalry into the periphery by way of arms
transfers. The likelihood of war was high, so that both political and military
considerations dominated the security agenda (Kirshner, 1998: 64). Prior to 1955, studies
in the field mainly involved military concerns. In the decade from 1955 to 1965, which is
known as the ‘golden age’ of security research, the central question continued to concern
various military aspects, such as nuclear weaponry, arms control, security dilemmas, and
the security strategy of the East and West (Walt, 1991: 213-214).
In other words, security is an important andpolitically powerful concept in international
relations but study of its meaning received far less attention than it deserved. Evidence of
neglect for security as a notion in International Relation studies is found in the limited
nature of the literature qualified as conceptual analysis, with most scholars failing to
provide a precise definition in their surveys. Wolfers Arnold, whose research is regarded
as the best-known conceptual piece on national security, argues that national security
may not have a precise meaning at all.
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For these reasons it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national
security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, though closer analysis
will show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion
than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford (Wolfers, 1952: 483).
In 1973 Klaus Knorr began a survey of the field by stating his intention to
deliberately bypass the semantic anddefinitional problems generated by the term
‘national security’. In 1975, Richard Smoke observed that the field had paid quite
inadequate attention to the range of meanings of security (Baldwin, 1997: 8).
Although Buzan makes substantial progress over decades in this field, he also agrees that
security is an immature notion and lacks conceptual backing. Buzan (1991b) makes a list
of five explanations for the ignorance surrounding the definition of security in his book
‘People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold
War Era‘, including the complexity of the concept, the overlap between the concepts of
security and power under conditions of acute confrontation, the lack of interest in
security by various critics of realism, the fact that security scholars are too busy in
keeping abreast with the latest developments, and that the decision-makers found the
conceptual ambiguity helpful (Buzan, 1991b: 7-12). However, in Baldwin’s interpretation,
none of these explanations are convincing (Baldwin, 1997: 9). Conversely, Baldwin (1997)
submits that the ambiguity lies in the lack of conceptual specification in terms of the
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characterization of security, for example, security for whom, security for which values,
how much security, from what threats, and by what means (Baldwin, 1997: 13-16).
Besides its vague definition, the study of security creates confusion on the basis of how it
has been perceived. Though the majority of scholars are content to call the field ‘security
studies’, other different but related concepts are deployed simultaneously, like national
security studies, international security studies, global security studies, strategic studies,
defence studies, military affairs and security regimes. Strategic studies primarily concern
the choice a state has between alternative strategies for a state. Both defence studies and
military affairs imply that the field is wholly concerned with military dimensions of a
given state, while the idea of security regimes draws attention from the state to the
system level of analysis (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988: 7). Haftendorn (1991) further clarifies
that ‘national security’, ‘international security’ and ‘global security’ refer to different sets
of issues and have their origins in different political contexts. In his theory, global
security refers to a system of world order or security; the course of international security
includes: theory and history of peace, war and conflict; security regimes and institution-
building; impact of technology and information dissemination on international conflict;
defence policies of states and their domestic foundation…nuclear strategy, weapons
systems and disarmament (Haftendorn, 1991: 11, 15-16). It appears that only the term
‘national security studies ’ can make it relatively clear that the research is national in
scope and concerns the field of security in notion.
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2.2 New security studies
It appears that national security in conventional security contexts is associated with
military statecraft alone. If the issue entails use of military force, only then is it seen as a
security issue. Military is therefore the central concern of conventional security studies.
However, a series of papers have been presented, calling for a revised theory on national
security, in two periods in particular: the first took place in the mid-1970s, and the
second began in the late 1980s. Not only is a relatively clear definition of security
required, but also a theoretical breakthrough is needed to ensure the notion’s
compatibility with the changing security system of the post-Cold War world.
Initially, Beaton (1972) pointed out the need for expansion of concepts relating to security
so as to include a range of systemic considerations (Beaton, 1972: 7). Brown released
‘Redefining National Security’ in 1977. Jordan and Taylor (1981) suggested that national
security should have had a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm
(Jordan & Taylor, 1981: 3). Later, the Brandt Commission put forward a new concept of
security. In the 1982 report entitled ‘Common Security’, it was advocated that the
military-based notion of security should be transformed through greater international
cooperation, transparency, disarmament, conversion, and demilitarisation (The Brandt
Proposals: A Report Card). In 1983, Ullman (1983) noted that ‘defining national security
merely inmilitary terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality’ (Ullman, 1983: 123).
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The second stage included the publication of ‘Redefining Security’ by Jessica Tuchman
Matthews (1989), and ‘Defining National Security’ by Joseph Romm (1993). Also, the
United Nations Secretary-General in 1995 called for a conceptual breakthrough,
extending beyond armed security and towards protecting people in their communities
(Rothschild, 1995: 56). These studies reveal that military force has not ceased to be a
major element of national security, but it has declined in importance, relative to issues of
economy, energy, environment, cultural security and so on. In Mathews’ words, ‘global
developments now suggest the need for another analogous, broadening definition of
national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues’ (Mathews,
1989: 162).
McGuire (1990) explains four factors distinguishing current security problems from
conventional ones: the diminishing military dimension of national security, the
increasing socio-economic component, the change in the geographic nexus of risk, and
the insecurity resulting from the competition between East and West (McGuire, 1990: 4).
Taking other related literature into account, there are several triggers listed. First,
America was the first group to study security. For more than four decades, from the end
of the SecondWorld War to the end of the Cold War, the national security strategy of the
United States focused on containing the Soviet Union. However, with the collapse of the
Soviet empire, America needed to search for a new direction, leading to a new debate
over the problems which constituted a threat to national security (Romm, 1993: 1).
Further factors include the fact that the Cold War’s bipolar system was replaced by the
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rise of a multi-polar power structure, and the warming-up in international relations
which gradually reduced the importance of military power over time.
Secondly, military threats are not the only dangers that a state faces, though they are the
most serious ones (Walt, 1991: 213). The emergence of non-traditional security issues
such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and AIDS are a reminder that non-military
issues deserve more attention from decision-makers and scholars. As national economies
are connected more closely than ever before, a series of domestic problems such as
resource shortages, food crises, and income inequality may spread from a single country
onto the international scene. Some threats, such as environmental problems, societal
disorder and internal chaos, used to be domestic issues but are now global threats also.
Thirdly, one feature of the Cold War was that international economic issues were
marginalized as a secondary concern. Setting the rules for the economic system and
achieving the optimal economic transactions were seen as technical issues. But since the
1970s, the birth of OPEC and the occurrence of oil crises, the collapse of the Bretton
Woods monetary system, and the developing countries’ push for a New International
Economic Order, have made it clear that the major issues related to international
economic relations fail to be explained solely by economic factors (Krasner, 1996: 108).
Therefore, the reduced importance of military force, the emergence of non-military
threats and the impact of economic considerations on foreign policy drive the emergence
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of the new security theory. In 1991, Buzan Barry promulgated the ‘New Patterns of
Global Security in the twenty-first Century’ in the Journal of International Affairs. In
1998, he published an influential book with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde: ‘Security: A
New Framework for Analysis.’ According to this new framework, security should be a
multi-faceted notion. Military security involves two-level interplay of the armed
offensive and defensive capabilities of states. ‘Protecting the territorial integrity of the
state is the traditional object of military security, and the two immediate environments
for the state—regional anddomes tic—are again the main concerns in this sector’ (Buzan,
Waever & de Wilde, 1998: 70).
Political security focuses on the organisational stability of states, smooth running of the
government and the ideologies allowing for legitimacy (Buzan, 1991a: 433). Unlike
military security that deals with armed threats, political security focuses on non-military
threats to sovereignty. The purpose of political threats may range from pressuring the
government on a particular policy, to overthrowing the government, fomenting
secessionism, and disputing the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to a
military attack (Buzan,Waever & de Wilde, 1998: 141-142; Buzan, 1991b: 118-119).
Economic security concerns access to resources, capital and markets necessary to
maintain sustainable development and state power. The nexus between economics and
security may be defined through reference to the idiom that war is economics by other
means. National wealth could be generated not only by production and exchange
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through the promotion of international trade, but also predation through seizing the
resources and economies of other nations (Kapstein, 2002: 158, cited from Hirshleifer,
2001: 1).
Considering the fact that economic development is substantially driven by energy supply,
energy security is regarded as a key component of economic security. Energy security is
defined as a ‘condition in which a nation perceives a high probability that it will have
adequate energy suppliers at an affordable price’ (Deese, 1979/1980: 140). According to
Leidy’s research, concerns about energy security stem from three related problems:
concentrated supply in a historically unstable region; the sustained exercise of market
power by key oil exporters; and the continued vulnerability of the economy to episodic
oil supply shocks and price spikes. Firstly, global oil reserves are concentrated in a
volatile region of the world, with 60 percent of reserves in the Persian Gulf region.
Secondly, partly as a consequence of this concentration of low cost reserves, oil-
producing states are able to exercise market power to maintain oil prices above estimated
competitive levels. Third, in the face of short-run supply volatility, most oil consuming
nations have limited scope for adjusting their oil demand or supply, particularly as oil
demand becomes increasingly concentrated in the transportation and manufactory
sectors (Leidy, 2007: 3). Nowadays, a new problem has developed: the last decade has
witnessed a substantial increase in the world’s demand for oil due to the dramatic
economic growth in developing states, China in particular. It is reported that China
imports 3 million barrels of oil per day, which accounts for almost half of its total
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consumption. China’s share of the world oil market is about 8 percent, but its share of
total growth in demand since 2000 has been 30 percent (Yergin, 2006: 2-3). With the
inclusion of significant demands from developing countries, the four major problems
contribute to uncertainty in energy security, and also to concerns over economic security.
Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of
language, culture, association, religious and national identity, as well as customs, within
acceptable conditions for evolution. The distinctive contradiction in the societal sector
nowadays is seen as the clash of civilisations and migration problems, which leads to
conflicts between several hundred ethnic-cultural societies trying to form an integrated
international community (Buzan, 1991a: 433).
The idea of linking environmental issues to national security was suggested by Ken
Conca in the 1950s. He stressed that the threats to a state were mostly from nature, not
from other states (Kuang, 1997: 26). In Buzan ’s theory, on the one hand, there are many
environmental issues thatmay threaten human existence, such as the mass production of
greenhouse gases or chemicals that erode the protective ozone layer. On the other hand,
’environmental issues look set to become a regular feature of centre-periphery dialogues
and tensions. The holistic quality of the planetary environment will provide the centre
with reasons for wanting to intervene in the periphery in the name of environmental
security’ (Buzan, 1991a: 450).
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Mathews (1989) considers the environment issue from the perspective of population
growth. He argues that population growth is the origin of most environmental problems.
It took around 130 years for the world population to grow from onebillion to two billion,
whereas it takes just a decade for it to increase from five billion to six billion. Although
the linkage between population levels and the resource base is complicated, technologies
may determine the impact of population growth, the added population certainly
challenges the government’s ability to provide food, housing, health care and education,
which in turn increases the demands on resources, such as coal and oil (Mathews, 1989:
163-164). His analysis is in accordance with the current global oil crisis, global food crisis,
and global warming phenomenon.
It appears that the new security agenda expands the scope to multiple sectors that cover
almost every aspect of human life. In comparison to traditional national security, non-
traditional security may be summarised in two ways: external military or non-military
menaces to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and internal threats to society and
individuals borne by increasing international interactions. If categorised in specific fields,
this includes security barriers to sustainable development, such as energy issues,
environmental issues, and global warming, internal social issues affecting other countries
and even the entire international community, such as refugee problems, financial crises,
racial conflicts, and other harmful activities of non-governmental organisations in
international society, for instance terrorism and extremism. In addition, Rothschild (1995)
describes the redefined security concept of the 1990s as taking four main forms. It is
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extended from the security of nations downwards to the security of groups and
individuals, from national security upwards to the security of the international system;
horizontally, covering different entities such as individuals, nations, and systems and
different dimensions such as political, economic, societal, military, environmental and
cultural. In other words, it is diffused in all directions, upwards to international
organisations, downwards to local government, and sideways to public opinion and the
abstract forces of nature or of the market (Rothschild, 1995: 55).
However, considering Baldwin’s critique that the ambiguity of the security concept is
due to the lack of definition in its characterisation, including security for whom, for
which, from what threats, by what means, and how much security, the new security
theory still fails to meet these criteria. In Baldwin’s view, ‘‘most such efforts are more
concerned with redefining the policy agenda of nation-states than with the concept of
security itself” (Baldwin, 1997: 5). Economic security, environmental security, military
security, societal security, cultural security and so on are no more than different
dimensions of security, while military power, economic power, civil rights and so on are
just different embodiments of a national power, instead of a breakthrough concept.
2.3 Economic security
In Nesadurai’s definition, economic security may be conceptualised through either a
micro or a macro perspective. Micro economic security centres on the individual as the
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referent of security, converges with the notion of human security, with economic security
defined as the security of a stream of income for individuals as well as access to a level of
consumption for basic human needs. The macro view is directed at securing the integrity
or robustness of the market to generate growth and welfare in society (Nesadurai, 2004:
473).
Indeed, since ancient Athens taxed the empire to raise a fleet against Sparta, there has
always been a connection between wealth and military power and therefore, in the most
simple and direct way, between economics and national security. However, this
relationship did not manifest for a significant time. During the Second World War,
economists made no major contribution to the outpouring of publications on the causes,
conduct, and consequences of war. Later, in the Cold War period, there was little
economic cooperation between the two camps, and the dominant positions of the two
superpowers in the international system meant they had few concerns for the
consequences of economic interactions in preserving their autonomy. The split between
the fields of International Political Economy and international security was actually one
of the more serious problems within the discipline of political science.
The end of the Cold War, however, paved the way for increased political management of
stable economic growth. The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade put efforts
towards trade liberalisation by removing restrictions on cross border activities. The
attempts of liberation developed initially at the regional level, including the Association
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of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), eventually reaching global economic integration. The increased economic
transactions after the reduction in trade tariffs and the gradual removal of capital
controls in developed countries produced a new focus on the impact of the deepening
economic ties on political relations. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1997)
proclaimed in ‘Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition’, international
politics has been characterised by a surge in economic interdependence (Keohane and
Nye, 1977). As a result, questions were raised as to how International Relations studies
may respond to the new phenomenon generated by increasing economic cooperation.
There is plentiful literature on the economics-security relationship.
• In an early book entitled ‘Economic Aspects of Sovereignty’, Ralph Hawtrey
(1952) emphasised the nexus between economic affairs and national security,
characterising these as essential and reciprocal (Hawtrey, 1952).
• Walt (1991) argued that the dimensions of economics and security include the
connection between military spending and economic performance, the strategic
importance of economic resources and their role as potential sources of conflicts,
and the political influence of the military-industrial complex (Walt, 1991: 227).
• Charles Hitch provides an overview of topics that economists may work on
within the security field. Topics include: the analysis and measurement of
economic strength for war, the implications of large defence budgets in times of
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peace, the appropriate size of the defence budget, efficiency in using and
managing defence resources, economic warfare and foreign economic policy etc.
(Kapstein, 2002: 162-163).
• Kirshner (1998) lists the classical areas where the link between economics and
security studies is recognised, such as the political economy of power, the
economic causes of war, and the role of national budget constraints on the
construction and execution of grand strategy (Kirshner, 1998: 66).
• Nesadurai (2004) states that ‘studies of the connections between economic
performance and military spending as well as the linkage between economic
resources scarcity and inter-state conflict are perfectly valid topics for security
studies’ (Nesadurai, 2004: 462).
In summary, the interplay between the two areas can be divided into four areas of study:
economic statecraft used for foreign policy objectives, economic causes of war, economic
interdependence and political conflict, and economics of national defence.
Aspect 1: economic statecraft’s uses for foreign policy objectives
In a world of infrequent military conflict and greater economic interdependence, neither
politics nor political conflicts are going to cease. States still have to face disagreements
and attempt to impose their will on one another. The difference is that, in peacetime,
states tend to influence the political behaviour of one another by using soft instruments,
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and such practices become more common. As Dumas (1990) observed, there is little
doubt that military power retains a role in protecting sovereignty and integrity, but
considering the daunting costs of launching a war, the decision-makers may resort to
other less threatening policies to ensure security (Dumas, 1990: 653). Huntington (1993)
also notes that ‘in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely,
economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or
subordination of states’ (Huntington, 1993: 72). It appears that economic and political
factors are virtually inseparable, and international economic interactions, which have
increased greatly in scope and significance, would be able to influence international
relations through the application of economic leverage in international affairs.
Both David Baldwin’s ’Economic Statecraft’ and Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot’s ‘Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered’ are influential books for analysing the employment of economic
statecraft for political means. According to Baldwin (1985), statecraft involves the
application and interplay of multiple instruments, including military, economic and
diplomatic, to achieve states’ multiple objectives, such as national security, economic
prosperity and political influence (Baldwin, 1985). In ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’,
Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot (1990) focus on the study of economic sanctions in particular,
and suggest that a sender country may inflict expenses on a target country mainly by
limiting exports, imports and financial movement (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot, 1990: 36).
Lindsay (1986) further posits that policy-makers might have one or more of the five aims
he sets out when enacting sanctions: compliance, deterrence, subversion, and
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international or domestic symbolism (Lindsay, 1986: 153). Furthermore, in ‘The Changing
Relationship Between Economics and National Security’, Friedberg (1991) argues that
economic statecraft could play a central role in situations where relatively weak states
seek to exert their control over scarce resources to influence the policies of the
comparatively strong and wealthy, where strong states exploit trade and financial aid to
shape the political preferences of the weak, and where strong countries could
increasingly frequently use economic instruments against one another (Friedberg, 1991:
272).
Given that economic statecraft may act as a political tool, Susan Strangedebates the issue
of who enjoys dominance when using economic leverage. In ‘States and Markets’ (1994),
the state is defined as the embodiment of politics and the market is that of economics.
Their relationship is shaped by the fact that the state profoundly influences the outcome
of market activities by setting the rules that govern economic transactions as well as by
regulating distribution. She finds that there is little doubt that markets can be controlled
by those powers that provide security, as they decide how to produce, who manages
financial flows, and who controls access to knowledge and information. Powerful states
may use their advanced economic resources to expand their influence, and to exploit
their privileges in manipulating markets to punish the small states. In particular, after the
fall of the Soviet Union, the number of small and market-sensitive economies which are
more sensitive and vulnerable to economic coercion increases within the international
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system. This grants the powerful states an opportunity to use their economic strength to
advance their political goals.
Finally, there are at least two weighty sources of evidence to corroborate the argument
that economic statecraft may serve political objectives. Firstly, the two-time Arab oil
embargos in the 1970s act as a means to revive research interests in the interplay of
economic interdependence and international security (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988: 10).
These events result in recognition that control over scarce resources such as oil could
becomes a source of political power. Secondly, being the most powerful state in the
world, the United States is not just responsible for the majority of economic sanctions,
but is also an important donor of foreign aid, in the pursuit of international influence.
According to Radelet (2003), ’Foreign aid first became an important tool of American
national security policy under the Truman administration. The first great foreign aid
program, the Marshall Plan, was aimed at rebuilding Western Europe after World War II,
in part as a bulwark against Soviet expansion’ (Radelet, 2003: 2).
Aspect 2: economic causes of war
Kirshner(1998) puts forward three ways in which economic forces are a source of war:
changes in relative economic growth, internal economic dislocation, and incompatible
national economic strategies (Kirshner, 1998: 67). For example, according to the economic
growth theory, states tend to grow at different rates. The states that grow faster may
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close the gap between the rising power and the position in the international order by
means of waging war. Friedberg (1991) also notes that ‘as some economies expand more
rapidly than others, the distribution of wealth among states begins to shift, and with
these shifts in wealth come, eventually, changes in the distribution of political power.
Such changes are often accompanied by considerable turmoil.’ (Friedberg, 1991: 268).
Furthermore, international economic dislocation and incompatible national economic
strategies suggest that conflict may occur if governments intend to engage in war to
divert attention from their failed domestic economic policy, or to struggle for either
economic opportunity or resources.
Furthermore, Gilpin (1981) argues that the distribution of the available economic surplus
in a world of scarcity may lead to conflict (Gilpin, 1981: 67). Today, one sees states
directly engaged in competition for shares of the world’s wealth and resources, such as
the struggle for energy resources. The US invasion of Iraq may be interpreted as a grab of
oil resources by means of military statecraft.
Aspect 3: economic interdependence and political conflict
Interdependence in world politics refers to, according to Keohane and Nye’s definition, a
particular international relationship that merges when countries are linked by
interactions that can have costly and reciprocal effects (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 9).
Mutual dependence cannot be assumed to exist within the symmetric distribution of
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costs and benefits between the countries. Through sensitivity and vulnerability,
asymmetrical dependence can be expected to complicate bilateral relations (Keohane and
Nye, 1991: 126-127). There are two schools, drawing opposite conclusions in regard to
how economic interdependence influences political relations: one indicates that
asymmetrical interdependence leads to an increase in conflicts amongst partners,
whereas the other insists that interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflicts.
Many scholars are in favour of the latter perception. Haas and Schmitter (1996) clarify
that economic interdependence may result in political cooperation and integration due to
the effect of spill-over (Haas and Schmitter, 1966). Nye (1971) advocates that ‘a functional
web of interdependence can reduce international conflicts by creating a sense of
community, raising its net costs, and producing value changes that promote integrative
solutions to conflicts’ (Gasiorowski, 1986: 26, cited from Nye, 1971: 109-110). Gartzke, Li
& Boehmer (2001) argue that states are less likely to fight if there are costs associated
with using military force, such as the loss of economic interests (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer,
2001: 394). According to their view, the increasing level of interstate cooperation in one
field between states is thought to result in possible linkages in other fields, so that
enhanced bilateral communication may reduce political suspicions and
misunderstandings, thus decreasing the likelihood of international conflicts and
increasing the possibility of coordination in other aspects. Furthermore, if considered at
the level of states, economic growth can be acquired either through trade exchange or by
military exploration. If the resources could be gained throughmarket exchange, there are
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few incentives for a ruling party to meet these needs through territorial expansion and
imperialism.
This theoretical assumption can be corroborated through some empirical evidence.
Mansfield’s study provides strong support that frequent economic flows do inhibit the
outbreak of military disputes among the member countries of a preferential trade bloc
(Mansfield, 2004). Another finding provided by Gasiorowski andPolachek (1982) verifies
the hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between trade and conflict, using US-
Warsaw Pact trade and conflict data (Gasiorowski and Polachek, 1982: 709). Similarly, in
another of Polachek’s papers, he analyses the data on trade and conflicts within 30
countries for the period between 1958 and 1967, and concludes that the desire to reap the
benefits of trade produces greater incentives to retain cooperative relations (Polachek,
1978). Dumas (1990) uses the example of the European Economic Community to argue
that the nations of the community have fought countless wars with one another in past
centuries, but they make no effort to prepare for a war, despite continuous conflicts in
other areas. He concludes that the establishment of a mutual and interdependent
economic community eliminates the possibility ofmilitary conflict (Dumas, 1990: 655).
In comparison, realists and mercantilists believe that asymmetrical dependence may be
used as an economic weapon, since the increasing economic interdependence may serve
as a source of tension among states, rather than as a deterrent to conflict. For example,
Mansfield andPollins (2003) believe that the incentives to resort tomilitary means would
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increase as the states attempt to reduce their economic vulnerability and to minimise
dependence on foreign commerce (Mansfield and Pollins, 2003). Pevehouse (2004)
argues that the probability of potential disputes would increase as the issues between
states expand in scope and complexity with increasing interdependence (Pevehouse,
2004). Keohane (1975) states that interdependence pressurises the international situation
due to the problems arising from increased sensitivities (Keohane, 1975). Barbieri (1996)
concludes that trade increases conflict by referring to a measure of interdependence
based on the salience of trade (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 393, cited from Barbieri:
1996). Knorr (1977) notes that those vulnerabilities borne by economic cooperation might
produce unforeseen problems that threaten national security (Knorr, 1977).
Aspect 4: economics of defence
Deger (1986) argues that the positive correlation is illustrated by the creationof additional
aggregate demand in a society. If the aggregate supply is sufficient relative to the
potential demand, an additional demand accrued by the defence sector may be
complemented by the gap between initial supply and demand. An increase in aggregate
demand that leads to more efficient capacity utilization is meant to stimulate investment
and then increase the growth rate (Deger, 1986). Furthermore, given that a strong
economic base is vital to military power andpolitical influence, in wartime, the size of the
national economy is an important determinant of a state’s ability to sustain military
capability. ‘A state’s military capability rests not only on the supply of key strategic
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materials, but also on possession of an industrial base capable of supporting the armed
forces. For major powers this means having an industrial base capable of manufacturing
a wide spectrum of up-to-date weapons.’ (Buzan, 1991: 126). Hawtrey (1995) also
concludes that ‘the amount of military power that any country can exert is determined by
the numbers and military qualities not of its entire population, but of that portion of the
population which can be equipped and maintained in the field and transported to the
critical points. The limitation is an economic one.’ (Hawtrey,1995: 55). In peacetime, great
powers may transform national economic wealth into defensive power in order to
enhance security, and with strong defensive power and influence, social stability in
general becomes likely, which helps attract investment and, in turn, enhances economic
growth (Mastanduno, 1998: 830).
On the other hand, the negative effects of military expenditure are manifested in the
deteriorating balance of payment accounts and the burden on public sector spending
(Landau, 1993). Specifically, the claim is based upon the reallocation of resources. A
national total saving should be composed of investment anddefence. The resources used
for a defence system are not available for investment, so that increasing the contribution
to the defence sector is proportionate to a decrease in the amount available for
investment, given the fixed amount of total savings. Dumas (1990) notes that the
maintenance and expansion of large military forces may lead to short-term and long-
term losses of economic strength, by diverting scarce resources from contributive to non-
contributive activity (Dumas, 1990: 660). Although in some cases a reduction in the
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defence budget may not definitely result in an equivalent rise in commercial investment,
it could lead to smaller budget deficits, lower interest rates, and increased investment in
education and infrastructure programs (Friedberg, 1991: 267). Also, a decrease of skilled
scientists involved in defence-related research may lead to an expanded supply in the
civilian and commercial sectors, which would promote economic performance more
directly.
2.4 Conclusions and hypothesis
Studies in the field of security have undergone an evolution from traditional security
theory to the new security theory. Traditional definition of security, perceived as the
protection of territory and sovereignty through military power, has been proven
inadequate for explaining the multidimensional phenomenon of the current
international system. Particular flaws lie in the limited analysis of the effects of
economic interdependence between states on international relations and the emergence
of those non-traditional security threats. Thus, since the 1970s and especially after the
end of the Cold War, the non-traditional security theory has become a research focus in
the field of security study. It is estimated that more than one-fourth of US security
research emphasises this field, including studies on illegal immigration and refugees,
financial crises, cross-border criminals, drug trafficking, environment and so on.
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Contrary to the accusation of lacking precise conceptual definitions in traditional security
theory, the expansion of the security framework cannot necessarily fill in the blanks, or
undermine the importance of military security. The non-conventional viewpoint simply
delivers a message that, despite the fact that the military field is where a state is
primarily established, a security study cannot be comprehensive without taking into
account ideas from other major sectors. The new theory considers security as a particular
type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. In other words, the most significant
difference between conventional and new security literature lies in that the latter
includes what is termed ‘statecraft ’, which is reflected in economic, political, societal, and
environmental fields, in addition tomilitary concerns. Among the five sectors, security in
the economic sector is a remarkable component. For a state, economic capability
determines its political influence and military power. In the background of economic
integration, the issue of whether a state is capable of providing a steady increase in
standard of living for the whole community through national economic development
while maintaining independent economic sovereignty, is crucial, especially for
developing countries.
It appears that, since the end of the Cold War, theories concerning national security,
which previously focused on military security, have been expanded in new forms.
Importantly, security interests have been redefined to include not just military security
but others such as economic security. This redefinition of security should be examined in
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particular with regard to a new class of international actors, such as China. This leads to
the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: for a growing economy like China, economic development is always the
primary concern of government work as Deng Xiaoping and his successors consistently
advocated. The central position of economic development affects China’s security
thinking andmakes China pursue national security by means of economic security at the
contemporary stage.
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Chapter Three: Theories of Economic Statecraft
Economic globalisation, defined as the integration of financial markets and the increasing
dispersion of production, is understood to be a source of interdependence and
interpenetration of national sectors. In general, the penetration of a national economy by
an international system of production, trade, and finance structure may produce a range
of political and economic issues, as the international economy itself becomes a significant
political issue when its impact on the wealth of states increases. Therefore, it is expected
that widespread economic interpenetration affects the participating countries both
economically and politically, and the surge in the unprecedented levels of economic
interdependence has directed attention to its impact on interstate relations.
From the perspective of politics, the major impact is on the way that international
relations and related foreign policies are perceived. In addition, economic
interdependence may act as an alternative economic instrument for the policy-makers. In
the early 1970s, Japan attempted to link the renewal of the Japanese-America Treaty to
American market access; in the 1980s, South Korea initiated an effort to engage in
economic cooperation with the Soviet Union as a means to undermine Soviet relations
with North Korea; in the 1990s, the United Nations punished Iraq for its invasion of
Kuwait through the oil-for-food program. Such application must be on the basis of
interdependence and its success depends partly on asymmetric dependence.
This chapter will focus on the use of economic instruments. The particular term
‘statecraft ’ is used to describe the construction of economic strategies for securing
national interests in the international area, as well as the execution of these strategies by
diplomats. This study will review the strategies of economic statecraft at the first section,
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adopting Baldwin’s position that economic statecraft is a combination of economic
sanctions and economic incentives.
The second section considers the discussion on the effects of sanctions in particular.
Abundant research in this field shows the failure of economic sanctions, where they
could not achieve designed objectives while resulting in unaccountable costs, not just on
the target and the sender, but also on third parties, including the neighbours and the
trade partners. Considering the debatable outcomes in sanction cases, a preference for
economic incentives is apparent. The strategy of mixing sanctions with incentives,
widespread foreign assistance, and the increasing establishments of trade agreements is
evidence of the positive effects of economic incentives.
At the end of this Chapter, the second hypothesis will be introduced.
3.1 Economic statecraft
Statecraft is widely considered to be either the organised actions that governments take
to change the external environment in general or the policies and actions of other states,
in particular to achieve the objectives that have been set by policy-makers. In Kaplan’s
understanding, ‘a day when the world is being divided between two great power blocs,
when neutrality is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain, when statecraft is
invading the economic and cultural aspects of social existence, as well as the political and
military areas, when most great problems of domestic life must be reconsidered with
regard to their bearing on the international situation, few, if any, can doubt its
importance’ (Kaplan, 1952: 548). Baldwin’s ‘Economic Statecraft’ (1985) is a fundamental
book that identifies the instruments of statecraft available to policy-makers, including
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propaganda, diplomacy, and economic leverage. Lasswell (1945) adds the policy
instrument of military force.
1. Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate
manipulation of verbal symbols.
2. Diplomacy refers to influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation.
3. Economic statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on resources
that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms ofmoney.
4. Military statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on violence,
weapons, or force. (Balwin, 1985: 13-14).
Both propaganda anddiplomacy are believed to lack credibility or demonstrable efficacy
in international politics, andmilitary action entails high costs, economic statecraft, which
has enjoyed resurgence in popularity since the 1970s, is seen as a ‘middle-ground’
between fighting and simply speaking. Economic statecraft is meant to affect the
international economic environment if the participants have economic interaction at least,
since it is meaningless to impose an economic barrier on a country with which the
sending country has no economic cooperation at all. Scope of leverage varies with the
size of the reliance relationship, the importance of the goods on which one relies, and the
cost of finding replacements elsewhere. Together, these determine the payoff that
economic statecraft reaps (Caporaso, 1978: 22).
Baldwin (1985) further catalogues some specific economic techniques of statecraft. (See
table 3.1). The left column contains examples of positive incentives, also named economic
rewards, while the right column contains the techniques related to negative sanctions.
The remarkable significance of Baldwin’s work in defining economic statecraft lies in the
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integration of positive incentives and negative sanctions in the sphere of economic
interactions, dismissing the misunderstanding that economic statecraft refers to
economic sanctions only.
Table 3.1: Examples of Economic Statecraft
Source: Baldwin, 1985: 41-42
3.1.1 Economic sanctions
Sanctions have been applied frequently as a policy instrument, predominantly in the
form of boycott, embargo, and financial restraints. Scholars have often acknowledged the
importance of these policies since their application and there aremany significant studies
scrutinising the context of economic sanctions.
Firstly, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) provided the fundamental dataset in
‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’. In the book they emphasised the universal use of
negative sanctions and their limited effectiveness. Economic sanctions are viewed as ‘the
deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of ‘‘customary’’
Economic incentives Economic Sanctions
Trade Subsidies to exports and imports
Tariff discrimination(favourable)
Granting licences
Economic engagement
Preferential free agreement
…………….
Embargo
Boycott
Quotas
Tariff discrimination
………………..
Capital Providing aid
Investment guarantees
…………………..
Financial control
Freezing assets
Aid suspension
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trade or financial relations, where ‘‘customary’’ means levels that would probably have
occurred in the absence of sanctions’ (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990: 2).
Secondly, Kaempfer and Lowenbergs’ ‘The Theory of International Economic Sanctions:
A Public Choice Approach’ (1988) indicates sanctions as one of the public options.
Martine (1992) addresses the importance of international cooperation to ensure the
success of economic sanctions in ‘Coercive Cooperation’. In addition, Van Bergeijk’s
‘Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial Policy’ (1994) explores the correlates of
success in cases of sanctions. In addition to these key findings, other scholars, such as
Jing et al, Pape, Cooper, also add plentifully to the sum of the research.
According to these texts, the use of sanctions has a long history, which can be traced back
to 432 B.C. The Empire of the Ancient Greeks punished Megara by forbidding any trade
with them for their support of Corinth during the battle of Sybata. Since World War I,
there have been approximately a hundred sanctions that have been imposed by
individual states or multinational groups (Nunor & Joaoe, 2002: 43). Currently, the use of
sanctions has not only increased in frequency but has also been deployed more
frequently under the aegis of the UN Security Council, which used sanctions 21 times in
the last two decades (Oudraat, 2000: 107) (See Table 3.2). The first utilisation of economic
sanctions by the United Nations stemmed from the unilateral declaration of
independence in South Rhodesia in 1965 (Wallensteen: 2000: 2).
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Table 3.2 UN Security Council Sanctions (1945-2000)
On a state-level, the US has been most active in the use of unilateral sanctions. By 1997,
around 75 countries experienced sanctions imposed by the US (Ernest, 1999:4). Other
Country Type of sanctions Date
South Rhodesia Comprehensive economic sanctions Dec 1966—Dec1979
South Africa Arms embargo Nov 1977—May 1994
Iraq Comprehensive economic sanctions Aug 1990—present
Republic of the Former
Yugoslavia
Arms embargo Sep 1991—Jun 1996
FRY Comprehensive economic sanctions May 1992—Nov 1995
FRY Arms embargo March 1998—present
Bosnian Serbs Comprehensive economic sanctions Sep 1994—Oct 1996
Libya Arms embargo
Partial economic sanctions
Mar 1992—2003
Liberia Arms embargo Nov 1992—present
Haiti Arms embargo
Partial economic sanctions
Jun 1993—Aug 1993
Haiti Arms embargo
Partial economic sanctions
Oct 1993—present
Haiti Comprehensive economic sanctions May 1994—Oct 1994
UNITA (Angola) Arms embargo
Partial economic sanctions
Sep 1994-—present
Country Type of sanctions Date
UNITA (Angola) Targeted financial sanctions Jun 1998—present
Rwanda Arms embargo May 1994—Aug 1995
Sudan Partial economic sanctions
Travel ban and freeze of assets for
human rights violators
May-1996—present
2005-present
Sierra Leone Arms embargo
Partial economic sanctions
Oct 1997—Jun 1998
Sierra Leone Partial economic sanctions Jul 1999—present
Afghanistan Targeted financial sanctions
Partial economic sanctions
Nov 1999—present
Eritrea Arms Embargo May 2000—present
Iran Sanctions on trade in sensitive
nuclear materials and technology Dec 2006— present
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entities, such as the EU, take part occasionally, but America mostly enacts sanctions
alone, illustrated by trade sanctions on Iran, Libya, former Burma, Sudan, and so on.4
However, this trend was reversed during recent decades. From 1990 to 1993, the United
States enacted actual unilateral sanctions, excluding threats thereof, in only one case,
namely against Russia and India over missile technology (Elliott, 1993: 33). Also, the
objectives that the United States pursues have changed. During the Cold War, the use of
sanctions was attempted to weaken the power of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the use
was to support human rights and to monitor weapon proliferation, and the targets of
these policies were most likely to be Third World countries, which are supposed to be
economically weak andpolitically unstable.
Traditional sanctions
In ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’, Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot (1990) refer to a list of
basic forms for sanctions. They suggest that a sender country may inflict costs on a target
country mainly by limiting exports, imports or financial movements (Hufbauer, Schott &
Elliot, 1990: 36).
Embargo on exports is probably the most common technique, which restricts exports
from the sender to the target. The prohibition is usually enforced by export licences and
related measures, such as destination controls. There are some examples, such as the
weapons embargoes against South Africa and China respectively and limiting grain
shipments against the Soviet Union.5 An arms embargo, being a special type of embargo,
is deployed not to inflict economic damage, but to prevent access to weapons. The
4 See Appendix I.
5 See Appendix I.
81
strategy is widely applied against violent groups in the form of a complete ban,
restrictions on military equipment, and limitations on production (Tostensen & Bull, 2002:
383). Sanctions on South Africa were the first time that an arms embargo was enacted
(Wallensteen: 2000: 2).
Embargo on imports may limit certain product shipments from the target to the sender.
This form attempts to decrease the target’s foreign exchange earnings, and in turn
undermine its capability to purchase goods (Bornstein, 1968: 418). The other purpose is
mainly to protect domestic infant industries. In the 1980s, for instance, the US steel
industry lobbied the government to ban imports on steel from South Africa; Japan has a
tradition of putting obstacles on agricultural imports in order to protect the interests of
domestic farmers.
Financial controls refer to restrictions on payments to or from the target, suspension of
loans or aids, blocking of foreign exchange holding, and freezing assets abroad
(Bornstein, 1968: 418). For example, the International Seminar organised by the United
Nations Special Committee on Apartheid called on all financial institutions to cut loan
activities and trade financing to South Africa for their apartheid policy (Wassermann,
1981: 367). A comprehensive package of financial sanctions, which reduces the ability to
access international financial markets, may have a devastating impact on the target
countries, especially those with high account deficits.
Compared to financial sanctions, economic sanctions on imports or exports are unlikely
to be effective (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot, 1990: 70). An embargo is usually imposed on
selected commodities so that it is comparatively easy to circumvent by seeking new
partners or finding alternative markets. American President Carter cut grain shipments
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to the Soviet Union as penalty for their invasion of Afghanistan, but the supplies were
replaced by those from Brazil, Australia, and particularly France and Germany
(Wassermann, 1981: 368). In the case of Nicaragua, a few weeks after the United States
cut its aid, the Soviet Union provided around 20,000 tons of wheat to replace the lost
shipment (Leogrande, 1996: 331). In comparison, reduced loans or assistances make it
difficult for the target to find replacements. Furthermore, trade controls always hurt
ordinary people who have little responsibility for the policies that result in sanctions,
whereas financial controls are more able to affect decision-makers. A striking example is
the sanctions on Iraq. Embargoes set the Iraqi health system back by around 50 years,
according to the World Health Organization, whereas the ruling elite was virtually
untouched (Alnasrawi, 2001: 214). On the contrary, financial sanctions are able to
jeopardise the target’s interests by freezing their overseas assets directly (Dashti-Gibson,
Davis, Radcliff, 1997: 610).
Smart sanctions
In addition to the traditional sanctions, Tostensen & Bull (2002) introduce the concept of
smart sanctions, which is composed of transportation and communication controls, and
humanitarian exemptions. It is expected that smart sanctions have the potential to be the
refinement of conventional sanctions policy without incurring excessive humanitarian
costs.
The transportation and communications control covers the restrictions in the provision of
aircraft, railways, and the limitation on shipping services. In general, the travel sanction
hits the target while minimising humanitarian costs by individual travel restrictions, visa
restrictions, and prohibition of air cargo flights. Individual travel and visa restrictions are
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expected to influence the commercial relations of the target. The ban on air cargo flights
is intended to reduce the imports of military materials or to decrease profitable exports
(Tostensen & Bull, 2002: 380, 390). For instance, in the 1990s the United States stopped all
travel and work permits to Iraq, and in 2005 the United Nations imposed various travel
restrictions on Sudan.
Humanitarian exemptions refer to the institution-specific exemptions, the item-specific
exemptions, and the country-specific exemptions (Tostensen & Bull, 2002: 381). The
institution-specific exemptions allow certain organisations akin to the Red Cross to
continue operating and furnishing ordinary people with necessary supplies; the item-
specific approach excludes such items as urgent medicine or food consumed by
vulnerable groups. In terms of the country-specific exemptions, if a country relies
significantly on food imports, sanctions are likely to exempt such goods. All these
exemptions aim to achieve the desired damage on the decision-makers but without
collateral damage on the innocents.
3.1.2 Economic incentives
According to Baldwin (1985), economic incentives refer to ‘the provision, denial, promise
and threat of goods and services in an attempt to influence the attitudes and behaviour of
another actor’ (Crumm, 1995: 313, cited from Baldwin, 1985). Examples include aid
programs, economic engagements and preferential trade arrangements (Dorussen, 2001:
252).
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Foreign aid
Foreign aid is viewed as actual or promised aid that should be higher than the baseline of
expectation of the target country (Baldwin, 1971: 23). Since World War II, foreign aid has
been associated with national security and economic interests, supporting present
strategic allies, seeking long-term national interests in certain regions, and serving
domestic economic interests (Fleck & Kilby, 2001: 600). Morgenthau (1960) noted in ‘The
New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy’ that ‘foreign aid is always an
economic instrument of foreign policy, but in conditions of pervasive conflict the
instrument becomes a weapon’ (Morgenthau, 1960:2).
Stokke (1996) argued that the origin of foreign aid lay in official development assistance.
From the very beginning, development assistance became an instrument in the bipolar
world system that emerged after World War II. For the Western powers, the main
recipients of bilateral aid were almost without exception the newly independent
countries which previously were their colonies. The promotion of democracy and an
open market economy, and the containment of communism in the Third World were
used as the prime argument for aid. Similarly, aid was also used by the Soviet Union as a
foreign policy instrument extended to those strategically important governments and
social structures (Stokke, 1996: 18-20).
Although the foreign aid doctrine has undergone several major shifts since the Second
World War, in principle it remains a means of carrying out national foreign policy
objectives. In the modern politics of aid, donor states link aid to a bundle of aspirations
embracing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, transparency and good governance.
The linkage takes two forms: political conditionality attached to aid allocations and
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disbursements, and support for specialised projects and programs like democracy-
assistance. In general, foreign assistance does not always incentivise the recipient’s
economic development, as the practice of tying aid to the purchase of the donor
country’s goods and services or linking aid to political concessions apparently decreases
the real value of aid to the recipient (Burnell, 1997: 187).
The US, EU and Japan have always used foreign aid for the furtherance of their political
objectives. In the EU’s case, aid has been associated with national policy objectives
relating to former dependencies with which they continue to have special economic and
political ties (Mikesell, 1968: 1). In the case of Japan, the past decades saw Japan suspend
the provision of aid to China three times for political reasons: first in response to the
Tiananmen Squaremassacre in 1989; again in 1995 after China’s nuclear testing; finally in
2005 after China’s protest to the Japanese premier’s visit to a controversial war shrine.
The United States is not just responsible for the majority use of economic sanctions, but
also is an important donor of foreign aid in the pursuit of international influence, despite
of the fact that foreign assistance legislation never receives strong support from Congress.
Mikesell (1968) argues that the US national foreign assistance objectives involve national
security, humanitarian and national economic benefit (Mikesell, 1968: 17). The first great
foreign aid program, the Marshall Plan, was aimed at rebuilding war-torn Western
Europe, in part as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. In current international affairs,
Washington has placed significant efforts on tending to establish a positive relationship
between the provisions of aid and the voting coincidence rate in the United Nations.
Wang (1999)’s research proves that Washington has successfully used aid programs to
gain support in the UN on certain issues that are crucial to their national interests (Wang,
1999: 208).
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Furthermore, Black (1968) finds that the US uses different forms of aid in different areas.
Development assistance, including development loans and technical cooperation grants,
focus on Africa, Latin America, and near East and South Asia; supporting assistance,
referring to loans and grants, is the predominant category of aid in the Far East, with a
heavy emphasis on economic support for the struggle against Communist aggression;
the contingency fund is used to meet urgent needs that either are unforeseen or cannot
be accurately defined in advance, such as flood relief, earthquake rescue, and other
urgent demands. Other donations include contributions to international organisations,
American schools and hospitals abroad, development research and so on (Black, 1968: 73-
80).
Economic engagement
Another type of economic incentive is economic engagement, which is defined as ‘a
policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the
behaviour of the target state and to effect an improvement in bilateral political relations’
(Kahler and Kastner, 2004: 1). From seeking political allies to pursuing trade partners,
Phillips (2006) suggests that the selection of the partners in essence reflects that the
national interests shape a particular framework of economic engagement (Phillips, 2006:
12). According to Ravenhill and Jiang (2007), there are three categories of partners with
which countries prefer to shape a economic framework: countries that may help facilitate
the production network; neighbouring countries relevant to national security, while
economic benefits are the second concern; and resource-rich countries with the aim to
enhance a state’s security of resource supply (Ravenhill and Jiang, 2007: 3-4).
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Kastner andKahler(2006) set out how to form a framework of engagement, in which three
strategies are defined, including ‘conditional policies that directly link economic ties to
changed behaviour in the target state; unconditional policies where economic
interdependence is meant to act as a constraint on the behaviour of the target state, and
unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to effect a
transformation in the foreign policy goals of the target state’ (Kahler and Kastner, 2006:
523). No matter which one is used, the ultimate goal of the engagement is a reduction in
threats to core security interests. Countries simply propose involvement in economic
engagements with their counterparts in the hope that the increased commercial and
financial integration will yield an improvement in bilateral political relations. As trade
and investment expands in a community, the members would have an incentive to
develop a greater interest in maintaining a stable political environment and instituting
closer ties within the community.
In ‘Economic Statecraft across the Strait’, Wong (2005) tests the effects of economic
engagement within the mainland China-Taiwan context. He argues that the Taiwan issue
is always at the core of Beijing’s foreign policy. Beijing encourages cross-strait exchanges
since they expect that the increased commercial activity would limit Taipei’s ambition of
independence and would advance cross-strait reunification. In addition, Taiwan’s
economic ties with the mainland would give the latter certain political leverage to
manipulate Taiwan’s economy (Wong, 2005: 42-43).
Preferential Trade Agreements
The concept of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) and their negotiations have been put
forward for years, but few studies have pointed out clearly that the trade agreement is
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indeed a species of foreign policy instrument, which indicates a government’s priorities
through the selection of negotiatingpartners. Cooperation through trade arrangements is
economic in nature, by definition. However, it is inadequate to conclude that these
agreements are only economically driven. In general, nations pursue economic
integration for two reasons: politics and policy-making, and economics. In the absence of
multilateral control through WTO rules, nations are free to pursue many goals through
the conduct of economic integration, so that PTAs could be considered as economic
instruments that a country may bring to bear in its quest to enhance security. A trade
arrangement is expected to provide an improved context for further contacts, and the
tightened economic networks together with the growing interpenetrationmay amount to
political leverage.
There are at least five forms of trade agreements:
• Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTA): the loosest type of arrangement involving
the granting of partial preferences to a set of trading partners. If the concessions
are unilateral, it is called a preferential trade arrangement; if the concessions are
reciprocal, it is called a preferential trade area.
• Free Trade Area (FTA): if the members of a PTA eliminate all tariffs and
quantitative import restrictions amongst themselves, it amounts to a free trade
area. However, the members retain varying levels of tariffs and other barriers
against the products of non-members.
• Customs Union: if all members do not just remove trade barriers amongst
themselves, but also set a common level of trade barriers for outsiders, it is defined
as a Customs Union,which will set all trade policy for the members as a whole.
• CommonMarket: this represents deeper integration, beyond the free exchange of
goods and services—the free movement of labour and capital is permitted among
the members.
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• Economic Union: it involves harmonizing national economic policies and a
common currency (Pangestu & Gooptu, 2002: 80).
Cheong (2003) revealed thatmore than 50 percent of existing Regional Trade Agreements
are based in Western Europe and the Mediterranean region, followed by RTAs in the
Americas and Eastern Europe (Cheong, 2003: 169-170). In Europe, the former rivals,
Germany and France, take the leading role in influencing neighbouring countries to take
part in economic integration. The situation is different in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is
the most promising country in terms of economic power, but it has not yet taken a
leadership role in promoting economic integration. Considering that the Japanese
exclude the agricultural sector from the FTAwith Singapore, Japan is unlikely to become
a leader in pushing economic integration if it maintains its current position on this matter.
China’s proposal of an FTA with ASEAN and the promise to open domestic agriculture
markets gradually raise the question of whether China can become a leading force and
promote economic integration in East Asia.
From an economic perspective, the spread of PTAs can be attributed mainly to the fact
that cases of regional economic integration have resulted in economic benefits, as seen in
the success of NAFTA and EU, though attempts to liberalise trade through the WTO
have met frustrating delays. Therefore, existing trading blocs are considering expansion
and new economic agreements are emerging. States often form PTAs to improve their
access to foreign markets. By reducing trade barriers among participants and restricting
the possibility of raising these obstacles, trade agreements provide insurance against
future disruptions of commerce with selected economic partners. Such insurance appears
crucial, especially when the stability of the global trading system is threatened. Also, it
has been argued that having a Preferential Trade Agreement is a defensive strategy
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against the proliferation of other trade blocs, spurred on by the fear of being excluded.
For example, the emergence of European integration is expected to spur the formation of
the North America Free Trade Area, which together with the Europe Economic
Community contributes to the initiative of free trade agreements in the Asia Pacific
region.
In addition, Wang (2004) argues that the primary purpose of regional economic
agreements is often political, and the economic consequences, good or bad, are side
effects of the political payoff (Wang, 2004: 139). In fact, the leading trade powers such as
the US, the EU and China, have actively engaged in the PTA not just for economic
motivation. In the case of America, the country has signed an agreement with Jordan,
Singapore, Chile, Australia, ASEAN and a number of Central and South America
countries. As to ASEAN, US Trade Representative Susan Schwab confirmed that ”the
ASEAN region… is a very high priority for not just US commercial and economic ties but
for the overall geo-political interests and commitments of the United States” (Jegathesan,
2006). China was a latecomer to the Preferential Trading Agreement and reluctant to
engage in the framework. However, Beijing has become an active player in negotiating
the agreement, especially after its successful accession to the World Trade Organization.
According to Wang (2004), the economic partnership agreements with Hong Kong and
Macau are intended to facilitate the production network on the onehand, and to calm the
regions by offering them economic incentives on the other hand. The ASEAN-China Free
Trade strategy is designed to contribute to China’s capability to form a counter power
comparable to the US by unifying Southeast Asian states (Wang, 2004: 144 –145).
3.2 The failure of economic sanctions
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This section mainly explores the situations wherein policy-makers intend to apply
economic sanctions and examines the outcomes. In most situations, the outcomes appear
to be unsatisfactory. Both the failure in making the target country compromise and the
expensive costs that sanctions impose suggest that economic sanctions should not be
considered to be an effective strategy. Instead, the efficiency of economic incentives is
apparent.
3.2.1 Reasons for imposition
There are some scholars investigating the typical scenarios of sanctions’ employment. In
the opinion of Van Bergeijk (1995), there are several factors. To begin with, military
operations have failed to maintain peace, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan. Policy-
makers are therefore inclined to resort to the sanction routes. Secondly, the end of the
Cold War makes international cooperation more likely, which reduces the possibility of
trade diversion or sanction busting. Thirdly, international agencies increasingly impose
sanctions in order to avoid the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons as well as
the spread of mass destruction weaponry. Though CoCom (the Coordinating Committee
for Multinational Export Control), which restricts the exports of related technologies and
weapons to communist countries, was dismantled, other institutions, such as the United
Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, have the power
to prevent nuclear proliferation through sanctions. Fourthly, current economic
interdependence creates a number of trade conflicts, such as the disputes between the
United States and Japan over Japanese cars, or between the United States andChina over
textile products. Within the international order, both communities may resort to
sanctions to solve the problem if negotiations fail to reach agreement. Finally, sanctions
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are proposed against free riders especially when international agencies enforce
environmental policies (Van Bergeijk, 1995: 445-448).
Cooper (2001) analyses the logic of using economic leverage, especially sanctions. He
notes that for a decision-maker, available options follow a sequence: diplomacy,
economic leverage, andmilitary force. Economic leverage is the second of the three steps
available to a government. A dispute between two countries is initially addressed
through diplomatic efforts. If tensions escalate, one or both sides will consider a more
serious solution, generally economic sanctions; if sanctions do not produce results,
participants will resort to military force. Taking Iraq as an example, the first response of
international society was to require Iraqi troops to withdraw when Kuwait had been
invaded, followed by comprehensive sanctions as Iraq refused to comply. Finally,
international troops led by the United States began to remove Iraqi forces when sanctions
did not succeed. However, economic leverage is not always the middle-road between
diplomacy and force. In some cases, where the dispute is not severe enough to escalate to
the military level or where conflicts involve human rights, economic sanctions become
the last resort for the decision-makers (Cooper, 2001: 487).
There exists an expectation that economic sanctions may help achieve certain objectives.
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990) have compiled a lengthy list of objectives that the
sanction senders pursue in relation to target countries. In many human rights and
nuclear non-proliferation episodes, sanctions aim to change policies or modify
behaviours in the target country. Also, sanctions are aimed to destabilise the target
regime, and it is expected to limit the military capability of the target country (Hufbauer,
Schott & Elliott, 1990: 11).
93
Lindsay (1986) also studied the objectives that economic sanctions may achieve. He
suggests that policy-makers might be guided by some of the five aims he sets out, when
enacting sanctions: compliance, deterrence, subversion, and international or domestic
symbolism. First, sanctions are deployed to force the target nation to alter its policies to
comply either with the sender’s preferences, or with a system of international regulations.
The effectiveness is based on the expectation that the costs of sanctions would exceed the
profits derived from the disputed policies. Second, sanctions are supposed to subvert or
overturn the entire regime. The use of such sanctions rests on the possibility that
economic damage would lead to a greater level of political disintegration. Third, the
sender wants to dissuade the target from repeating the disputed action in the future, or
to warn other countries not to imitate its behaviour. Fourth, the sender regards the
sanctions as a signal to express disappointment, or as a sign of taking actions to thwart
criticism (Lindsay, 1986: 153-168).
Finally, Kaempfer & Lowenberg (1988) analyse the cases of sanctions via public choice
approach. According to the approach, the level of economic sanctions is determined by a
function of political influences of different interest groups. (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1988:
789) For one group, this implies a demand for sanctions―members wanting to impose
sanctions, whereas in another group that argues for reduced sanctions, the members
want to avoid sanctions. Sometimes the groups seeking the same purpose would become
allies to strengthen their power. If various interests groups have varied weight in terms
of political influence, sanction interventions are not likely to be enacted, but the
government would consider their imposition if the pressure against sanctions is offset by
pressure for sanctions. From this point of view, the application of sanctions does not
primarily pursue massive economic devastation on the target, but satisfies the
requirements of domestic interest groups.
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3.2.2 The outcome of sanctions
Economic sanctions are applied in many ways, ranging from curbing international trade
movement, prohibiting financial mobility, and restricting communication and
transportation. Since the earliest application of sanctions, the debate on the effectiveness
of sanctions has been continuous. ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’ (1990) investigates
nearly 115 cases, which are divided into five categories according to the major foreign
policy objectives pursued by senders: ‘(1) change the target country’s policies in a
relatively modest way (2) destabilise the target government (3) disrupt a minor military
adventure (4) impair the military potential of the target country and (5) change the target
country’s policies in a major way’ (Van Bergeijk, 1995: 392). For each episode, Hufbauer,
Schott & Elliot (1990) define the success score of a sanction based on the combination of
the policy result and sanction contribution. The two factors are evaluated from point 1 to
4 respectively. Points 1 to 4 represent the process from failure to success for policy results,
and from none to significant influence for the sanction contribution. A score of more
than 8 out of a possible 16 is regarded as success.
According to this approach, 34 percent of sanctions episodes are considered as a success
in achieving their political objectives. Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot (1990) find that in the
majority of the episodes, the policy of sanctions neither changes target country’s policies
nor overturns the target regimes. The success rate falls to only 25 percent during the
period 1976 to 1989 (Bonetti, 1997: 2). In further research, Pape (1997) found that only five
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percent could be considered successes (Wallensteen, 2000: 5, cited from Pape, 1997).
Reasons are noted below.
Failure to reach the objectives
When sanctions are imposed on a nation, the desired effects are not the imposition of
economic damage, but rather a change in the nation’s behaviour. The success therefore is
relative to a single factor―occurrence of desired change, and meeting the initial
objectives will be a key to the judgment of success. In reality, however, few cases embody
the connection between sanctions and the changed behaviours. As Wallensteen (2000)
pointed out, in a total of eleven sanctions episodes initiated by the United Nations in the
1990s, only two saw the target modifying its policies. The success rate was close to
twenty percent (Wallensteen, 2000: 6). He further noted that the United States’ sanctions
against Iran, North Korea, China, India and Pakistan ‘do not seem to have changed the
behaviour of these states or their leaders in the direction demanded’ (Wallensteen, 2000:
8). Furthermore, an undeniable fact that innocent people, rather than power-takers, suffer
the hardship in sanctions is regarded as the most significant failure. Hence, it seems safe
to conclude that sanctions have limited efficacy in achieving foreign policy goals,
although it is equally incorrect to claim that they never work.
As noted above, Lindsay (1986) suggests that senders impose sanctions for several
reasons: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic
symbolism. However, he also confirms that sanctions generally fail to force compliance
since the target suffers insufficient economic damage, or the target does not think the
compromises can be offset by the costs; as political coalitions can be produced in certain
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scenarios, sanctions fail to subvert the target regime; sanctions fail to deter the target’s
behaviour because the possibility of continuing the sanctions is in doubt, or the target
believes that they are able to and intend to retaliate (Lindsay, 1986). In the subversion
scenarios especially, there are numerous failed examples: the Soviet Union attempted to
replace Tito with a pro-Soviet leader in 1948 via the power of sanctions. However, results
showed that the target regimes still remained in power. In certain cases, such as Uganda
and Rhodesia, the regimes collapsed due to other factors, not because of the impact from
sanctions (Lindsay, 1986: 160). Galtung (1967) explains that an attack from the outside
can conversely act as a catalyst to unite an entire nation. This phenomenon of ‘rally
around the flag’ makes it even more difficult to subvert the target regime (Galtung, 1967:
378-416).
Similarly, Lenway (1988) agrees that sanctions do not work in general if judged by their
efficiency in achieving the primary stated objectives (Lenway, 1988: 401). In Gavin’s
study, he argues that sanctions may achieve the ‘signalling objective’ but it is a costly
signal, considering the loss of economic opportunities for the territorial neighbours. In
his view, the application of sanctions is nothing other than an overreaction to public and
legislative pressures (Gavin, 1989: 1-9).
Sanctions bring high costs
In the influential book ‘Economic Statecraft and Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:
History and Current Policy’, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) try not just to study the
political or economic factors furthering the achievement of policy goal in a sanctions
scenario, but also to address the costs of sanctions to all participants and to third parties.
Van Bergeijk (1995) also agrees that economic sanctions are essentially the heftiest non-
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military instrument in international conflict solution, which places costs on the target,
sender, and even target’s neighbours or trade partners.
Van Bergeijk (1995) divides the costs as direct and indirect. Direct costs are related to the
target itself. In the case of financial sanctions, welfare loss may be the total value of
reduction, since it is always irreversible. In the case of trade sanctions, the costs would
include soaring transportation costs, disrupted trade flows or the risk premiums paid to
the middleman, although a part or all of the loss may be offset by some assistance from
third countries. Indirect costs refer to the external effects of sanctions on third parties. In
some cases, the impact of sanctions will disperse the target’s trade partners, and limit
their external trade also (Van Bergeijk, 1995: 449-452).
For target countries, the direct damage caused by trade sanctions is limited and less
significant. The research shows that only in a third of the total 116 episodes, the losses
exceed one percent of Gross Domestic Product of the target state (Van Bergeijk, 1995: 450).
This suggests that sanctions fail in imposing a severe economic impact, as they cannot be
enacted on a broad enough catalogue of commodities or applied by many countries. The
application on a limited scale gives the target a chance to reach triangular trade
arrangements (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot, 1990: 75). Conversely, the imposition of
sanctions may produce the business opportunities for the entrepreneurs of both the third
country and the target itself. Kerr & Gaisford (1994) suggest that entrepreneurs may
exploit these opportunities by accessing the markets of the embargoed commodities, by
producing substitutes for the sanctioned goods, and by exploring other potential
partners (Kerr & Gaisford: 1994: 171). For example, a worldwide weapon embargo
against South Africa motivated the swift development of its domestic arms industry, and
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the boycott by oil-exporting countries led to the establishment of the coal-mining
industry in South Africa.
However, the argument that sanctions impose limited costs on the target entirely
neglects the criminal consequence of sanctions. In fact, sanctions may push underground
economic activities, since the majority of targeted governments indulge in organised
smuggling as a survival strategy for gaining urgent supplies to preserve the regime.
Incentives for smuggling can be reinforced even after sanctions are lifted. For the entire
society, the most dramatically criminalizing consequence is a high level of public
tolerance of smuggling. According to an investigation by the Serbian Customs
Administration, in some targeted states, smuggling, corruption and other illegal
activities are viewed as normal, rather than as infringements of the law. It was reported
that the underground trade between Bulgaria and Serbia reached more than 5 billion
dollars in 1994; in 1996, the Serbian Prosecutor-General admitted that the country’s
financial system and infrastructure were not likely to survive without sanctions violators,
resulting in the government rewarding key actors for their contribution to oil smuggling
with the ownership of several gas stations (Andreas, 2005: 344-345).
For the sanction senders, the largest loss is the sacrifice of investment opportunities in the
target, and the ‘echo effects’ of sanctions continue to impede bilateral trade between the
target and the sender after their lifting. In addition, the costs for the senders may be more
serious, taking the intangible costs into consideration. Sanctions produce uncertainty
about the sender’s reputation as the sender might be regarded as an unreliable partner,
not only by the target, but also by other countries. The previous partners of the sender
might diversify the supply channels and seek new co-operators with higher levels of
reliability. In the case of Italy, trade sanctions against their occupation of Abyssinia in
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1935-1936 were put in place. However, the Italians diverted their exports from the
sanctioning to other countries. The effects persisted after the sanctions were removed
(Slavov, 2004: 4).
For the third party, the ‘disrupted trade theory’ suggests that a land neighbour suffers
trade reduction due to rising transportation costs and disrupted trade relationship.
Slavov (2004) analyses the effects on the neighbour of the target through the gravity
model, which measures potential trade flows between countries. The results show that a
land neighbour would act as an innocent bystander, and their trade volume with the rest
of the world tends to fall (Slavov: 2004: 2, 9). Although ‘the smuggling theory’ claims that
the target’s neighbours should gain more trade volume because part of their trade is by
way of proxy for the target, the theory cannot be tested in economic terms, since it is
difficult to measure the real smuggling value.
Similarly, some think that since the sanctioning countries have to face the phenomenon
of sanctions busting, the reduced trade volume will be diverted to the other partners of
the target. However, the study by Caruso (2003) suggests the opposite. His theory
assumes that sanctions consist of three types: limited, moderate and extensive. Minor
embargos, trade and travel restrictions are considered to be limited; moderate means
broader sanctions; and extensive refers to certain comprehensive trade and financial
sanctions. He gauges the effects on G-7 countries, with the exception of America. The
empirical results prove that extensive sanctions have significant negative effects on trade
volume between sanctioned and non-participating countries; unilateral limited and
moderate sanctions only have insignificant positive effects (Caruso, 2003: 15, 20).
Other factors
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There is an argument that the problem with sanctions is the lack of political will in
certain nations. Some members of the United Nation Security Council may be concerned
that sanctions would be held against them oneday. The use of sanctions against Italy, for
example, was vetoed in the Security Council; the comprehensive embargo led by
America on the Soviet Union was initiated in 1947, but the United Nations refused to
impose them subsequently (Wallensteen, 2000: 3). Furthermore, the senders always
primarily consider their own national interests instead of the success of sanctions. The
scenario with South Africa is a typical one. In 1963, the United States, France and other
allies imposed an arms embargo against South Africa for the apartheid policy, but in
1970, these countries abstained when the United Nations tried to tighten the sanctions. In
1977, they even vetoed the UN’s resolution of making sanctions mandatory. Interestingly,
South Africa was able to buy the military-related goods and technology from them
through foreign companies (Nathan, 2000: 4).
In addition to political unwillingness, success is limited by lack of cooperation with the
neighbouring states, which have little incentive to apply sanctions entirely. The
neighbouring countries are always used as the logistical centres to transfer goods into the
sanctioned region. In the Italian case, the neutral position of Switzerland made trade flow
appear usual; in the Rhodesia scenario, the embargoed goods could enter Rhodesia
through South Africa; in Iraq’s case, Iran not only refused to cooperate with the oil-for-
food program, but also smuggled commodities to Iraq (Andreas, 2005: 344-345).
3.2.3 The efficiency of economic incentives
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It is apparent that current literature on economic statecraft places a great deal of
emphasis on sanctions. In regard to sanctions’ performance, Baldwin (1985) insists that
their efficiency has been underestimated due to the insufficient framework used to make
the estimates. Unlike Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990), whose analysis is designed to
identify one primary objective and one target in each case, Baldwin not only introduces
the idea of multi-objectives and multi-targets, but also addresses the sanctions’ symbolic
role. In Baldwin’s theory, the policy-makers design economic leverage not just for
national economic interests, but for political prestige. The effectiveness of economic
sanctions, therefore, cannot simply be measured in quantitative terms, as many of these
policies are crafted to deliver signals to adversaries. This may be the explanation for an
interesting issue: economic sanctions are employed frequently, regardless of the notable
failures’ record. Furthermore, Baldwin argues that the costs of sanctions are unlikely to
exceed the costs of other alternative polices like the use of military force, especially as the
costs of war include lives lost, damage to prestige and moral costs. From this perspective,
economic sanctions might be considered more efficient (Lenway, 1988: 404-407).
Furthermore, some argue that every form of economic statecraft has its own tailored
scenario. Trade sanctions aremore suitable to countries that highly depend on imports or
exports. Financial controls are targeted to certain countries or specific groups, which rely
heavily on loans or credit offered by the international capital markets to maintain
economic development. Economic engagement may be used to increase political leverage
by maximising economic linkage with trade partners. Foreign assistance is mostly
granted to potential political allies in connection with future cooperation. Therefore,
incentives may not necessarily be feasible in certain cases.
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However, the advantages of economic incentives are apparent. Baldwin concludes that
sanctions may not be costly in comparison to the costs of war, but it is hard to reach the
same conclusion in comparison to the costs of economic incentives. Economic incentives
are viewed as actual or promised aid that should be more valuable than the baseline of
expectations of the target country, and negative sanctions are regarded as actual or
threatened punishments related to this baseline. The difference between the two
embodies not only the target’s first reaction, but also after-effects. Firstly, punishment
tends to deliver an impression of hostility to the target, which usually leads to fear and
causes resistance. To some extent, the employment of economic sanctions is associated
with a country’s economic position in the global system. Since the majority of sanctions
are imposed by the strong economies on the weak, sanctions appear to be the economic
weapons of power politics, which may easily result in hostility and confrontation. In
comparison, rewards may send the signal of sympathy, and always offer compromises.
Secondly, as Chan (2006) notes, the objectives of economic statecraft are to increase a
state’s stake in ongoing and future commerce, and to decrease the incentives for other
countries to support economic and political rupture (Chan, 2006: 4-5). Incentives may
strengthen a bilateral relationship in the future, whereas punishments are likely to
reduce the willingness of the target to cooperate on other issues. Thirdly, sanctions are
mostly used to resolve disputes, but economic incentives may have wider applications in
both solving disputes and ensuring parties’ collaboration.
As Azam and Saadi-Sedik (2004) note, the foreign power has three major options:
threatening sanctions, enacting sanctions, and providing economic rewards (Azam &
Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 5, 14). Where utility of threats is restrained by credibility, and negative
sanctions have debatable outcomes, economic incentives are viable. Recent studies have
suggested the strategy of ‘mixing carrots with sticks’, meaning the application of
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incentives and sanctions simultaneously. This can be understood as compensating the
negatives of sanctions by the positives of incentives, which denies the unilateral use of
sanctions from other perspective. In the case of North Korea in the 1990s, the United
States and South Korea provided a package of economic rewards to motivate the North
to dismantle their nuclear program. In the meantime, threats of both sanctions and
military force were ongoing. Such a mixed strategy has been resumed under current Six
Party Talks.
On the other hand, in recent years, the world has witnessed the development of
economic arrangements between different trading unities. It is reported that of the 142
members of the WTO, 90 percent have formed or entered into regional economic
cooperation organisations (Forging closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the
Twenty-First Century, 2001: 30). Around 380 RTAs had been notified to the GATT/WTO
by July 2007. On the same date, 205 agreements were in force. Taking into account those
RTAs that are in force but have not been notified, those signed but not yet in force, those
currently being negotiated, and those in the proposal stage, a figure of about 400 RTAs
that are scheduled to be implemented by 2010 can be deduced. Of these RTAs, Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for over 90% (Regional
trade agreements, WTO Homepage). In incorporating the widespread trade agreements
along with the increasingly important role of foreign assistance in the external policy of
major powers such as theUS and Japan, it appears that economic incentives start to show
their popularity and effic iency in the context of international relations.
3.3 Conclusions and hypothesis
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The concept of ‘economic statecraft’ involves the utilization of a state’s economic
resources and capital in its foreign policy conduct, and economic statecraft itself is the art
of conducting state affairs. The existing literature on economic statecraft follows two
tracks. Firstly, it not only introduces the various forms of economic statecraft, which refer
to the combination of sanctions and incentives, but also suggests the priority of economic
incentives in comparison to economic sanctions in terms of efficiency.
Secondly, much of the literature gives more attention to the issue of whether economic
sanctions or incentives can effectively achieve foreign policy objectives, which indicates
that current literature has treated both economic sanctions and economic incentives as
diplomatic means, and not just as economic policies. The provision of economic statecraft
is associated with the increasing economic conflicts in the era of economic
interdependence and the desire to avoid the use of military force. When economic
interpenetration creates an incentive for states to utilise economic leverage, economic
statecraft is used to advance national interests.
From this perspective, economic statecraft has become a major tool of international
diplomacy. Both developed and developing economies have the experience of using
economic statecraft to support national interests, but it is likely that the levels of
development and differences in social system account for significant differences in
approaches to statecraft. This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis II: For a new rising international player like China pursuing a peaceful rise
policy, which never favours a military approach in seeking its security interests, security
objectives and economic diplomacy can never be separated, though the specific approach
of economic diplomacy may vary by region.
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Part II: China’s National Security Concept and the Chinese Model of Economic
Statecraft In Its Diplomacy
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Chapter Four: China’s National Security Studies
A consensus has been reached that security theory is a contentious matter in academic
and political contexts. However, the theoretical problems do not undermine the core
value of security studies for a state in international relations. In comparison to
traditional security theory, the new security theory still fails to reform the notion, but
makes it a multidimensional concept and reflects certain changes that have occurred in
global politics, such as the emergence of economics in international relations and the rise
of non-military threats. While this evolution is quite similar in China’s context, China’s
security study still shows its distinguished characteristics and defines specific threats
that it faces.
This chapter will focus on China’s new security concept and test the first hypothesis by
analysing the priority ofChina’s security agenda.
4.1 China’s new security theories
The years 1997 and 1998 saw Chinese leaders frequently call for a new security concept
in some diplomatic settings:
• The new concept was officially unveiled by the People's Republic of China (PRC)
in March 1997 at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum.
• In their joint statement at the conclusion of their April 1997 summit, President
Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin called for a ‘new anduniversally
applicable security concept’.
• In December 1997, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen outlined and explained the
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‘New Concept of Security’ during activities marking the 30th anniversary of
ASEAN.
• In February 1998, Defence Minister Chi Haotian called for the establishment of a
‘New Concept of Security’ in a speech in Tokyo to the National Institute of
Defence Studies, and again in a talk presented to the Australian College of
Defence and Strategic Studies during his visit to Canberra (Finkelstein, 2003).
Finkelstein (2003) explains that Beijing puts forward the new concept of security since the
proposal is an indication of China’s dissatisfaction and frustration with the unfolding
international system; a reaction to policies and actions by the United States, especially
Washington’s strengthening of its military alliances in East Asia, and an attempt to
dismiss the China Threat Theory in that proximate area in particular (Finkelstein, 2003).
Wu (2001) also lists the changes in the international security area that may influence
Chinese security thinking, including: the relaxation of global tensions; relations among
major powers having become relatively stable; existing armed conflicts and local wars
becoming less frequent; the development of the international process of disarmament
and counter-proliferation; the interdependence of various economies having led to calls
for joint control over financial turmoil; and East Asia having remained generally peaceful
despite of unsolved disputes and ongoing differences (Wu, 2001: 278).
In China-related studies, the security concept is divided into traditional security and
non-traditional security studies (NTS). Generally, they define military security as a
traditional security study, but they differ in the analysis of the issues within the non-
traditional study. In Wang Yizhou’s ‘Defining Non-traditional Security and its
Implications for China’, he notes that some Chinese scholars put forward five major NTS
issues on the basis of China’s domestic need: economic security – including energy
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security and financial security; food security; environment security; information security;
and population security, and the three negative forces such as: religious extremism;
separatism; and terrorism. However, others think that NTS encompasses the economy,
anti-terrorism, information, illness, drug trafficking, crimes at high seas and ecology
(Wang, p.5). This section will discuss China’s security situation, mainly in military,
political, economic, and environment sectors.
4.1.1 China’s military security
In China’s security context, the Asia-Pacific region, which consists of Northeast Asia and
Southeast Asia, is more akin to a security concept than a geographical one. The region is
where great powers converge. If China is able to build up its power base in the Asia-
Pacific, it may eventually emerge as a global power. This focus on the region has been
reinforced by the international repercussions arising from the Tiananmen incident in
1989. Since then, China’s diplomacy has paid much attention to the surrounding region
(Zhoubian Waijiao), which signifies the diplomatic shift from the two superpowers for
the first time. The former President Jiang Zemin stated that ‘China is now going all out
for economic development and this requires not only domestic stability but also a stable
international environment. We attach great importance to political stability in the Asia-
Pacific region, because this constitutes an important condition for ensuring economic
development in the region’ (Ong, 2002: 3). Under Jinag Zemin-Zhu Rongji administration,
the 1990s saw the establishment of a broad range of relations with the neighbours, as
evident in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation andASEAN Plus One, in particular.
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In the Southeast Asian area, resorting to the mechanism of ASEAN Plus One or ASEAN
Plus Three, China has been putting effort into promoting either political exchange or
economic interaction. In the meantime, China signed the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea’ in 2002, by means of which China and other ASEAN
claimants agreed a peaceful resolution to the South China Sea disputes. This effectively
fosters bilateral relations towards shaping ‘good-neighbourliness’. The Northeast Asian
region, which may conveniently be treated as a geographical area including Japan, China,
South and North Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan and the far-eastern portions of Russia, has
always been a region full of contradictions. The area involves the interplay of major
powers – America, Soviet Union, Japan and China, and in the twentieth century it
experienced three wide-ranging wars: the Russia–Japan war in 1905, China–Japan war
between 1937 and 1945, and the Korean War during 1950–1953 (Ong, 2002: 1–2).
However, since China integrates economically with Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan, and
is allied with Russia in international affairs, the security environment in Northeast Asia
has been more relaxed than previously.
However, China’s regional security is still open to challenge anddeserves great attention.
China is facing a severe security concern stemming from the neighbouring three powers:
Russia in the north, India in the southwest, and Japan in the east. Vietnam and the
Philippines in the south are non-allied states. Reunification with Taiwan has not yet been
achieved, and China is facing the containment of the US ‘first islands chain’ in the Asia
Pacific Ocean6. Moreover, the territory and resources disputes remain the greatest
6 The deployment of the United States in the Asia Pacific region has three island chains: the
‘first island chain’ is composed of the US military bases in Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, Japan,
and Korea, which is the frontline of the US military employment Westwards; the ‘second
island chain’ is centred at Guam and linked with the presence inAustralia, which offers a base
for the US moving forwards; the ‘third island chain’ is primarily composed of the US military
base in the Hawaiian Islands group, which is the defence frontline of American mainland.
110
security obstacles in the Asia-Pacific region. For complex historical and cultural reasons,
the territorial demarcations between some states in this region have not been drawn.
With the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
disputes over the sovereign status of some islands and sea rights become prominent,
such as the four northern islands between Russia and Japan; Tokto island between South
Korea and Japan; the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) and the East China Sea between
China and Japan; the South China Sea between China and certain Southeast Asian states.
These factors undermine China’s regional security environment.
As well as being the most important stakeholder in the security framework of the Asia-
Pacific region, over the past decades the US military has never changed its containment
policy toward China. Part of the US military has always regarded China as a potential
enemy and made strategies correspondingly. The United States maintains its dominance
in the Asia-Pacific area through a military alliance with the Northeast Asian states such
as Japan and South Korea, and grasps the opportunity offered by the war on terror to
enhance its influence in Southeast Asia, which severely threatens the security situation
surrounding China. Also, the US military actions in the Gulf, Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan make the Chinese realise that Washington has not ruled out the possibility
of using action to settle disputes. The military interference over the Taiwan Strait in 1996,
the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 1999, the airplane incident in Hainan Island in
2001, the confrontation between ships from the two countries in the South China Sea in
2008, and the collision of a Chinese submarine with sonar equipment being towed by a
US destroyer in the Philippines in 2009, intensify the possibility of a war breaking out
between the United States and China. Furthermore, as Chinese economic development
urgently requires massive energy inflows, safe transportation appears to be critical for
the sustainability of economic growth. But, the US navy dominates the 7,000 miles of sea
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lanes from Shanghai to the Straits of Hormuz through which half of China’s oil supplies
must pass, and around 80 per cent of China’s oil imports ship through the straits of
Malacca, which is a natural target for terrorists and an interdiction point in any
prospective conflict.
Due to these risks, China’s military security continues to assume a supportive role in the
security agenda. In China’s definition, its military force should undertake the mission of
defending the territorial sovereignty and integrity, resisting foreign aggression and
safeguarding state unification. In order to build a capable force, after Deng Xiaoping,
Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao continued to emphasise the quality of the military, trying to
build a high-technology-focused information defence system. China is expanding its
military ability to strike Taiwan with shorter-range missiles; Japan, India, and the
Philippines with medium-range missiles; and the United States with longer-range ICBMs.
The PLA is also introducing sea skimming missiles, quieter submarines, and asymmetric
capabilities in cyberspace and outer-space that are designed to keep US carrier battle
groups away from littoral areas around China in times of crisis (Green, 2007: 98).
Furthermore, China is stepping up its diplomacy in the region to create Asian-only
institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the ASEAN Plus Three.
4.1.2 China’s political security
Political security relates to the ideology that grants the rulers of particular country
legitimacy. In China’s case, the key to its political security is to maintain the communist
government, which to some extent represents the struggle between the communist and
capitalist political system. The legitimacy of the Communist regime at the current stage
has been challenged from external and internal pressure sources.
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Externally, the West’s response to the Tiananmen turmoil in 1989 reminds Beijing that
Western-style democracy and human rights are a fundamental security threat directed at
the core values of the Chinese communist leadership. Since the collapse of communism
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China’s communist regime has become the top
target. The Chinese repeatedly state that ‘in international political affairs, the
superpowers should not be allowed to order other countries about, pursue power politics
and impose their values on others’ (Ong, 2002: 19).
Internally, rapid industrialisation results in two major issues for China’s political rule.
First, because of the lack of sophisticated legal and compliance system, the party’s
reputation among Chinese people has waned gradually due to the widespread
corruption of the party members. People have been calling for political reform of the one-
party system, including political transparency and democratic elections. Second,
economic asymmetric growth has increased the gap between the advanced Eastern
coastal provinces and the less-developed Western provinces, between rural and urban
areas, and between the rich and the poor, which may lead to social tensions. In addition,
China’s economy mainly relies on exports of manufactured goods, but the collapse of
some industries in the coastal provinces as a result of current global economic downturn
results in massive unemployment. Since most of the labour comes from the less-
developed western provinces, the high unemployment particularly hurts the economies
in these areas. Given these two issues, on the one hand, the Communist Party must
revise and clarify the party in order to reduce people’s hostility. On the other hand, the
party has to reduce social conflicts by sustaining economic growth, to reduce
unemployment rates and to promote the development of the western provinces, in order
113
to ensure the ruling power of the party. For this reason, China’s political security is
closely associated with the possibility of a sustainable economic development.
4.1.3 China’s economic security
According to Wang’s analysis in ‘Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance:
China Confronts Globalization’ (2004), economic growth and national security were
considered as two separate topics from 1978 to 1992, and as a single domain from the
mid-1990s onwards, especially after the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and China’s
entrance into the WTO. He noted that ‘before the middle of the 1990s, economic reform
and economic growth had been given high priority on the agenda of government
domestic policy, while national security, as a crucial part of China’s foreign policy, was
mainly related to policy instruments to ensure territorial integrity or to prevent
subversion from outside hostile forces’ (Wang, 2004: 524). Partly due to the deeper
economic integration and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the economic-security nexus
has come to the attention ofChinese scholars and the ruling party.
Considering the effects of economy on national defence and its role in promoting
political security, economic stability and development are extremely important. Since
Deng’s era, the development of the Chinese economy has been granted immense political
importance and is considered China’s long-term task. In Deng Xiaoping’s words, ‘except
in the event of an emergent war, the Chinese people must steel themselves to carry out
this task with reality and commitment; they must make it their central task and allow
nothing to interfere with its fulfilment. Even if there is a large-scale war, afterwards
China will still have to pick up where it left off or start over’(Li, 2007: 40, cited from
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1994: 249). The principle that China must strictly
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adhere to economic development continues to receive full attention in the leadership that
succeeds him. At Hu’s national congress speech in 2007, he stressed that ‘we need to
vigorously push forward strategic economic restructuring and make greater efforts to
improve China’s capability for independent innovation as well as energy and
environmental conservation, and to enhance the overall quality of the economy and its
international competitiveness’ (Hu Jintao’s speech at 17th Party Congress, 2007).
However, there are a number of pressing challenges to China’s economic stability. First,
the superiority of multi-national firms places Chinese counterparts at a disadvantage in
capital, technology andpolicy treatment, leading to a shrinking market share for Chinese
enterprises, and the frequent assertions of the ‘China Threat’ in recent years makes the
maintenance of a security environment conductive to China’s growth difficult. Second, as
economic security involves not just the healthy growth of the domestic economy, free
and fair trade practices, but also free access to resources, the supply of energy resources
may correlate with China’s economic security. China is now the world’s second largest
consumer of energy, accounting for more than 12 per cent of global energy demand. Its
energy sector displays a dependence on coal and oil (see Table 4.1). In 2007, when the
Asia-Pacific region accounted for two-thirds of global energy consumption growth,
China contributed half of global energy consumption growth (BP Statistical Review of
World Energy June 2008, p.2). In addition to the oil sector, while global coal consumption
rose by 4.5 per cent in comparison to 2005, China accounted for more than 60 per cent of
the growth in 2006 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007, p.5). It is certain
that China will continue to rely on imported energy resources for meeting its
consumption needs, considering its declining domestic production (see Table 4.2).
115
Table 4.1: Primary Energy Consumption in China (Quadrillion Btu)
Source from Haider, 2008: 5, cited from Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Table 4.2: Estimates of Chinese Oil Imports (Million Barrels Per Day)
Sources from Downs, 2004: 24.
Indeed, the insecurity of energy lies not in the dependence on foreign sources of energy
supply itself – over the past two decades the oil-producers have not attempted to use
Year Coal Natural Gas Petroleum Total
1980 12.5 0.6 3.8 17.3
1985 16.9 0.5 4.0 22.2
1990 20.7 0.6 4.9 27.0
1995 27.5 0.7 7.2 35.2
2000 22.7 1.2 9.7 36.7
2005 26.4 2.2 11.2 43.2
2010 33.3 3.4 14.2 55.3
2015 40.1 5.3 17.9 69.1
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
IEA(2002) 4.2 6.9 9.9
US EIA(2003) 2.0 2.9 4.2 5.9 7.5
APERC (2002) 2.0 3.5 5.1 6.9
Sinopec (2003) 2.0–2.4 3.6–4.0
ERI/SDPC (2002) 1.6 2.5 4.1
PRC Industry (2002) 3.4 5
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energy as a weapon against China as they did against the West in the 1970s – but rather
in the growing consumption in China’s domestic markets, without improvements in
energy efficiency. From the perspective of international relations, the insecurity is also
embodied in the unsafe sea transportation, the intense competition with other oil-
consumers, the United States in particular, and the strong regional or international
reaction to China’s active pursuit of supplies through the exploitation of offshore sources
of energy, notably in Africa. In view of the increased vulnerability of its oil imports from
the Middle Eastern region and through the Strait of Hormuz, Beijing has adopted a
cautious policy relating to the Gulf region and the Iran nuclear crisis. For the same reason,
China has been giving economic assistance to Africa and has become involved in
economic engagements to ASEAN, since the African continent may offer abundant
energy supplies, and the Malacca Strait, which belongs to Malaysia and Singapore, both
ASEANmember states, is a conduit for the supplies.
4.1.4 Other Non-traditional security
When economic globalisation leads to interdependence, high levels of interdependence
effectively connect national economies. Such linkage acts as a transmission belt,
conveying the issues of one country into or away from the other country. Examples
include crime, drug trafficking, immigration, and environmental degradation, which
were formerly regional concerns but have now become global and require collective
cooperation. In China’s case, the environment is a major concern in the framework of
these non-traditional threats. Environmental degradation in China is severe.
Environment problems like pollution, acid rain, and contaminated rivers have now
become a key policy issue, which poses not only a major long-term threat to Chinese
public health, but also a political challenge to the ruling party. It is reported that more
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than 500 million people lack access to clean drinking water, and only 1 per cent of the
country’s 560 million citizens breathe air considered safe by the EU standards – air
pollution is blamed for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year. Emissions of sulphur
dioxide from coal and fuel oil, and the expansion of car ownership are the main cause of
environment problems (Kahn and Yardley, New York Times, 2007; Whittington, BBC
News , 2004).
Furthermore, under the assumption that launching a real war is overly costly, the
competition between states will not necessarily continue to rely on military power, but
mostly on scientific innovation. In the Chinese scenario, rapid growth does not lead to
sufficient competitiveness globally. Conversely, the growth is attributed to the
dependence on labour-intensive industries and foreign technology. However,
international competitiveness derives from advances in information, communication,
and related technologies, and those who possess them become rule-makers by asserting
intellectual property over these achievements. To develop individual intellectual
property or home-grown technology is the only way to be a regulatory state, which is
defined to ‘develop capabilities to set market rules and thereby steer market dynamics
through regulatory agencies, commissions and administrative procedures that maintain
an arm’s-length relationship between state andmarket’ (Bach, Newman andWeber, 2006:
500, cited from Majone, 1997).
If a state has its own property rights, this will replace the market share of foreign
standards, enhance negotiation power, and reduce the payment to the technological
owner. Importantly, it may avoid excessive dependence on other countries. Since
Chinese technologies are far behind those of developed countries and it has to rely on
foreign technologies in the key fields – such as communications, computer andmilitary –
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scientific innovation or scientific security should be a focal point for China to improve
national competitiveness.
4.2 Core of China’s security concept
In the mid-1990s, China called on the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to jointly
develop a new security concept. In 1997, the former President Jiang Zemin clarified
Chinese new security perspectives to the international community, by noting that the
old security thinking, reliant on military confrontation, is regarded as a failure in
ensuring security as military power cannot create permanent world peace. Subsequently
in 2000, President Jiang repeated at the United Nations Conference that to create
mutual-security is the only reliable way to prevent conflicts and war; the ideology of
Cold War should be abandoned and the new security theory based on mutual-belief,
mutual-benefits, equality and cooperation should be upheld in the international
community (Wu, 2006: 5). In 2002, the new concept was formulated officially in the form
of a policy paper—‘China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept.’
According to the policy paper, the meaning of the security concept has evolved to be
multi-fold, extending from military and political to economic, science and technology,
environmental, culture and many other areas. The core of such a new security concept
includes mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. Indeed, the core value
is not a novel one but is a re-packaged notion of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence’ announced by Former Premier Zhou Enlai in 1955, referring to mutual
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs, equality andmutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
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According to the policy paper:
Mutual trust means that all countries should transcend differences in ideology
and social system, discard the mentality of Cold War and power politics and
refrain from mutual suspicion and hostility. They should maintain frequent
dialogue and mutual briefings on each other’s security and defence policies and
major operations.
Mutual benefits means that all countries should meet the objective needs of social
development in the era of globalisation respect each other’s security interests and
create conditions for others’ security while ensuring their own security interests
with a view of achieving common security.
Equality means that all countries, big or small, are equal members of the
international community and should respect each other, treat each other as equals,
refrain from interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and promote the
democratisation of the international relations.
Coordination means that all countries should seek peaceful settlement of their
disputes through negotiation and carry out wide ranging and deep-going
cooperation on security issues of mutual concern so as to remove any potential
dangers and prevent the outbreak of wars and conflicts (China’s Position Paper
on the New Security Concept, 2002).
China claims that different nations should trust each other on security issues, pursue
regional and international security through mutually beneficial cooperation, commit to
solving disputes by negotiation and seek stability through cooperation. From this
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perspective, the new security concept is similar to Rothschild’s idea of common security,
which suggests that states may no longer seek security at each other’s expense;
conversely, it can be attained only through cooperative undertakings (Rothschild, 1995:
56). Taking note of the multilateral cooperation that China engages in within the region,
the ASEAN Plus One, the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit and Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation highlight the efforts to achieve common security for all parties
through communication, coordination and cooperation. Furthermore, at least at the
policy level, China shows the gesture of seeking settlement of disputes with its
counterparts through peaceful negotiation, working for the establishment of a regional or
international security cooperation mechanism, and attempting to use economic mutual
interests as an avenue to ensure lasting security in its concerned areas. In many
international settings, China’s leaders repeatedly claim that China is not pressing to
ensure own interests and influence on the international level, and is not trying to
challenge the current international power structure. Rather, it will conceal its capabilities
and bide its time in its surrounding area.
However, the core value of the new security theory itself unavoidably causes security
dilemmas. First, the theory states that the mutual benefits can act as an impetus to
maintain national security and that mutual trust is the foundation of national
cooperation. But mutual benefits cannot be automatically understood as equal payoff.
The ‘Prison Dilemma’ in international relations suggests that with cooperation, if one
side receives more than others, the one who gains less is likely to defect. Without a
powerful treaty and effective punitive mechanisms, cooperation pursuant to mutual trust
is unlikely to survive in the long term.
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Second, even if the states enjoy common interests on certain issues, they might diverge
on others. Every state faces different security problems at different stages. For
developing countries, security threats could arise from such traditional perils as
sovereign intervention, territorial violation, or a food crisis, while developed countries
may have other concerns such as illegal immigration. For instance, the major threat that
the United States faces nowadays is terrorism, so it is high unlikely to expect that North
Korea would jointly attack terrorism with the United States, or call for environmental
protection with the EU. Not only do the developed countries have different security
concerns from developing ones, but also even a single state has different security
agendas at different times. In the case of America, to retain its superpower position was
the key aim before 9/11, but after that, anti-terror efforts became crucial in American
security goals. Therefore, without effective incentives, cooperation on security is not easy
to achieve.
4.3 Conclusions
As China’s influence has increased remarkably since its open-door policy, there is
insufficient discussion of China as an emerging power. The debate today is whether
China would demand more influence to match its increasing strength and by what
means it would attempt to secure its position. From this perspective, Chinese thinking on
national security is an important research issue.
When scrutinising the Chinese scenario, we may conclude that the emergence of a new
security view has not reduced the weight attributed to traditional security in China’s
security strategy. For a state, the principal and core objective is to protect its territory and
sovereignty. Although there is unlikely to be a large-scale military invasion, due to a
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series of internal issues such as the Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang issues, and the external
conflicts akin to the East China Sea disputes with Japan, the South China Sea issue with
some ASEAN members and the US encirclement in the Asia-Pacific region, China should
continue to undertake the mission of maintaining territory integrity and security. Taking
into consideration the recent chaos in Xinjiang and the aggressive confrontation in the
South China Sea, military security in China’s surrounding area should not be
disregarded.
Meanwhile, economic security appears to be highly important for the Chinese within the
current situation. As argued, most of the political security threats faced by the Chinese
communist party are either directly or indirectly related to the issue of economic
development. China’s political security, referring to the sustainment of the ruling of the
communist party, requires not just stable developments in domestic market, but also
further economic growth in the less developed middle and southern areas – to narrow
the gap between the rich coastal and the poor southern provinces. Otherwise, both the
legitimacy and competence of the communist ruling will be questioned. More than that,
the calls for political reform are expected to rise. For this reason, economic sustainability,
which needs at least a stable regional environment and a sufficient supply of resources,
is considered as the primary factor to secure both economic security and political
security. Correspondingly, China’s security agenda has shown a focus on
neighbourhood-building and global resource hunting. For instance, China and Africa
are being pulled into each other’s economic and political contexts. China wants to
engage Africa’s resources in developing its economic muscle, while Africa wants to see
China as a leader of the Third World that may speak for them politically and
economically extract them from poverty. Similarly, the interplay with ASEAN may
ensure a friendly environment for China, while ASEAN wishes to benefit from China’s
123
growth and resort to Chinese power to prevent the United States from dominating the
region.
These arguments have verified the first hypothesis. For a rising economy like China,
economic development is always the primary concern of government work due to its
significance to Chinese political security, thus China’s economic security has become
crucial in Chinese national security concept at the contemporary stage. Notably, China’s
military security has not been undermined its importance.
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Chapter Five: China’s Economic Statecraft in its Diplomacy
Wu (2007) argues that ‘economic diplomacy represents compatible policy efforts by one
state to respond to competing interests from either home or hosting societies. Its goals are
to maximize national interests through government and its overseas missions...the
economic diplomacy of nation-states has two aspects: either using economic leverage to
promote political objectives or mobilizing diplomatic resources to advance trade and
commercial objectives’ (Wu, 2007: 1, 8). The former aspect suggests that the diplomatic
efforts in service of strategic objectives take place by means of economic statecraft, either
as rewards, sanctions, or engagement. The latter point refers to the diplomatic activities
of a sovereign state intended to maximise national economic interests, in service of the
domestic economy, including the monitoring and reporting of economic situations in
foreign countries to the home government and the provision of advice on how to
enhance overseas investment. This chapter focuses on the former .
Indeed, since the end of the Second World War and in particular the Cold War, economic
statecraft has played an increasingly prominent role in international relations, as
economic interdependence, which has closely integrated the participants as a result of
swift growth of economic globalisation, enables economic statecraft. From an
international relations perspective, the significance of economic statecraft does not
simply stem from serving economic development, but also in assisting the state to
achieve its strategic objectives. Taking the famous ‘Marshall Plan’ as a typical application,
it helped Western countries restore their fragmented economies and opened a wider
market for the US surplus capital and products. On the other hand, it may have repelled
the possible socialist expansion of the Soviet Union by building a robust linkage within
Western Europe.
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In China’s case, the strategy of economic statecraft is used rather often. The communist
regimes in Cuba, North Korea and Laos are traditional recipients of Chinese grants; the
return to the United Nations in 1971 was a remarkable reward for Chinese long-term
assistance to Third World countries, in addition to the US efforts. In the 1990s, the
Chinese took economic revenge on France for their arms sales to Taipei, and their
shopping trip in Europe and the United States attempted to evade human rights
accusations for the conflicts over Chinese trade surplus. However, as Wu (2007) notes,
the use of economic statecraft in these cases reveals that the politics-first strategy usually
involves little economic calculation and disregards the balance of cost and benefits. This
remains unchanged until China clarifies its priority of diplomacy (Wu, 2007: 8).
This chapter will discuss the Chinese model of economic statecraft in foreign policy and
trace its distinctive path. The first part will briefly present the structure, actors and
processes in the making of China’s foreign and foreign economic policy. The second part
will analyse the evolution of Chinese diplomacy and the corresponding effects on the
role of economic statecraft, dividing the process into four stages by examining three
crucial years over the past decades: 1978, 1989, and 2001.
Stage one (1949–1978): Western isolation compelled China to conduct ideological
diplomacy with other third-world states. Economic statecraft – foreign aid specifically –
was used to break through the isolation and acquire recognition of its legitimacy.
Stage two (1978–1989): at the end of 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party
Central Committee decided to decentralise control over the economy and approved the
open-door policy, which ceased the self-isolation and led to remarkable changes in its
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economy. Diplomatically, China abandoned ideology-dominated thinking and tried to
absorb Western advanced technologies and capital.
Stage three (1989–2001): the Tiananmen events in 1989, calling for domestic political
reform of the One-Party dominant system, imposed significant changes on China.
Externally, both China’s political system and human right records have attracted
Western attention and in turn have become the targets of criticism, forcing the Chinese
government to reverse their diplomatic focus from developed countries towards
developing states. Internally, China’s political leaders altered their priorities between
political and economic reforms. Some of them questioned the necessity of an open
economic policy. Deng’s speech on the Southern tour and the Fourteenth National
People’s Congress in 1992 stabilised the situation through identifying the primary role of
economic development and ensuring the determination of securing a socialist market
economy. Since then, the Chinese economy has experienced a decade’s high growth.
Stage four (2001 onwards): in 2001, China successfully became a member of the World
Trade Organisation. The membership not only corresponds with the expansion of
Chinese economic scope, but also triggers resource shortages as a result of the swift
expansion. This imposes direct challenges on domestic industrialisation; the Iraq War of
2003 further deteriorates the energy security of China, as the Middle East supplies the
majority of China’s energy imports; and the US anti-terror war in Asia exacerbates
China’s regional security. At this stage, both energy and regional security become key to
China’s security agenda.
Through the four-stage analysis, the chapter reaches two conclusions. First, Chinese
diplomatic efforts have shifted the focus on the issues of surrounding security and
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energy supplies, going through the protection of national independence before the 1970s,
the provision of conditions for smooth economic development in the 1980s, and the
breach of the Western political isolation in the 1990s. This is attributable to active
South–South cooperation with other energy-rich countries and the efforts in improving
the relations with periphery countries. Second, at each stage, no matter the focus of
foreign policy, economic statecraft always works as a complementary leverage to assist
the achievement of national strategic objectives. From the economic assistance to Africa
in the 1950s to the proposals of Free Trade Area with ASEAN and SCO today, economic
statecraft has become instrumental to China’s diplomacy and its use has been
rationalised beyond an ideology-dominated foreign policy.
5.1 The process in the making of China’s foreign policy
Before assessing trends in China’s economic diplomacy, let us remind ourselves of the
state structures that govern foreign policy and foreign economic policy in China.
Despite the growing complexity and changing focus of Chinese foreign relations, it
seems that Beijing’s major foreign policy decision are usually seen as decisions of top
communist leaders at the apex of China’s political hierarchy. Indeed, the decision-
making power for either the foreign or domestic policies is concentrated in the hands of a
few key individuals. In theory, the party bodies, such as the Central Committee (中共中
央委员会 ), the party Secretariat (书记处 ), the Central Military Commissions (中央军委 ),
the government bodies such as the State Council (国务院 ), and the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress (人大常务委员会) are involved in foreign relations and
policy-making processes to various extents. Especially the Political Bureau (政治局 ),
representative of the Central Committee, is thought of as being the major decision-
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making body, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the State Council is the
executive body. But in reality, the supremacy of the party leadership and the hero
worship of the top leader determine that the highest party leader alone makes the final
ratification. For example, since 1949 the ultimate foreign policy authority was understood
to have depended on Mao Zedong, who raised ‘two-middle areas’ or ‘the Third World
structure’ theories to conduct Beijing’s diplomacy, while in the 1980s major policy
authority rested with the single figure as Deng Xiaoping, who defined the central
position of economic development, and, correspondingly, foreign policy was designed to
approach the West and the regional states.
Since the late 1980s, Deng Xiaoping had attempted to institutionalise the decision-
making process and to make it less dependent on personal authority. First, in addition to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many other government organisations under the State
Council are granted functions related to foreign affairs, such as the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade7, the Ministry of Finance, Military Force, and other
national policy banks such as China Export–Import Bank and China Development Bank
(see Table 5.1). To support the implementation and coordination of foreign policy, there
is the party Secretariat’s Foreign Affairs Small Group (中央外事工作领导小组 ), which
comprises key party and government officials, including the President, the Premier,
leaders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the
Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Propaganda and other related senior
officials. 8 In general, the decision-making process for foreign policy follows a fairly
7 The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and other organs under the
Economy and Trade Commission were composed of theMinistry of Commerce in 2003.
8 The party Secretariat’s Foreign Affairs Small Group (中央外事工作领导小组), also named the
Party Secretariat’s National Security Small Group (中央国家安全领导小组 ), which was set up
in 1998, is the successor of the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office (国务院外事办公室 )
established in 1981.
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hierarchical pattern. If the ministries were unable to make a decision or if higher-level
consideration was required, the issue might be referred to the State Council for review.
Certain major issues would be discussed by the Foreign Affairs Small Group before
consideration by the party Secretariat. If the issue were extremely critical, the final
decision would be directed to the Political Bureau (see Figure 5.1).
Table 5.1: Ministries Involved and Their Functions On The Process of Making Foreign
Policy and Foreign Economic Policy
Ministries Function on the process of policy-making
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Besides running diplomatic activities on behalf of the
state and the government, the Ministry studies
overarching and strategic issues in international
situations and international relations, advises the
Central Committee and the State Council on major
foreign issues, and implements policy decisions.
Ministry of Commerce
Through regular meetings with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce
coordinates China’s foreign economic policy with
other aspects of its foreign policy, including the
formulation of development policies of foreign
economic cooperation, and the management of
China’s concessional loans, special funds and other
foreign aid funds of the Chinese government. The
Department of Aid to Foreign Countries under the
Ministry is particularly responsible for the
formulation of foreign aid plans.
Ministry of Finance
The Ministry drafts regulations on external finance
and debts, and prepares the budget of the central
government on foreign aid. Together with the
Ministry of Commerce, the two examine the foreign
aid projects regularly.
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Figure 5.1: China’s Foreign policy making process
Ministries Function on the process of policy-making
Military force
The most important link between the military and
foreign policy establishments appears to be at the
highest level – the Political Bureau. It is a kind of
tradition that at least one of two Standing members of
the Political Bureau must come from the Central
Military Commission.9Furthermore, the PLA’s
strategic research bodies, such as the Beijing
Institution for International Strategic Studies and
Military Science Institution of PLA, work on military
and security issues with foreign policy implications.
These research fruits will be directed to senior military
officials.
National Policy Banks China Development Bank is responsible for the
financial support of Chinese enterprises’ going out
strategy by offering investment. For example, the
China–Africa Development Fund under the bank
particularly aims to promote investment on Africa.
The Export–Import Bank of China is authorised by the
Chinese government as the sole lender of the
government concessional loan. It is responsible for
offering credit and soft loans, to its counterparts.
State
Council
Foreign Affairs
Small Group
Party
Secretariats
9 The Ministry of Defence is a government body, and the Central Military Commission is a
party institution. The former has no real power except for diplomatic or military
communication. In general, the leaders of the Central Military Commission are also the
leaders of the Ministry of Defence. In 2007, 2 of the 25 elected members of the Political Bureau
came from the Central Military Commission.
Political Bureau
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Second, the tradition that the decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a
few key individuals at the top of hierarchy has changed gradually. When the party
Secretariat’s Foreign Affairs Small Group meets weekly or as required by circumstances,
in some cases, related expertise would be invited to provide expert advice, even directly
to the Political Bureau. These invited expertise come from reputable think tanks and
universities. 10 But one thing should be noted: Western scholars emphasise independence
from government, political parties, and interest groups as well as non-profitability, as the
feature of think tanks. In China, because of the existing one party dominated system,
almost all Chinese think tanks are government-funded or have a degree of government
connection. For example, Qian Qichen worked as the director of International Relations
School, Beijing University, after he stepped down fromVice-premier. Xia Yong, an expert
on Law, was removed from China Academy of Social Sciences and acceded to the Sea
Palace, becoming a senior counsellor with Hu Jintao.
Third, the public voice can be heard by the core of power through the omnipresence of
the Internet: President Hu Jintao and Primer Wen Jiabao are reported to use the Internet
10 The top ten important think tanks are: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Development
and Research Central of State Council, China Academy of Sciences, China’s PLA Academy of
Military Sciences, China Institute of International Studies, China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations, China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, China
Association for Science and Technology, China Association for Global Strategy, and Shanghai
Institute of International Studies .
Related
Ministries
and Policy
Banks
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regularly to know what the public think and communicate with them through the official
Xinhua Net and the Government Net. The party-controlled TV media, China Central
Television, have begun to discuss the populous Netnews. A number of party officials
have been deprived of both position and party membership after their corrupted
behaviours were exposed via the Internet. In terms of foreign policy, the public has
started to use the Internet channel to exert pressure on the party and government. For
example, after French president Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama in 2008, a great number of
people immediately launched an anti-France campaign through the Internet, which to
some extent made the government take a hard line in its policy when dealing with
France. From this perspective, foreign policy making in China has been moving towards
a moredemocratic way.
Fourth, after the reform era, as China’s contracts with other countries increased, not only
top party and government leaders became involved more frequently in foreign affairs,
but also officials at lower levels may meet with foreign visitors, sign cooperative treaties
and agreement with foreign nations and companies, and travel abroad regularly.
Therefore, the governments at lower levels may play roles in executing China’s foreign
policy and foreign economic policy on the onehand, and on the other hand their interest
pursuits could be reflected in shaping the overall direction of Chinese foreign policy.
However, in the party state, the relations between party and government functions in
foreign affairs could still be seen as party supremacy in overall policy making and
supervision, with the government’s State Council and related ministries under the State
Council responsible for the execution of foreign policies and the daily conduct of foreign
relations. The highest party body, the Political Bureau, makes final ratification on crucial
foreign policies. The Nation People’s Congress (NPC), which is supposed to be the
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highest organ of state power in China, has the authority to amend the constitution, enact
basic laws, elect the president and vice president, decide on the choice of premier and
other members of the State Council, and examine and approve policy plans of the State
Council, but its diplomatic role is limited in meeting with counterpart organisations in
foreign countries. Although the NPC should have a voice in foreign matters and it
should prepare reports on related foreign policy issues for other party and government
bodies, traditionally, the NPC’s proposals are more related to domestic issues, and they
never veto on any government or party bills, including foreign policies, with anything
less than 90% approval rate in every case. Since the majority of the NPC members are
composed of party members and senior officials in governments, the highest power
authority in China has limited effects on the foreign policy making process.
5.2 The role of economic statecraft in the changing foreign policy
This section will analyse the evolution of Chinese diplomacy and the corresponding role
of economic statecraft in the evolution.
5.2.1 Stage one (1949–1978)
In the early years following the establishment of New China, ‘war and revolution’
dominated the ideology of both the country and the people, with expectations for the
final victory of anti-imperialism, socialist revolution, and liberation struggles worldwide.
The primary task of China’s diplomacy was defined as the removal of imperialist control
on China and restoration of national sovereignty and independence (Li, 2000: 45;
Brodsgaard, 2002: 7; Tang, 2000). Confronted with the hostility from the capitalist camp
and the Western blockage, the political leaders applied a highly systematic Communist
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ideology to the realm of foreign policy, and the central government issued three
principles in the early 1950s: leaning to one side (yi bian dao); building another stage
(ling qi lu zhao); andwelcoming guests before cleaning up (da sao gan jing zai qing ke) –
which promoted diplomatic attention to other socialist countries and colonised
countries.11 The diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states like
Albania, Begonia, Poland, Romania, and North Korea were set up immediately.
Under the full Western embargo against China, the ‘leaning to the Soviet Union’ along
with the self-sufficiency policy were beneficial to national construction. During the first
‘five-year’ plan from 1953 to 1957, the Soviet Union helped China create development
plans, offered low-interests loans, and transferred needed technologies. With the
technology and capital assistance the industrial bases of China’s North-eastern provinces
were shaped.
However, the harmonious relations with the Soviet Union turned around in the late
1950s. In 1958, Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposed to set up military bases in Chinese
territory, which would make China a periphery state of the Soviet Union. Triggered by
Chinese opposition, later in 1959, the Soviet Union announced the abolition of all
bilateral projects, including the cancellation of contracts and the withdrawal of experts.
Both then assigned large forces to border areas, representing the complete breakdown of
bilateral relations. Since then, the new communist regime confronted two superpowers
and the foreign policy of ‘leaning to the Soviet side’ lost its significance. Confronted with
the international situation, Mao Zedong pointed out the strategic thinking of ‘two-
11 Leaning to one side refers to alliances with others groups opposing imperialist invasion;
building another stage means the abandonment of previous diplomatic relations that the old
China established; welcoming guests before cleaning up suggests the complete removal of all
potential imperialism in China.
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middle-areas ’. In his theory, the middle areas included the majority of under-developed
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the developed capitalist states in Europe.
The similarity of the two areas lay in opposing US control, so that Beijing may limit the
two hegemonies by cooperating with the first area and allying with the second area. The
following years saw Chinese efforts of engaging with countries in the two areas and the
establishment of diplomatic relations with a total of fifty states, including many African
and Western European states: with Gannon in 1960, Kenya in 1963, Tanzania in 1964,
France in 1964, and Italy in 1970.
In the 1970s, Mao further constructed a hierarchical structure of three worlds: the two
superpowers constituted the first world, Japan, Western Europe, Australia and Canada
stood within the second, the rest of the world, including Asia, Africa and Latin America,
was the third. He suggested an international strategy of cooperation with the Second and
Third worlds to contain the hegemony of the two superpowers (Zhao, 2004: 4). However,
considering the imminent threat from the Soviet Union, Chinese political leaders decided
that the primary task was to ally with all potential allies, including the United States,
against the influence of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Beijing seized opportunities to
deliver positive messages to the United States, such as the resumption of China–US
Ministerial negotiations, Ping-Pong diplomacy, and the secret visits of Kissinger. In 1973,
when Mao met with Kissinger, the Former state secretary of America, the former clearly
conveyed that Chinese cooperation with Japan, Europe along with the United States
were able to counter the threats of the Soviet Union. Similarly to Chinese intentions, the
United States also saw Beijing as a counter-balance force. During this period the role of
Beijing shifted from a steadfast member of the Soviet Bloc to a socialist political ally of
the United States. With the warm relations with the United States, the number of
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countries recognising the legitimacy of Beijing grew from 32 in 1959 to 55 in the late of
1970s (Li, 2000: 46).
In the period from 1949 to 1978, the power balance between the two superpowers
determined the priority of Beijing’s foreign policy, although its diplomatic objective was
always to get worldwide acceptance and to grow as an independent state. From a
member of the Soviet-led socialist camp in the 1950s, a new communist state confronting
both superpowers in the 1960s, to a political partner of the United States against the
Soviets in East Asia in the 1970s, Beijing cautiously chose its position between the two
states. Undoubtedly, the unstable political situation externally and the over-emphasis on
class struggle internally caused more harm than good. Economic construction was set
aside entirely. The centrally planned economy stood at the breaking line after the 3-year
of natural disaster from 1959–1962 and the 10-year Cultural Revolution from 1967–1976.12
The only impressive diplomatic achievement was the setup of a good foundation for
subsequent China–African relations. Regardless of the ‘two-middle areas’ or ‘the third
world structure’ theories, Africa remained an unchanged political partner in China’s
strategic plan, given the mutual goals of revolution against imperialism. Furthermore,
considering African countries made up 30 per cent of the membership in the United
Nation, the group may have worked as a positive force to help Beijing win the legal seat
in the UN, replacing Taipei.
12 Even in comparison to the wartime period of 1920s, the average of the trade ratio remained
much lower, 16.7 per cent of GDP in the 1920s to 9.8 per cent in 1957, and 6.9 per cent in 1965
(Ash, 2002: 38). By the late of 1970s, technological levels fell decades behind the average
world practice, while consumption levels were static and falling for many (Brodsgaard and
Heurlin, 2002: 84).
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During the 1952 Bandung conference, Premier Zhou Enlai revealed the aim of
cooperation with Africa. Later during visits to Africa in the 1960s, he clarified the
necessity of mutual political solidarity and promised to finance the revolutionary
activities and national construction in the continent, which may be seen as the initial
attempt of China’s economic statecraft. In 1967, China’s largest foreign aid project was
granted to build the Tanzania–Zambia railway at a cost of more than 600 million USD.
Even during the domestic chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government
continued to commit aid, estimated at 1.9 billion USD to 29 African countries during 1970
to 1977 (Yu, 1988: 852, 855). The return to the UN with the support of the African states as
well as the abandonment of diplomatic ties with Taipei was regarded as the return of the
long-term financial assistance.13 However, it was certain that the economic assistance was
very limited in scope and in amount due to China’s fragmented economy.
5.2.2 Stage two (1978–1989)
At this stage, there were two events having significant impacts on China’s domestic
development and its foreign policy:
• The influential Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December
1978 showed signs of correcting Mao’s errors in excessively stressing ideological
war and class struggle, and suggested a focus on the socialist modernisation.
• In January 1979, official relations were formally established between the United
States and China, and in September, the Soviet Union launched rounds of
peaceful negotiations with China at the vice-minister level to solve the bilateral
issues.
13 In 1975, 30 of the 48 African countries had recognised Chinese legitimacy and abandoned
diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Yu, 1988: 850-851).
138
With the remedying of Sino-America relations, the tension with the neighbouring
countries in the East Asian region was relieved. In 1972, Japan established relations with
China. In 1974, Malaysia and China set up diplomatic relations. In 1975, both the
Philippines and Thailand initiated relations with China. Also with US backing, Beijing
replaced Taipei in the United Nations, which symbolised the successful access to
international political community. Due to the decline in the power of the Soviet Unionas a
result of its entrapment in the Afghanistan war, China faced fewer threats from its most
powerful neighbour. It seemed toDeng Xiaoping that the world scene for China could be
identified as peaceful so that the government should attach priority to domestic
development. Furthermore, the political leaders acknowledged that the decline of China,
in great part, was associated with the anti-Western sentiment and the self-isolation policy.
Integration with the outside world through trade and capital flow was considered urgent
when trade and the mobility of capital were accelerating worldwide. Eventually Deng
Xiaoping defined the national goal of economic development and determined to adopt
any means to that end. The market was defined as the socialist market economy, shifting
from the planned commodity economy. Diplomatic resources were utilised to attract the
Westernadvanced technology,capital, andmanagerial skills.
In early 1979, Eastern provinces, such as Guangdong and Fujian provinces, were
nominated to be Special Economic Zones, and four Special Export Zones in the coastal
areas, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou, were established subsequently. These
special zones shouldered the mission of importing foreign technology, investment and
management skills, and of stimulating exports to earn foreign currency. In 1984, Beijing
decided to move further, opening 14 cities located along the coast. Within the open zones,
preferential measures were issued to promote economic development, including tax-
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reduction or exemptions for foreign enterprises and export subsidies for local
entrepreneurs. The private sector was granted legal status and equality of tax treatment,
which effectively promoted the small andmedium size entrepreneurial developments.
Due to economic reform, this period saw a rapid and stable economic growth and an
increasing number of FDI inflows (see Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). In 1993 the total trade in
the Special Zones reached a record high of 27.8 billion USD, and manufactured exports
accounted for 14.3 billion USD (Webber, Wang and Ying, 2003: 148). Driven by the
growth of economic zones, the total foreign trade grew from 20.6 billion USD in 1978 to
111.6 billion USD in 1989, and the GDP increased from 307.6 billion USD in 1980 to 401
billion USD in 1988 (World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007, IMF; Tang, 2000).
The trade volume on GDP rose from 9.8 per cent in 1978 to 23.1 per cent in 1985 and to 30
per cent in 1990 (Brodsgaard andHeurlin, 2002: 38).
Table 5.2: FDI Flows toChina from 1979–1989 (USD Billion)
Year Amount
1979–1982 1.77
1983 0.92
1984 1.42
1985 1.96
1986 2.24
1987 2.31
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, PRC
Table 5.3: China’s GDPGrowth from 1979–1988
Source: Liu, 2005; National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2004.
Since the focus of the government agenda remained on economic construction, the
foreign policy was designed to serve this target. At the same time as economic reforms
gave China access to Western technologies and markets, it required Beijing to maintain
good relations with the countries providing abundant investments. In this regard, Beijing
entirely abandoned the ideology-oriented diplomacy, instead, it actively promoted the
full normalisation with the United States, Europe, and Japan. Through the growing
economic interaction, the relations with the West reached a historic level and the
divergence of the political system was over-shadowed temporarily.
1988 3.19
1989 3.39
Year GDP growth (%)
1979 7.6
1980 7.8
1981 5.2
1982 9.1
1983 10.9
1984 15.2
1985 13.5
1986 8.8
1987 11.6
1988 11.3
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Furthermore, Beijing directed massive diplomatic efforts to improve the relations with
the neighbouring states. The initiative was to ‘cooperate with neighbouring countries in
order to take a share of the rapid economic growth in the region’ (Zhao, 2004: 258). Later
Deng Xiaoping clarified the importance of a favourable environment for economic
modernisation, not only internationally but also regionally. Diplomacy in promoting
regional stability was therefore launched by proposing to settle the historical issues
through negotiation and to seek common ground without letting the divergences affect
the restoration of bilateral relations. Beijing began border negotiations with India; it took
positive actions to break the long-term confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the
period saw bilateral interactions being restored on economy, trade, science and so on; it
also intensified the exchanges with the ASEAN. When Chinese Primer Li Peng visited
Thailand in 1988, he revealed the desire of establishing or restoring the friendship with
all ASEANmembers.
Moreover, since China was striving to improve people’s living standards and to enhance
national capability, which required economic support of the Western developed states,
foreign assistance in this stage was mainly directed inwards instead of outwards,
illustrated by an increasing FDI inflow. When China itself relied on external resources,
foreign aid towards African countries was given less emphasis, as both were developing
countries with limited capital. Less Chinese development aid was destined to Africa and
the number of visiting delegations also declined. Nevertheless, China’s aid commitments
of approximately 259 million USD in 1984 made it Africa’s sixth largest donor (Mawdsley,
2007: 411).
5.2.3 Stage three (1989–2001)
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• The Tiananmen incident occurred in 1989, calling for political reform. Beijing’s
suppression by military force led to Western sanctions and criticism of China’s
human rights records.
• The Soviet Union abandoned the communist system and disintegrated entirely in
1991. The triangular America–China–Soviet Union relationship lost its
equivalence so that the importance of China to both the United States and Russia
faded.
• American military intervention in the Gulf War of 1991, the warship deployed to
the Taiwan straits in 1996, the Revised Guideline for US–Japan Defence
Cooperation in 1999, and the Kosovo crisis of 1999, including the bombing of the
Chinese embassy, made China aware of the US unilateralism worldwide and its
ambitions in the Asia Pacific.
Since 1989, the determination on economic openness was undermined by domestic calls
for political revolution. The subsequent crackdown of the Soviet Union not only raised
questions of the credibility of the communist system, but also placed Beijing at the centre
of controversy, being the biggest Communist state in the world. Divergences appeared
among the top leaders, hesitating between the priority of political reform or economic
reform. Deng Xiaoping institutionalised the concept of socialist market economy and
confirmed the primary task of economic construction during his Southern tour of 1992. In
Deng’s words, ‘except in the event of an emergent war, the Chinese people must steel
themselves to carry out this task with reality and commitment; they must make it their
central task and allow nothing to interfere with its fulfilment. Even if there is a large-
scale war, afterwards China will still have to pick up where it left off or start over’ (Li,
2007: 40, cited from Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1994: 249).
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Also due to the 1989 incident, an arms embargo was imposed by the EU and the United
States as a direct response to the military actions of the Chinese authorities. It seemed that
the harmonious economic relations failed to dismiss the conflicts in the political sector.
Since then, the Chinese human rights record has been the target of Western criticism and
been used as a condition for economic collaboration, making Beijing aware of the
fundamental divergence between them and the West.
Moreover, a series of US movements, including the military intervention in the Gulf War
of 1991, the attempt of replacing the priority of national sovereignty by human rights in
the World Conference onHuman rights of 1993, the permitted visit of Taiwanese leader, Li
Denghui, to the United States in 1995, the warship deployed to the Taiwan straits in 1996,
the Revised Guideline for US–Japan Defence Cooperation in 1999, the Kosovo crisis of
1999, an increasing number of submarines deployed in the Asia Pacific since the mid-
1990s, and the bombing of Chinese embassy, compels China to be aware of US military
power and ambition. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Washington considers
Beijing more a potential strategic competitor than a possible ally. In 1998, the Chinese
Defence Minister publicly accused the US presence in East Asia of limiting China’s
development.
The above three factors changed Beijing’s diplomatic thinking inmany ways. Zhao (2004)
discussed Chinese foreign policy of the post-Tiananmen period in his book Chinese
Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour . According toZhao, first, Beijing engages
more frequently inmultinational cooperative frameworks, trying to abandon the image of
dictatorship. Second, Beijing seeks to develop its regional policy, by the ‘good-neighbours’
mechanism. On the basis of his conclusion, this study argues that in the post-Tiananmen
era, in order to avoid direct confrontation with the United States, Chinese diplomacy
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follows Deng’s 24-character strategy: observe calmly, secure our position, cope with
affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile,
and never claim leadership; at the same time it attempts to break isolation from the West
by uniting with Europe, and the Third World states, especially the regional developing
states.
It is apparent that to restrain US unilateral expansion Chinese efforts alone would be
insufficient and collaboration with second and Third World states is necessary. This
period saw China tighten relations with potential allies (see Table 5.4). First were the
relations with West Europe. Due to the 1989 incident, the European states followed the
United States in imposing sanctions on China, which jeopardised bilateral economic and
political relations. After the British Prime Minister and the Italian Prime Minister visited
Beijing in 1991, the Chinese Premier paid visits to Italy, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain,
which pushed the recovery with the West Europe. When Jiang Zeming visited France in
1994, he proposed to develop a long-term stable partnership with Europe and to enhance
the exchanges in international affairs. In 1995, the EU issued a policy paper on China,
calling for the enhancement of cooperation in all aspects. At the Asia–EU conference in
1998, China and the EU released a joint announcement, which lifted bilateral relations to
a constructive partnership. These diplomatic exchanges effectively promoted China–EU
interactions.
Table 5.4 Partnerships between China and Major Counterparts during 1997–2000
Country Year Partnership
Russia Apr/1996 Both established a strategic, cooperative partnership of equality
and mutual trust facing the 21st century
France May/1997 Both established a comprehensive partnership
United State Oct/1997 Both declared to build a constructive strategic partnership in th
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Source: Zhao, 2004: 181; official announcements.
Second, the relations with Africa and Latin America are also of interest. The relations
with Africa were not affected by the Tiananmen incident. Conversely, the denunciation
of the Tiananmen Square affair not only embarrassed the Beijing government but also
represented a contagion effect that could have threatened the power base of the African
political elites, as the majority of African leaders had come to power without democratic
legitimacy. In order to avoid the wave of democratisation reaching Africa, they were not
reluctant to lend their support to Beijing’s behaviour. In 1996, President Jiang Zeming
visited six African states (Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwe), and
Country Year Partnership
s e 21st century
Canada Nov/1997 Both agreed on a comprehensive partnership straddling over
the present and the next centuries
ASEAN Dec/1997 Both agreed to establish a partnership facing the 21st century
based on good-neighbourliness and mutual trust
India Dec/1997 Both reached a consensus on the establishment of a partnership
of constructive cooperation facing the 21st century
Pakistan Feb/1998 Both decided to establish a partnership of comprehensive
cooperation facing the 21st century
European
Union
Apr/1998 Both agreed to establish a constructive partnership of long-term
stability facing the 21st century
United
Kingdom
Oct/1998 Both decided to establish a comprehensive partnership
Japan Nov/1998 Both declared to establish a partnership of friendship and
cooperation facing the 21st century, working for peace and
development
South Africa Feb/1999 Both decided to establish a constructive partnership facing the
21st century
Egypt Apr/1999 Both confirmed to establish a relationship of strategic
cooperation facing the 21st century
Saudi Arabic Oct/1999 Both confirmed to establish a relationship of strategic
cooperation facing the 21st century
African
Countries
2000 First forum of China–Africa summit
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proposed to develop full cooperation with Africa. During his visits, he signed more than
20 cooperative treaties in economy, trade and cultural sectors with the six states, and
assisted more than 600 projects in the continent (Jiang Zeming’s Trip to Six African States,
2000). In terms of Latin America, in the 1990s Beijing set up dialogues at the ministerial
level with the Rio group, the most influential political institution in the region. In 1994,
China became an observer state of the Latin American Integration Association. In 1997
the Caribbean Development Bank accepted China as one of its member states.
The third issue is the relations with the neighbouring states in Asia Pacific. The
‘periphery policy’ in the 1980s was initiated to produce a stable regional situation for
economic growth, but after the 1989 turmoil, an additional implication arose – that the
Asia Pacific region may be a regional foundation for China’s diplomatic breakthrough in
the future.
In the Southeast Asian region, as in Africa, the Tiananmen incident did not affect the
relations with the neighbours. In 1989 China exchanged diplomatic recognition with Laos;
in 1990, Indonesia restored full diplomatic relations with China; in the same year, Sino-
Singapore and Sino-Vietnam relations were normalised, while Brunei followed in 1991.
The normalisation with all ASEAN countries was widely seen as a breakthrough in
Chinese diplomatic history. Later in 1991, the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reiterated
Chinese willingness to cooperate with ASEAN at the 24th ASEANministerial meeting. In
1996 China was granted a dialogue membership, and in 1997 the China–ASEAN Joint
Committee was set up (China–ASEAN relations, Xinhua net). The Asian Financial Crisis
in 1997 acted as an impetus to facilitate bilateral relations. Through the ‘Stand-by-Asia’
policy, Beijing did not just offer economic assistance to the afflicted countries but also
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refused the Renminbi depreciation.14 In December 1997, China and ASEAN agreed to
establish a mutual trust partnership for the 21st century. At the ASEAN–China summit in
2001, the two agreed to expand areas of collaboration to agriculture, information and
communications technology, human resource development and investment.
In Central Asia, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China recognised the new
federal states and built diplomatic relations with them. In 1994, Beijing and Moscow
issued a joint-declaration, which promised not to accumulate nuclear weapons directed
at one another. Subsequently in 1996, both announced a strategic, cooperative
partnership of equality and mutual trust facing the 21st century, which defined a
direction for bilateral diplomacy. With the efforts of China and Russia, the two together
with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the Shanghai Agreement on
Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area in 1996, aimed at the
development of long-term stability in the border areas. In 1997 the Agreement onMutual
Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas was released, which relieved tension by
downgrading the military forces in the border areas to the minimum level compatible
with good-neighbourly relations. With the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, these states
formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an inter-governmental multi-security
organisation.
The SCO is a political group aiming to improve regional stability and counter the
influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asia region. According to the
declaration on the establishment of the SCO, the main purposes are: ‘strengthening
14 China did play an important regional stabilisation role in the 1997 Financial Crisis by not
devaluing the Chinese Yuan just for the sake of maintaining its own export price
competitiveness, and even offered financial assistance to some neighbouring countries to
rebuild their badly affected currency markets, including more than USD 4 billion economic
assistance to Thailand, and export-credits to Indonesia.
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mutual trust and good-neighbourliness and friendship among member states,
developing their effective cooperation in political affairs, economic and trade…working
together to maintain regional peace, security and stability, and promoting the creation of
a new international political and economic order featuring on democracy, justice and
rationality’ (Yang, 2004: 9). If including the observer members (India, Pakistan, and Iran),
the SCO covers the largest geographical area of any regional organisation, and possesses
17.5 per cent of oil reserves, and 47–50 per cent of natural gas reserves in the world. It is
undeniable that the cooperative treaties with the central Asian states significantly
ameliorate Beijing from the concerns on border issues in central Asia, and enable it to
concentrate on dealing with the US containment from themaritime Southeast Asia area.
In South Asia, when Jiang Zemin visited the three South Asian states in 1996, a
constructive partnership towards the 21st century with India, the full-cooperation
partnership towards the 21st century with Pakistan, and the Good-Neighbour relations
with Nepal were successfully formed.
In North-eastern Asia, South Korea and China formed a partnership in 1998. However,
relations with Japan did not significantly improve. In 1989, Japan joined the Western
states in imposing sanctions on China, froze governmental loans, and cancelled all high-
level visits. In 1994, without the knowledge of the Chinese government, Japan allowed
the Taiwanese political leader to attend the opening ceremony of the Asia Sports Games
held in Hiroshima, Japan. In 1995, Japan froze economic assistance to protest against
Chinese nuclear tests.
According to the analysis above, it is apparent that since the Tiananmen turmoil of 1989,
there were at least two shifts in Beijing’s diplomatic focus. First, the US-led sanctions
149
reminded Beijing of the fundamental differences between the West and China. In order
to break the Western isolation, Beijing re-emphasised the importance of Third World
states in Latin America, Africa and Asia, which shared similar values. South–South
cooperation became apparent within Chinese diplomatic efforts. Second, the US military
actions around the world and in the Asia Pacific region further made Beijing aware of US
military power and ambition. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing, in
the eyes of America, was not a valuable ally; instead, it could be a potential rival with
clashing ideology. In order to surpass the US encirclement, a good regional environment
appeared critical, so Beijing strived to improve the neighbouring relations in its
Northeast, South, and Southeast sides. Therefore, regionalism became another symbol of
China’s diplomacy in the 1990s, in addition to South–South cooperation.
In the course of improving China’s diplomatic situation, economic statecraft began to
demonstrate its role. First, economic sanctions were initiated to express political
dissatisfaction. In 1991 and 1992, Paris ignored Beijing’s protests and approved the sale
by French firms of six La Fayette frigates and sixty Mirage 2000-5s planes to Taiwan. In
December 1992, Beijing ordered the closure of the French consulate and of the French
Trade Commission in Guangzhou. At the same time, French firms were excluded from
some tender processes, including Guangzhou’s mass-rapid-transit system. Although
these punishments failed to stop the deals, they may have warned other EUmembers not
to follow suit.
Second, the 1990s also saw Beijing government’s use of economic incentives. For example,
when China wanted American compromises on access to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, a purchase of more than 700 million USD in American goods in 1991
and a major contract with three automakers in Detroit in 1992 potentially helped achieve
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this objective (Zhao, 2004: 148). In 1994, China signed 18 trade contracts valued at 18
billion Francs with France; in 1997, China bought 110 Boeing airplanes when the US Vice-
President visited Beijing; also in 1997, China procured 4 billion USD products during the
American trip of President Jiang Zemin (Chen, 2001: 175). These economic rewards were
believed to undermine official critics by resorting to commercial pressure. Furthermore,
in promoting regional solidarity, China proposed the strategy of creating a Free Trade
Area with ASEAN. In December 1997, ASEAN members and China agreed to work
towards a Free Trade Area at the ASEAN Plus Three summit. Later at the meeting of
senior ASEAN and Chinese economic officials in August 2001, China put forward a
series of tariff reductions and other economic measures to be settled before 2009.
Subsequently, in November 2001, Chinese Premier Zhou Rongji presented the blueprint
for a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area in 10 years’ time, and promised to open Chinese
markets in advance to those original ASEAN members as well as to grant special
preferential tariff treatment for the commodities imported from less developed ASEAN
members.
5.2.4 Stage four (2001 onwards)
• The 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 grants Washington the excuse to re-access Asia.
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• The full accession to the WTO in 2001 pushes Chinese economic expansion
remarkably, at the same time leading to the resource struggle with other states as
a result of resource’ shortage.
• The Iraqi war of 2003 affects oil supplies to China from the Middle East, forcing it
to diversify.
In this section, the study argues that the WTO membership and the Iraq war compels
China to focus on its energy security; by resorting to an anti-terror war, the United States
accesses central Asia and Southeast Asia, which directly challenge China’s regional
security.
WTOmembership
After the end of the Second World War, dominant nations such as the United States and
Western Europe have led the way in producing an international economic system in
which labour, capital, and technology were meant to flow more freely. For the rest of the
world, the choice was either to follow the rules or to be excluded from international
forms of exchange and cooperation. If China wanted to be integrated into the world
system, it would have been required to adopt a mode of operation of production and
exchange, subordinate to pre-emptive regulations of the World Trade Organisation.
Since China’s growth imperatives are tied to economic globalisation and access to WTO
membership may have increased its integration into the world system, China had ample
motivation to join the system.
After rounds of negotiation, China joined the WTO in 2001. The direct results coincided
with economic growth and resources shortages. Within the following tables, economic
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growth is expressed as three variables: GDP growth, trade volume and FDI inflows.
During the period from 2001 to 2007, GDP volume and GDP annual growth increased
steadily (see Table 5.5). The trade volume increased significantly from USD 509 billion in
2001 to 2,173 billion in 2007 (see Table 5.6). Similarly, FDI into China increased to USD
52.7 billion in 2002, with Chinese share of total FDI into the developing countries rising
to 32.5 per cent. The World Investment Reports 2006 suggested that FDI inflows to China
andHong Kong continued to rise. China received USD 60.6 billion in 2004, and USD 72.4
billion in 2005 (Woo, 2004: 1; World Investment Report, 2006: 51).
Table 5.5: China’s GDP and GDP Growth
Source: National Bureau of Statistics; China Statistical Yearbook 2004; National Bureau of
Statistics Plan Report, from 2007; CIAWorld Factbook, 2007.
Table 5.6: China’s Trade Volume from 2001–2007 (USD Billion)
Year GDP RMB Billion at
Current Prices
GDP Annual Growth
Rate (%)
2001 10,965.5 8.3
2002 12,033.3 9.1
2003 13,582.3 10.0
2004 15,987.8 10.1
2005 18,386.8 9.9
2006 21,087.1 11.1
2007 24,661.9 11.4
Year Trade volume
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Sources: the Ministry ofCommerce of PRC.
Furthermore, Chinese membership of WTO brought challenges to at least two groups of
states. For those who have similar comparative advantages andproduce labour-intensive
goods, such as the majority of developing countries in Asia and Africa, the challenges
came in the form of competition in third-party markets. For those relying on resource
imports, such as the United States, conflicts occurred in the struggle for resources. In
terms of the latter, China’s extraordinary economic expansion demanded massive
natural resources. Taking oil as an example, since 1993 China has become a net oil-
importer country and, in the year 2003, surpassed Japan as the second largest oil-
consumer in the world. From 2000 to 2005, China’s energy consumption rose by 60 per
cent, accounting for almost half of the growth in world energy consumption. However,
in 2004, when oil consumption grew by 15 per cent in 2004, there was only a 2 per cent
increase in domestic production. Although China is able to meet more than 90 per cent of
its primary energy requirement with domestic supplies, it imports almost half of the oil it
consumes. The Chinese government estimates that it will need 600 million tons of crude
oil a year by 2020, more than triple its expected output, which suggest the unavoidable
reliance on oil imports (data from Taylor, 2006: 943; Zhao, 2008: 209–210). The ninth five-
year plan from 1995 to 2000 already involved a call for improving energy efficiency, and
2001 509.76
2002 620.78
2003 851.21
2004 1154.74
2005 1422.12
2006 1760.69
2007 2173.83
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the tenth five-year plan in 2001–2005 added a call for seeking international sources of oil
and gas.
Iraqi War
The Middle East was the biggest oil source for China, amounting to more than 50 per
cent of the total suppliers (see Table 5.7). Iraq was regarded as onewell-supplied country.
Before Saddam Hussein’s regime was overturned, China made some deals with Iraq for
developing its oil reserves, including oil exploration on the Al-Ahdab field in central Iraq,
which was worth more than 1.3 billion USD and had the potential to produce 90,000
barrels a day, and the exploitation right to another big field, the Halfayah field, which
could produce 300,000 barrels a day. The two deals were expected to be equivalent to 13
per cent of Chinese domestic oil production (Goodman, 2005: 2). Hence, Beijing actively
advocated the removal of sanctions that limited Iraqi oil production and sales, and
opposed any military actions to settle the Iraqi issue.
Table 5.7: China’s Regional Sources of Imported Crude Oil, 2000–2003 (%)
Regions 2000 2003
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Sources: Lai 2007: 522, cited from Yearbook of China’s Economic Foreign Relations and
Trade, 2002, 2003.
However, the war on Iraq without the authorisation of the United Nations and with
disregard for the opposition by the majority of states, not only represents US
unilateralism in dealing with international affairs, but also poses a direct threat to
Beijing’s energy security. In the Middle East, the country with the richest oil reserves,
Saudi Arabia, has been engaging with the United States through the security-for-oil
relationship established since the Roosevelt era; the second largest source, Iran, was
under the threat of military attack by the United States for years due to its nuclear
ambitions; and Iraq was already under the control of American military forces. It seemed
to China that it needed to decrease the dependence on the Middle East’s sources and
intensify the search for new suppliers.
Both access to the WTO and the Iraqi war caused uncertainty for China’s energy security
from different perspectives, which forced China to conduct an energy diversification
strategy to secure its energy supplies. First, Beijing began the energy hunt worldwide.
Since 2003, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has signed 20 deals in 12
countries (Goodman, 2005: 3). In central Asia, when Premier Wen visited Russia in 2004,
Russia promised to expand oil exports to China and China decided to invest in the
Russian infrastructure and energy sector (Lai, 2007: 526). In 2005, the Chinese President
Middle East 53.6 51.3
Africa 24.0 24.4
Asia-Pacific 15.0 15.3
Russia and Kazakhstan 3.1 7.2
Europe 3.6 1.8
South America 0 0.4
156
Hu Jintao visited Kazakhstan and signed agreements aimed at developing a strategic
partnership with the Central Asian republic. Largely through CNPC, China has invested
heavily in several oil and gas fields, owning more than 85 per cent of Aktobemunaigas
Corporation, 100 per cent of the Bars exploration and development blocks, and 50 per
cent of the North Buzachi oil and gas field, and so on (Zhao, 2008: 216). In North America,
President Hu Jintao signed a 19.7 billion USD investment deal during his tour of
Argentina in 2005, of which 5 billion USD were earmarked for oil exploration. In 2006,
Venezuelan President Chavez signed an agreement to allow China to drill for oil, set up
refineries and produce natural gas (Wu, 2007: 10). In the Middle East, despite US
attempts to classify Iran as a terrorist state, Sinopec made a major deal to buy 250 million
tons of liquefied natural gas from Iran in the next 30 years and Iran will export 150,000
barrels of crude oil per day, for 25 years, to China (Lai, 2007: 523). This first deal was
expected to be the largest natural gas purchase in the world. Another energy company,
CNOOC, also negotiated a 16 billion USD investment in natural gas fields in Iran
(Kleine-Ahlbandt and Small, 2008: 44). In the African continent, some countries, such as
Sudan and Angola, already were major oil exporters to China. By 2007, China had
become the largest trading partner of Sudan. Based on 2005 data, oil and natural gas
accounted for 63 per cent of African exports to China, and the volume of oil supplies
from Africa increased steadily (Africa-China: Hu’s Tour, 2007, Africa Research Bulletin)
(see Table 5.8).
Table 5.8: China’s Imported Crude Oil by Region 1995–2006 (%)
Regions 1995 2000 2003 2006
Middle East 46 53.6 51.3 45
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Sources: Lai 2007: 522, cited from Yearbook of China’s Economic Foreign Relations and
Trade, 2002, 2003; Zhao, 2007a: 10.
Second, Beijing began to use the political privilege of being a permanent member of the
United Nations’ Security Council to protect its resource-suppliers in particular,
illustrated in the cases of Iran, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Sudan. In the case of Iran,
considering the energy interests there, China rejected any immediate sanctions. In the
case of Sudan, China has long insisted that the massacre in Darfur is an internal matter.
They refused to agree the imposition of sanctions on four Sudanese government officials
from the beginning, and later persuaded the Sudanese government to accept the
deployment of the UN peacekeeping force, including Chinese military engineers, as they
were concerned about Chinese interests being violated. With regard to Myanmar, China
together with Russia vetoed the proposal that a genuine democratic transition should be
initiated in Myanmar, since Beijing planned the construction of a gas and oil pipeline
from western Myanmar to Yunnan and Sichuan province of China, in order to facilitate
the oil shipments from Africa and the Middle East while bypassing the Malacca Strait.15
Third, if Chinese economic assistance was ideology-oriented in the 1950s, nowadays
China is beginning to step up interests-dominated economic leverage. For example,
China's FDI is concentrated in the mineral and oil sectors with the highest Chinese FDI
stocks in Sudan (352 million USD) and Zambia (160 million USD), accounting for 4.5 per
Africa 11 24.0 24.4 32
Asia-Pacific 41 15.0 15.3 8
Others 2 6.7 9.4 15
15 It was reported that three days after the Chinese vetoed sanctions against Myanmar, the
government granted a Chinese company an important oil and gas exploration contract
(Kleine-Ahlbandt and Small, 2008: 46–47).
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cent and 5.0 per cent respectively (ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 2007: 3).
Furthermore, the proportion of non-commercial aid has been reduced, with
commercially oriented assistance accounting for the vast majority of Chinese
governmental aid. As of 2005, the Chinese Export–Import Bank made an accumulated
commitment of 800 million USD in concessionary loans for 55 projects in around 22
African countries, with mostly resources-rich countries, such as Angola, Mozambique,
Sudan, Zimbabwe (Zhao, 2007a: 17). Taking Zimbabwe as an example, it possesses
deposits of more than 40 minerals including ferrochrome, gold, silver and copper.
Mugabe’s ‘looking east policy’ provided Beijing with opportunities to access Zimbabwe’s
valuable resources and secure lucrative deals for Chinese firms. In return, China
supplied Zimbabwe with expertise, technical assistance, and agriculture equipment.
Chinese banks grant the enterprises, including the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company,
with credit. In Angola, China agreed to make provision of more development aid,
around 6.3 million USD in interest-free loans, when they agreed a deal on a new oil
refinery (Taylor, 2006b: 947).
The War on Terror
The 9/11 terrorist attack allayed the disputes between the United States andChina in the
1990s, and shifted US focus to the War on Terror. The war in Afghanistan was officially
meant to capture Bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime. Indeed,
Afghanistan is a geographically important country, a cross point of Central Asia, South
Asia and East Asia. Controlling Afghanistan means potential access to the Republic of
Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, which are rich in gas and oil. The US military base in
Afghanistan, on the one hand, will contain Russia from the north. Together with the
expansion of NATO to incorporate Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia, the military force will
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be in direct contact with Moscow. On the other hand, it may threaten China in the East,
inciting the separatists in Xinjiang. If Kazakhstan can help China reduce its reliance on
sea transportation from the Middle East and Africa by offering oil alternatives, access to
Kazakhstan through Afghanistan also threatens China’s energy security.
Furthermore, as Afghanistan is a land-locked country, the United States needs to use the
transportation route from Pakistan to assist their military action, if necessary. Pakistan is
a traditional ally of China, and the latter has massive interests in helping the former
exclude external influence. For example, China intends to use Pakistan as an alternative
line to transport supplies from the Middle East andAfrica, bypassing the Malacca Strait,
a waterway that is plagued by piracy and that could be closed off in a war or
international crisis by theUS navy.
Moreover, in the name of anti-terror war, the United States ramped up its military
presence in the Southeast Asian region. The Bush administration boosted ties with the
Philippine military, by expanding military assistance and training. The United States
framed this as part of the war against terrorism. As a matter of fact, since 2002, the
United States together with six countries in the Southeast Asian region – Singapore,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines – have participated in annual
anti-terror exercises through the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism. The
increasing military presence of the United States in the area poses direct challenges to
China’s maritime security.
It appears that the US global anti-terror war in the Asian region poses threats to China
from its south and southeast sides. Regional security has become the primary Chinese
concern. To deal with it, first, during the period from 1999 to 2000, the Chinese
160
government signed bilateral cooperation agreements with every ASEAN member that
prescribed all-around cooperation, covering political, economic, cultural, and security
issues. After the military clash over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea
between China and Vietnam in 1992–1994 and between China and the Philippines in
1995, the release of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in
2002, which paved the way for peaceful resolution for the disputed area, further
promoted bilateral political relations and laid a stepping-stone for economic cooperation
afterwards. In 2002, the China–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement was released and both agreed to form an ASEAN–China Free Trade Area by
2020. In 2003, China and ASEAN announced a Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity, andChina became the first country outside ASEAN to accede to the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation. Through regional multilateral dialogue such as ASEAN Plus
Three, East Asian Community and ASEAN–China Economic Cooperation Framework,
China enhanced bilateral dialogues with ASEAN.
Second, resorting to the platform of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the organisation
signed a contact group with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2005, with the
purpose of elaborating proposals and recommendations on realisation of cooperation on
issues of mutual interests. Moreover, after accepting Mongolia as an observer in 2004, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation granted observer status to Pakistan, India and Iran
in 2005. Integrating Pakistan and India within the framework as well as enhancing
dialogue with Afghanistan may not only contribute to regional security and stability, but
also restrain the US ambitions in using these states to contain China within its
surrounding areas.
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Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a security-oriented institution,
China has proposed the possibility of enhancing security among the members through a
common trade area. Chinese Premier Wen suggested establishing a free trade area in the
organisation in 2004. During the 2006 summit, the member states promised to coordinate
their efforts in implementing the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic
Cooperation, to promote trade and investment facilitation in priority areas such as
energy, transportation, information and communications and agriculture, and to
implement the free flow of commodities, capital, services and technologies gradually
(Declaration on Fifth Anniversary of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2006). So far,
the SCO Inter-Bank Association and the SCO Business Council have been established and
resulted in some effects. It is a certainty that for China, the significance extends beyond
economic benefits.
In summary, the open policy within the Chinese economy has developed significantly,
accounting for 5 percent of global income in 2004 from no more than 2.9 percent in 1978
(Gu,Humphrey and Messner, 2008: 275). At the same time, it is considered as an engine of
global economic growth. During the period from 1990 to 2005, China actually contributed
around 28 percent to the global GDP growth (Ianchovichina and Walmsley, 2005: 276).
The WTOmembership of 2001 facilitated its economic rise even further, illustrated in the
GDP growth rate, trade volume and FDI inflow. However, after China became a net oil-
importer in 1993, the thirst for resources supply became unavoidable as a result of
economic expansion. The Iraqi war exacerbated the energy shortage severel y, since the
Middle East is the biggest oil supply for China, so that Beijing was compelled to diversify
the supply channels by finding energy outside the Middle East, in Africa in particular,
which came to be the second biggest oil-exporter.
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At the same time as energy security is presented as the focus of Beijing’s foreign policy,
the US anti-terror war in the Asia Pacific and in South Asia, manifested in the US use of
military force in Afghanistan, the military supply line in Pakistan, and the military
exercises in the Southeast Asian region, pose challenges to China’s surrounding security.
Therefore, regional security becomes another focal point in China’s security agenda.
Through the platform of SCO, China enhances the dialogue with Afghanistan and
integrates Pakistan and India into the mechanism. Also on the basis of bilateral
cooperation of the 1990s, China intensifies the exchange with ASEAN.
During this process, economic statecraft continues to play a critical role. Although
economic leverage is not a new means of China’s diplomacy, its use appears muchwider
in scope and more efficient in consequence. The world has witnessed another form of
competition as China exploits its economic and humanitarian aid to other regions.
Besides the traditional allies including North Korea, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan,
China provides broader economic assistance programs to the African continent, in
exchange for resources and political solidarity. In addition to foreign aid, China forms
the Free Trade Area with ASEAN, and initiates the trade area within SCO, with the
purpose of linking the neighbouring states by economic mutual interests.
5.3 Conclusions
This chapter gives a brief account of China’s foreign policy making process, and
discusses the Chinese diplomatic evolution since the year 1949 in four stages, the
sequence being separated based on influential events that emerged in its diplomatic
history. In the first stage from 1949 to 1978, from the initial ally of the Soviet Union to the
confrontation of the two superpowers, national independence was the security priority.
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Attempts to break the Western isolation led to China’s ideological diplomacy towards
other socialist and anti-imperialist states. China supported the Third-World
revolutionary activities through the offer of foreign aid, even though the country was in
downfall, at the same time as receiving the recognition of its legitimacy as return. This
period saw the initial use of economic statecraft for political end.
In the second stage from 1978 to 1989, themutual interests of containing the Soviet Union
drove the normalisation of the China–US relations. The thaw of relations with the US-led
west relieved China’s regional and international environment, which enabled it to pay
more attention to domestic development. The core position of economic development
determined that the ideological diplomacy was abandoned in order to get advanced
technology and sufficient capital from the West. So this period saw inward economic
statecraft, in the forms of investment inflows.
The Tiananmen turmoil of 1989 along with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991
took China’s diplomacy into the post-Tiananmen era, which implied two significant
shifts: the Western isolation forced China to approach Third World states and made it
retain a low profile by remaining on the regional level. Since then, South–South
cooperation and the focus on a regional sphere have been impressive highlights in
Chinese diplomacy. On the one hand, the Chinese government signed massive
commercial contracts with the United States and Europe to dismiss the critique over
Chinese human rights records, and imposed sanctions on France to protest against
French arms deals with Taiwan. On the other hand, they promoted a framework of free
trade agreement with the Southeast Asian states to drive regional solidarity. If it was to
be argued that the economic diplomacies towards the South in the earlier stage were just
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a one-way ideological response to Western isolation, the approach to the South through
economic incentives in this stage was framed with pragmatic political consideration.
In the period after 2001, the successful accession to the WTO and the US war on Iraq
unveiled Chinese weakness in energy security. Since it became a net oil-importer, the
reliance on oil imports has increased significantly. In this regard, Beijing began its global
pursuit of energy, by utilising the political privilege of being a permanent member of the
United Nations’ Security Council and using economic statecraft of offering massive
foreign aid to Africa in particular. In addition to the concerns of energy security, the US
anti-terror war on central Asia and Southeast Asia posed direct challenges to China’s
regional security. With the mechanism of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and
China–ASEAN Summit, China placed efforts on binding the neighbours’ interests
together through the strategy of Free Trade Area, in order to limit the US political
penetration. If it was to be argued that the South–South cooperation and the regional
construction aimed to break the diplomatic isolation in the 1990s, they are also connected
to the mission of safeguarding regional security and energy security. From this
perspective, economic statecraft in this stage started to serve China’s security objectives.
The study can thus conclude that, first, economic statecraft has been used as an
implement of foreign policy since the early 1950s. Its forms developed from foreign aid
of the past to the combination of foreign aid, free trade areas, and economic sanctions to
a lesser extent, at present. Second, China has identified the mission of its economic
statecraft to the key strategic areas at the contemporary stage. The Chinese diplomatic
goals have been designed to take part in multi-national cooperation with both the
developing and developed world, and to create a favourable regional and international
environment for economic reform and modernised development. As a result, the role of
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China’s economic statecraft has been motivated to shape a peaceful environment for
security reasons, and to promote the inputs of economic resources and the outputs of
Chinese capital and products for economic construction.
In this regard, the purpose of economic statecraft has been upgraded from the protection
of national identity of the past to the current guaranteeing of China’s regional and
economic security. This conclusion therefore attests the second hypothesis that for China,
security objectives and economic diplomacy are not separated. Beijing has been using
economic diplomacy in ways that support and advance its national security objectives.
But whether the role of economic diplomacy will vary by region will be further tested by
case studies in Part III.
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Part III Case Studies
Chapter Six: The China–Africa Engagement and the Foreign Aid Strategy
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The rise of China has gradually become a focal point of global interests, not just because
of the significance for the international system but also due to the strengthening of
South–South cooperation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in China’s growing
footprint in Africa’s political and economic landscape, which is attracting widespread
attention, despite the fact that these relations are not a recent development. There has
been a massive increase in reports in the media, in particular since 2006, for instance:
‘China in Africa—the New Imperialism?’(Pambazuka News, 02/March/2006), and ‘Why
China is trying to colonise Africa’ (Telegraph, 31/08/2007). In addition to the media
coverage, scholars have shifted the focus on China from the communist ideology to its
pursuit of energy interests, such as ‘Into Africa: China’s Grab for Influence and Oil’
(Brookes, 2007), ‘China’s Global Hunt for Energy’ (Zweig and Bi, 2005), and ‘China’s Oil
Rush in Africa’ (Hurst, 2006). At the political level, German Chancellor Merkel called on
the EU not to ‘leave the commitment to Africa to the People’s Republic of China’, and
argued that the EU ‘should launch an enhanced partnership of equals with Africa’
(Kornegay, 2007: 8, cited from Conference Summary: partners in competition? The EU,
Africa andChina). American diplomats, such as the former US Ambassador to Ethiopia,
suggested a comprehensive study of China’s policies, strategies and goals in Africa,
aimed at increasing mutual understanding between China and America (Thompson,
2006).
This chapter concentrates on the China–Africa engagement at the contemporary stage,
addressing the use of economic incentives to secure China’s internal economic security
and external political security. Part one considers the policy level, examining the past
relationship from the ‘Eight Principles ’ on Zhou Enlai’s African tour in 1963, to ‘Four
Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ on Zhao Ziyang’s visit in 1982, to ‘A New
Strategic Partnership’ in 2006. The discussion concludes that China’s policy towards
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Africa has moved away from unconditional assistance towards the present stance in
which ‘mutual benefits’ has become the priority, but incentives have always been the
main tool used.
Part two examines both the motivation level and the strategy of economic incentives
under the framework of FOCAC. The study indicates that the mechanism of FOCAC
confirms that China’s engagement with Africa is driven not only by oil and other
resources, but also by the strategic importance of the African continent – with three
considerations: commercial factors; political consideration; and the resource imperatives.
In addition, the study demonstrates that the active interaction with Africa may lead to
conflicts of interest with the US, and possible negative effects on African economic
development.
Finally, the study draws the conclusion that at the contemporary stage, China’s African
policy involves the consideration of new security theory, embodying the roles of energy
security and economic security in defining foreign policy. It also indicates that the
distinctive use of foreign aid, not only serves the economic interests of the current stage,
but also ensures Beijing’s long-term strategic position in Africa.
6.1 China–Africa diplomatic interactions
This section debates the evolution of China’s African policy from the founding of New
China to the contemporary era, by means of three turning points: in 1963, 1982, and 2006.
The examination of the past relationship from the ‘Eight Principles’ on Zhou Enlai’s
Africa Tour in 1963, to ‘Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ during Zhao
Ziyang’s visit in 1982, to ‘A New Strategic Partnership’ in 2006 shows that China’s
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interests in Africa have significantly shifted from an ideological desire to be seen as a
leader of the Third World to the expansion of its global influence. Such expansion is
considered to link with the smooth access to resource import and export markets through
diplomacy, investment and trade. During the period of evolution, though China’s
approach towards Africa has moved away from ideological unconditional assistance
towards pragmatic ‘mutual benefits’, the study notes that economic incentives always
stand as a unchangeable priority.
6.1.1 ‘Eight Principles’ on Zhou Enlai’s Africa tour in 1963—ideological and political
objectives
China’s relations with Africa may be traced back to six centuries ago. In 1415, Chinese
explorers visited the East African coast and brought shiploads of Chinese commodities.
Kenya provided many local gifts in return. Another record showed that in 100 BCE ,
Emperor Wuti of the Han dynasty sent envoys westward, reaching Syria (Scott-Meuser,
2007: 2). Although the historians disagree over the earliest contact between the two
regions, they share a common understanding that the interaction in the modern era starts
from the Bandung Conference held in 1955.16 Of the 29 participating states, six were
African, such as Egypt and Libya. Premier Zhou Enlai attended the conference and
presented the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’.17 By that time, the Chinese side
strived to get widespread international recognition and to seek political allies against the
16 The core principles of the Bandung conference were political self-determination, mutual
respect for sovereignty, non-aggression in internal affairs, and equality, which were of central
importance to all participants, as most of them had recently emerged from colonial rule
(Bandung Conference (Asian–AfricanConference), 1955).
17 These principles were mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-
aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit as
well as peaceful coexistence. They initially prescribed the Sino-India relations, and then
applied to all China’s external relatio
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capitalist West, while many African countries were not yet fully independent and needed
support, either politically or financially, to help them win the liberation wars.18 The
Chinese revolution was considered as a successful example to be followed by African
people. Hence, following the conference, political exchanges began to be built between
China and Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia at the end of the 1950s, Mali, Ghana, Somalia, Uganda,
andKenya at the beginning of the 1960s.
This diplomatic achievement expanded Chinese interests in the continent.19 In 1963,
Premier Zhou embarked on his first ten-nation tour of Africa: the United Arab Republic
(currently Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and
Somalia. During the trip, Premier Zhou not only implied that international issues should
not be manipulated by big powers, but also emphasised that China would offer economic
assistance to Africa, which aimed to bind their interests against the phenomenon of
Western domination. While in Ghana and Mali, Premier Zhou put forward the ‘Eight-
Principles ’, which were:
1. The Chinese government has unremittingly been providing assistance to
foreign countries according to the principles of equality andmutual benefit…
2. While providing foreign aid, the Chinese government strictly respects the
sovereignty of recipient countries, no strings attached andno privilege required.
3. In order to relieve the burden of recipient countries, the Chinese government
provides economic aid in the way of an interest free or low interest loan, the
time limit of repayment could be delayed when necessary.
18 When the new China was founded, there were only four independent countries in Africa:
Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and SouthAfrica.
19 According to related reports, the number of Chinese delegations visiting Africa went up
from 25 in 1959 to 52 in 1962; 50 African officials visited China in 1959, whilst 1960 saw the
number almost double to 98 (Taylor, 2006a: 22, cited from Ogunsanwo, 1971: 45).
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4. The purpose of the Chinese government providing foreign aid is not to make
recipient countries become dependent on China, but to help recipient countries
gradually develop on the track of self reliance and economic development
independently.
5. For the projects constructed through China foreign aid, the Chinese
government does its best to make quick effects through small investment. Thus,
the governments of recipient countries could increase income and accumulate
money.
6. The Chinese government provides equipment and materials made in China of
the best quality, and negotiate the price in accordance with the price of
international market…
7. While providing technical assistance, the Chinese government will teach
recipients to fully master this kind of technology.
8. The experts who are dispatched by the Chinese government to help recipient
countries carrying out construction should be paid the same as their own
experts of recipient countries. They are required to have no special requirement
and enjoyment (Gountin: pp. 11–12).
These principles clearly clarified the Chinese intent to assist African countries through
the policy of economic and technical aid. The amount of aid flowing to Africa had
increased and the number of recipient countries had risen from 13 in the 1960s to 28 in
the 1970s20 (see Table 6.1). There were two characteristics of these assistance projects:
20 It was reported that in 1960, the amount of China’s aid to foreign countries was USD 57.6
million, and African countries received USD 25 million; in 1961, this amount was USD 167.2
million, and African countries received USD 39.2 million; in 1963, the amount of aid to foreign
countries decreased to USD 90.4 million due to three years of domestic natural disasters, but
the share for African countries increased to USD 74 million. Between 1971 and 1973, China’s
aid to foreign countries was USD 565.7 million, USD 647.9 million, and USD 229 million
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excepting the Tanzania–Zambia railway, most of the aid in Africa came in the form of
small and medium-sized projects; and second, the majority of projects were non-
commercial, such as agricultural developments and infrastructure programs.
Furthermore, these principles showed that the Chinese government provided assistances
to African countries without asking for any economic reward. Some loans did not require
repayment if the recipients could not afford it. However, for China’s decision-makers,
the aid diplomacy was conducted with both political and ideological objectives in mind.
Table 6.1: African countries receiving Chinese aid in the 1960s and 1970s
Country Date of first aid agreement Amount (USD millions)
Algeria 1958 100
Egypt 1958 193
Ghana 1961 81
Mali 1961 148
Somali 1963 220
Tanzania 1964 534
Kenya 1964 91
Burundi 1964 125
CAR 1964 56
Congo 1964 205
Uganda 1965 77
Mauritania 1967 239
respectively, and African countries received USD 323.5 million, USD 282 million, and USD 199
million (Gountin: p.2-3).
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Country Date of first aid agreement Amount (USD millions)
Zambia 1967 372
Sudan 1970 230
Equat.Guinea 1971 18.7
Ethiopia 1971 155
Guinea 1971 161
Sierra Leone 1971 94
Togo 1972 77
Tunisia 1972 97
Benin 1972 72
Mauritius 1972 48
Nigeria 1972 3
Rwanda 1972 56
Burkina Faso 1973 92
Cameroon 1973 124
Chad 1973 77
Senegal 1973 108
Niger 1974 64.7
Gabon 1975 26
The Gambia 1975 36
Guinea-Bissau 1975 18
Mozambique 1975 116
Sao Tme-Prcp 1975 12
Botswana 1976 19.4
Comoros 1976 10.3
Morocco 1976 32
Cape Verde 1977 17.6
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Source: Brautigam, 1998: 45
On the ideological level, China seemed to support any revolutionary movement against
imperialism, including African revolutions. The Chinese government believed that the
liberated people must help those who were not yet liberated to achieve and defend their
national independence. Also, the new Communist state insisted that assisting the
independence of developing countries was the most appropriate way to pursue socialism.
Therefore China actively supported the anti-imperialism struggle by providing material
help, including military aid. During 1955 to 1977, China supplied USD 142 million worth
of military equipment to African revolutionary groups, accounting for 75 per cent of total
military aid towards Africa (Meidan, 2006: 73).
On the political level, the primary motivation was to counter the international
recognition of Taiwan as the legal representative of China, and to a lesser extent to
compete with the Soviet Union in the African territories, exemplified by the case of
Zimbabwe.21 In this regard, China’s aid policy towards Africa did achieve its main
objective. The number of African countries abandoning ties with Taiwan increased from
13 in 1967 to 30 in 1974, and the support from the majority of African countries
contributed substantially towards the annexation of Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations
Security Council in 1971 (Looy, 2006: 2). Chairman Mao Zedong appreciated that without
Country Date of first aid agreement Amount (USD millions)
Liberia 1977 37.4
Seychelles 1978 8.1
Djibouti 1979 12.9
21 In Zimbabwe in the 1970s, China backed the movement of Robert Mugabe, while the Soviet
Union backed Joshua Nkomo’s party. Mugabe’s election victory laid the foundation for the
current relationship between China and Zimbabwe.
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the African allies, China would not be able to become a permanent member of the
Security Council.
6.1.2. ‘Four Principles ’ on Zhao Ziyang’sAfrican tour in1982—economic objective
After the acquisition of the seat in the UN Security Council in 1971, a diplomatic relation
between China and the United States was established in 1979. The less hostile
international environment was reflected in China’s foreign policy, so that economic
growth and domestic reforms instead of revolution dominated the policy agenda. The
12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982 delivered two messages
that had implications on China’s African policy: China would concentrate on domestic
economic development, and China would pursue its independent foreign policy
characterised by ‘mutual benefits’ in its direct meaning.22 In accordance with these shifts,
on the 1982 trip to Africa, Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang put forward the ‘Four Principles
on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation’, which stressed equality and
mutual benefits, practical results, diversity in forms and common development:
1. In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African
countries, China abides by the principles of unity and friendship, equality and
mutual benefit, respects their sovereignty, does not interfere in their internal
affairs, attaches no political conditions and asks for no privileges whatsoever.
2. In China’s economic and technological cooperation with African countries,
full play will be given to the strong points and potentials of both sides on the
basis of their actual needs and possibilities, and efforts will be made to achieve good
economic results with less investment, shorter construction cycle and quicker returns.
22 Before these shifts were publicised, the period from 1979 to 1982 had seen a reduction in
economic aid. From 1979 to 1981, only eight new loans were granted and their value dropped
from 178.8 million in 1980 to 19.7 million USD in 1981 (Brautigam, 1998:47).
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3. China’s economic and technological cooperation with African countries
takes a variety of forms suited to the specific conditions, such as offering
technical services, training technical and management personnel, engaging in
scientific and technological exchanges, undertaking construction projects,
entering into cooperative production and joint ventures…
4. The purpose of China’s economic and technological cooperation with
African countries is to contribute to the enhancement of the self-reliant capabilities of
both sides and promote the growth of the respective national economies by
complementing and helping each other (Brautigam, 1998: 49-50 emphasis added).
In comparison to the Eight Principles in the 1960s, these policies revealed a remarkable
difference in which China asked for mutual promotion of the two economies, as
principles 2 and 4 recommend. The shifts were in line with the changes in Chinese
strategic focus. Before the 1970s, China’s foreign policy was driven largely by the desire
to combat superpower hegemony, so that African countries could be seen as potential
allies in the political struggle. After Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao Zedong and focussed
on reforming domestic economy, China’s development strategy changed considerably
with the recognition that the anti-Western struggle only led to poverty and
backwardness, and that the Western industrial countries must be relied on to advance
the economy. It was apparent that because of continuous internal economic difficulties,
China was no longer interested in pursuing ideological revolution, and the socialist
modernisation project necessitated the input of massive foreign investment and
technology – Africa was not able to contribute to these ends due to their own failure to
open up to the international economy and their marginal role in global affairs.
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Thus, Beijing saw Africa as economically deficient and technologically inefficient –
incompatible with the reform aims. Though China maintained friendly relations with
African countries, this was not sufficient to give Africa the recognition it needed as a
significant partner. Chinese development aid destined for Africa decreased during this
stage, and the number of visiting delegations also declined. However, China’s aid
commitments of approximately USD 259 million in 1984 still made it Africa’s sixth
largest donor (Mawdsley, 2007: 411). In addition, Chinese aid projects in Africa had
tended to evolve into trade projects. Chinese workers provided aid and then remained
behind upon completion of the project in order to provide a platform for Chinese
companies to bid for African state contracts (Taylor, 2007a).
6.1.3 China’s African policy in 2006
The lull in China–Africa relations lasted until the Tiananmen turmoil in 1989. When
China intended to focus its diplomacy on developed countries, it was confronted with
harsh condemnation on human rights andpractical punishments exemplified by political
isolation and economic sanctions. These made the Chinese government aware of the
insurmountable value divergences between itself and the West. The only defensive
strategy seemed to be to strengthen ties with the developing world, which expressed
their understanding towards Beijing’s action in handling this internal problem. This
meant a reappraisal of the role of the Third World countries in China’s diplomatic
thinking.
In fact, the denunciation of the Tiananmen Square events not only embarrassed the
Beijing government but also threatened the power-base of the African political elites, as
the majority of African leaders came to power without democratic legitimacy of their
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populace, so that these regimes were not reluctant to lend their support to Beijing’s
behaviour. In addition, Africa’s backing was related to China’s role as an important
source of external aid anddevelopment assistance. It should be kept in mind that African
economies at the time attracted very little foreign investment, and China had provided
Africa with more than USD 4,783 million during the period of 1956-1987 (Naidu and
Mbazima, 2008: 751, cited fromTaylor, 2004). Even though the aid programs stagnated in
the 1980s, China remained one of the largest donors to Africa.
Some may argue that the 1989 incident did not affect Beijing’s relations with the Third
World countries as it did with the Western world. The attitude towards the developing
countries such as African states turned from one of temporary disregard to one of
renewed emphasis. Diplomatically, the Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, visited 14 African
countries during 1989 and 1992, which highlighted the intention of seeking political
assistance from the Africans. Economically, China increased the aid commitment. In 1988,
China only disbursed USD 60.4 million to 13 countries, and one year after, the number
grew to USD 374.6 million to 43 countries in 1990 (Taylor, 2004: 85, cited from Liu, 1996:
38).
In addition to the Tiananmen event, the disintegration of the Soviet Union during this
period advanced China’s initiative towards Africa. With the end of the Cold War, the
balance of power in the global system was gradually moving towards unilateralism. In
order to avoid becoming a sole target of the West, China seized the opportunity to push
for a multi-polar international order, which required the support from the developing
states including Africa. On the 1996 national visit to six African countries (Kenya, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe), President Jiang Zemin proposed the building of
a long term and stable Sino-African relationship geared towards the twenty-first century
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and put forward five principles of guidance: equality; sincere friendship; solidarity and
cooperation; common development; and being oriented to the future.23 Chinese
commentators note that Jiang’s proposal marked a new phase of development for the
China–Africa relations. Since then, China maintained close political relations with
African countries through frequent exchanges of high-level visits, and both sides
conducted fruitful bilateral and multilateral dialogues. The most impressive outcome is
the founding of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
The First Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in 2001 was attended by almost 80 ministers
from 44 African countries. It proposed the construction of an international political and
economic order, and the exploration of a new Sino-African cooperation. The subjects
discussed included Chinese investments in Africa, financial cooperation between bank
groups, agricultural cooperation, resources and education cooperation. The Beijing
Declaration was proclaimed at the end. In 2003, more than 70 ministers from China and
44 African countries responsible for foreign affairs and economic cooperation along with
the representatives of some international and African regional institutions joined the
conference. The FOCAC Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004–2006) was produced. In 2006,
which was the ‘Africa year in China’, the heads of state, government and delegation of
China and 48 African countries attended in the Third Ministerial Conference of FOCAC
and the Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009) was put forward.
In the same year, the Beijing government released ‘China’s African Policy’, which was
considered as the first of its kind in China’s diplomatic history with Africa. Through this
23 The five principles are commonly explained as having the objectives to promote friendship
and sincerity; respect the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention; promote
development on the basis of equality and mutual benefit; establish norms of solidarity and
consultation in international affairs; cooperate to create a more peaceful, stable and
prosperous world (Pere, 2007: 13).
180
white paper, Beijing states the aim to develop ‘a new type of strategic partnership with
Africa’ and the long-term plan is to ‘enhance all-round cooperation’ with the counterpart.
Cooperation covers various aspects:
• The political field: China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with
African countries on the international arena…
• Trade: the Chinese government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate
African commodities’ access to Chinese market and fulfil its promise to grant duty-
free treatment to some goods from the less developed African countries…China is
willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement with African countries and African
regional organizations.
• Investment: the Chinese government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises’
investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans
and buyer credits to this end...
• Debt reduction and relief: China is ready to continue friendly consultation with
some African countries with a view to seek solution to, or reduction of, the debts
they owe to China...
• Economic assistance: in light of its own financial capacity and economic situation,
China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations
with no political strings attached.
• Cultural exchanges: it will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms…
(China’s African Policy, 2006).
6.1.4 Conclusions
Current relations between China and Africa have their origins in the period since the
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Bandung Conference of 1955, at which 29 Third World countries including China and six
African countries met in Indonesia to confront superpower dominance. Chinese Premier
Zhou encouraged the African states to forge ahead with the struggle for the total
decolonisation of the continent, and during the national visits to Africa afterwards he
inspired them with the promise of economic assistance. By that time, the relationship
between China and some African countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
were promoted by the support of the liberation war against imperialism. Since Deng
Xiaoping took power and claimed the open-door policy in the late 1970s, Beijing’s external
engagement has been linked with pragmatic national interests, and bilateral cooperation
has expanded from the political level alone to multiple interactions, on the basis of the
change inChina’s strategic needs.
This study can note that, first of all, China frames the world as being ruled by a single
hegemony—the United States, and China’s diplomatic efforts to other countries,
including Africa, have become centred on gaining support when confronting the
hegemony. In Chinese perception, the political role of Africa in promoting a multi-polar
world system is imperative. This diplomatic intention appears more prominently in the
post-Tiananmen era. Second, Beijing addresses both multidimensional cooperation and
mutual benefits. The ‘mutual benefits’ do not purely refer to the political gains in
1955–1978, or the economic interests in 1978–1989, but a combination of multiple
strategic interests, which should be pursued through multidimensional interactions on
political, economic, cultural or other sectors. Thirdly, despite the shifts in the strategic
position of Africa at every stage, the diplomatic approach has always involved economic
incentives. From the initial small-scope of infrastructure development to the present plan
involving large-scale investment, China has consistently employed positive incentives
instead of sanctions in pursuing its strategic goals.
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6.2 The mechanism of FOCAC
More than four decades after Premier Zhou’s visit to Africa in the 1960s, China has
established diplomatic ties with almost every African state except those four countries
maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome e
Principe and Swaziland). To enhance the dialogue, the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation was established in 2000, which was initiated to institutionalise the
China–Africa diplomacy andpromote the bilateral dialogues. Naidu andMbazima (2008)
argue that the forum is seen as an alternative development paradigm of engagement to
the G8’s Africa plan and the Washington Consensus (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008: 756).
In this part, the study would argue that the mechanism of FOCAC undertakes the
objectives of strengthening cooperation with Africa. To a very large extent, through
frequent political exchange and increasing economic assistant, Beijing intends to ally with
the African continent for seeking political multi-polarity, facilitating economic exchanges
in resources, and furtheringChinese commercial activities overseas. In the second section,
the potential conflicts between the presence ofChina and the interests of the United States
in the continent, and the negative effects on African sustainable development are taken
into consideration as possible obstacles to China–Africa relations. China’s foreign aid
strategy towards Africa will be re-addressed in the final section.
6.2.1 China’s strategic objectives inAfrica under FOCAC
In the current context of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, Payne and Veney (1998)
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point out three dominant objectives: national unification; the promotion of world peace
and an impartial world order; and the sustainability of economic development (Payne and
Veney, 1998: 2). Taylor’s analysis suggests that China’s African policy aims to reform the
global order, increase resistance to hegemony, and contain Taiwan (Taylor, 2006a: 67–69).
Other scholars, such as Alves (2008), observe that China’s interest in Africa is based
primarily on its need for natural resources and diplomatic support (Alves, 2008: 28). In
other words, the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy towards Africa is not
interested in exporting communist ideology; instead, conventional economic and political
factors occupy Chinese attention. The following section will clarify the motivations in
three ways: political, resources, and commercial drives.
i) Political motivations
China’s political mission ought to be understood from both external and internal
perspectives. In external affairs, the biggest impediment in limiting China’s development
comes from the United States. In the latest Defence Strategy released by the US Defence
Department, China is defined as ‘one ascendant state with the potential for competing with
the United States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China’s growing
military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security’
(2008 National Defence Strategy, 2008: 3 emphasis added). The US military bases in the
neighbouring states including South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Afghanistan,
along with the US Pacific Fleet, remind China of the US military presence in this area, and
Washington’s practice of unilateral force in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq compel
China to consider the possible US strategy to its growing power. The concern about the
dominance of the United States in the global system prompts China to seek political
alignment with other countries which stand outside the central tendencies of world
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political struggle.
In order to balance US power in the international system, the shape of a multi-polar world
is proposed as the only solution. As early as the 1960s, Chairman Mao’s ‘Third World
Theory’ had already suggested that countries which had similar background and shared
similar interests ought to act against hegemony by creating a multi-polar world system.
Beijing tries to enhance relations with non-Western powers, and Africa can be included in
this group. The Chinese presence in Africa is illustrative of Beijing’s efforts to create a
paradigm of political alliance in opposing unilateralism, and the increasing interaction
under the forum enables China to use the strategic partnership with Africa as a way to
circumvent Western containment in an international system where civilisation and
hegemony coexist. In FOCAC 2003 Premier Wenpresented that the collective power of the
developing countries is a necessity to secure their own interests in international affairs,
and in FOCAC 2006, President Hu Jintao indicated that China would cooperate with
Africa to promote balanced and harmonious global development. The call to build a
harmonious society and to create an impartial international order should be taken as an
indication of the dissatisfaction towards America’s unilateralist ambitions.
In terms of internal political affairs, the forum is certainly a part of China’s long-term
strategy to contain Taiwan. Taiwan is the only unfinished project in the Chinese
reunification agenda, after Hong Kong’s return in 1997 and Macau’s transfer in 1999. In
the past, political competition with Taiwan for African support was a major driver when
designing the African policy. Without the support of the African group, China would not
have been able to take over Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations. At the current stage,
China still needs to limit Taiwan’s diplomatic space in the international community.
When the first Forum was opened in 2000, eight African countries recognised Taiwan
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(Liberia, Senegal, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Chad, Malawi, Swaziland, and Sao Tome and
Principle), but in 2008, the number decreased to just five (Senegal, Gambia, Burkina Faso,
Swaziland, and Sao Tome and Principe). All are small, resource-poor, and relatively
minor in political importance.
However, when comparing the external objective of forming a multi-polar system to the
internal Taiwan issue, the former takes more weight. It is quite an exaggeration to say
that the Taiwan factor is a key determinant of China’s foreign policy in Africa, although
Beijing continues to insist on the diplomatic principle of ‘one-China policy’. China has
economic exchanges with the five African countries having diplomacy with Taiwan, but
it appears that commercial interests, instead of political intention, drive these economic
projects.24 It is expected that fewer African countries would retain ties with Taiwan over
time, if the national strength of Mainland China continues to grow.
ii) Resource concerns
Energy reports indicate that the crude oil reserves and production are mainly located in
the Middle East, Africa, Eurasia, and North American areas, and the most productive
countries are mainly from these areas, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, Nigeria, Iraq,
and Algeria (see Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4). John Browne, Former BP chief executive, ever
observed the dependence on just three areas — West Africa, Russia and the five states
around the Gulf, led by Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (A Serious Problem, 2006, Petroleum
Economist on line). In comparison to other productive regions, African oil potential has
24 The projects, such as the Sayang Mineral Extraction in Gambia, Sinopec oil rights
exploration in Sao Tome and Principle and construction of Chitipa-Karonga road in Malawi,
are believed to be in accordance with Chinese commercial interests.
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only become acknowledged in recent years. Taking the top two oil-consumers as
examples, in America the importance of Africa to world oil supplies was revealed in the
2001 National Energy Policy; in China’s case, Chinese oil companies started to invest in
Africa at the end of the 1990s, and a specific foreign policy towards Africa was not put
forward until 2006. Furthermore, North American area is seen as the backyard of the
United States andmainly supply the US market. In the Middle East, the country with the
richest oil reserves, Saudi Arabia, has been involved with the United States through the
security-for-oil relationship established in the Roosevelt era; the second largest reserve
country, Iran, has been under the threat of military attack by the United States for years;
and Iraq has been under the control of the US military force since the 2003 invasion. In
contrast, the situation in Africa is considered less sensitive with relatively little power
intervention, after the ex-colonising powers such as France and Britain withdrew. This
may lead to the conclusion that Africa could be seen as a stable source in the world
energy market, although it possesses a relatively modest share of oil resources.
Table 6.2: World Oil Reserves by Region as of January, 2007 (Billion Barrels)
Region Country Oil Reserves Percentage of
world total
World Total
(1,317.4)
Middle East
(739)
Saudi Arabia 262.3
59.1Iran 136.3
Iraq 115.0
Kuwait 101.5
United Arab Emirates 97.8
Qatar 15.2
Others 10.9
North America
(213)
Canada 179.2
16.16United States 21.8
Others 12
Libya 41.5
8.65Nigeria 36.2
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Source: International Energy Outlook 2007, cited from Worldwide Look at Reserves and
Production.
Table 6.3: Production of ProvedReserves by Region in2006 (ThousandBarrels Daily)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007.
Table 6.4: TopWorld Oil Producers in 2004
Region Country Oil Reserves Percentage of
world total
Africa (114) Algeria 12.3
Angola 8.0
Others 16
Eurasia (110)
Russia 60.0
8.35Kazakhstan 30.0
Others 20.0
Region Production 2006 share of total (%)
Total Middle East 25589 31.2
Total Europe and Eurasia 17563 21.6
Total North America 13700 16.5
Total Africa 9990 12.1
Total Asia Pacific 7941 9.7
Total South and Central
America
6881 8.8
Total World 81663 100
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Source: National Security Consequences of US Oil Dependency, 2006: 21, cited from
Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables1_2.html.
In the demand side, a total consumption of marketed energy is projected to increase. 25
The new price structure and slower world economy have dampened oil demand growth
in OECD economies, whereas non-OECD economies, China and India in particular,
account for the majority of world oil demand growth. In 2007 China contributed one-half
of the two-thirds of global energy consumption growth, whereas the EU consumption
decreased by 2.2 per cent (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007; BP Statistical
Review of World Energy, June 2008, p.2). China appears to be one of the biggest energy-
consumer in the World.
Rank Country Total Oil Production
(Million barrels per day)
1 Saudi Arabia 10.37
2 Russia 9.27
3 United States 8.69
4 Iran 4.09
5 Mexico 3.83
6 China 3.62
7 Norway 3.18
8 Canada 3.14
9 Venezuela 2.86
10 United Arab Emirates 2.76
11 Kuwait 2.51
12 Nigeria 2.51
13 United Kingdom 2.08
14 Iraq 2.03
25 In the longer term the primary energy needs are expected to grow by 55 per cent between
2005 and 2030, at an average growth rate of 1.8 per cent annually. Oil would still remain the
single largest fuel for satisfying primary energy demands, increasing by 37 per cent from the
year 2006 to the year 2030. Coal consumption would jump by 73 per cent by 2030, pushing the
share up from 25 per cent to 28 per cent (World Energy Outlook 2007 Executive Summary:
China and India Insights).
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Some argue that China’s spectacular economic growth is largely responsible for its rising
energy demands. During the pre-reform period from 1960 to 1978, the economic growth
was only 5.3 percent on average, whereas between 1979 and 2007, the growth in China’s
GDP rose by 9.8 per cent annually (see table 6.5). Other issues accompanying economic
growth, such as the expansion of the middle-class as well as urbanisation, also increase
the demand for oil. However, at the same time as the two-digit economic growth
significantly increases the energy demand, the declining domestic production furthered
the energy shortage.26 In 1993, only 6.4 per cent of the total oil supply was from outside
sources. By 2002, that figure jumped to 31 per cent, and it is expected to reach 60 per cent
by 2020 (Scott-Meuser, 2007: 13, cited from Eisenman and Kurlantzick, 2006: 22). The
country has had to rely increasingly on foreign resources.
Table 6.5: China’s Average Annual GDP Growth: 1979-2007
Year Average Annual Growth (%)
26 Roughly 85 per cent of Chinese oil production is located onshore, such as the Daqing oil
field, the Shengli oil field, and oil fields in Xinjiang (China Energy Data, Statistics and
Analysis—Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, 2006: 2). The offshore reserves are scattered in the East
China Sea, the South China Sea (including the Taiwan Strait), the Yellow Sea and the Bohai
Gulf (see table 6.6).
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Source: Morrison, 2008: 4.
Table 6.6: Major Chinese Oil Fields Owned by theThree National Companies
1960–1978 5.3
1990 3.8
1991 9.3
1992 14.2
1993 14.0
1994 13.1
1995 10.9
1996 10.0
1997 9.3
1998 7.8
1999 7.6
2000 8.4
2001 8.3
2002 9.1
2003 10.0
2004 10.1
2005 9.9
2006 11.1
2007 11.4
1979-2007 (Post-
Reform)
9.8
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Source: China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis—Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, 2006: 2-3;
Downs, 2000: 7.
Given the growing dependence on outside oil, in the tenth five-year plan in 2001–2005,
the call for seeking international sources of oil and gas was voiced. In 2005, an Energy
Leading Group headed by Premier Wen Jiaobao was established to oversee energy
development and security. Africa figures on the agenda of Chinese oil diplomacy due to
several factors: the external power influences are less evident in Africa; unlike the Middle
East, African oil industries are open to foreign investment; apart from Nigeria, Algeria,
Angola, and Libya, other African producers such as Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Central African Republic and the Congo, which do not belong to the OPEC cartel, are not
obliged to follow the OPEC’s production and export quotas; and African oil has low-
sulphur content, which is best for environmental protection.
Major Chinese Fields by Company and by Production, 2006 (bbI/d)
China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC)
Daqing 929,268
Liaohe 256,991
Xinjiang 222,524
Changqing 162,422
China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation
Shengli 535,531
Sinopec Star 78,567
Zhongyuan 67,092
China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC)
The East China Sea
519,108
The South China Sea
The Yellow Sea
The Bohai Gulf
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Therefore, there is an impressive presence of Chinese oil companies across the African
continent, involved in a variety of commercial activities ranging from oil and gas
exploration to pipeline building. The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
(Sinopec) established in 1983, China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) founded in
1988, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) created in 1982 are
three vertically integrated companies. Historically, CNPC and its subsidiary companies
dominated in the North and West of China, and focused on oil and gas exploration and
production; Sinopec coped with the South part and engaged in downstream activities
such as refining and distribution; CNOOC was responsible for offshore exploration and
production. Nowadays, the three giants have not only stepped up exploration activities
within the borders but also helped develop alternative fuels abroad. Instead of
depending on the global oil market, the Chinese oil companies circumvent this reliance
by either directly purchasing stakes in African oilfields or safeguarding access to the
supply through long-term contracts. They have been taking a neo-mercantilist approach
to operate new exploration deals and take shares in already established African oil
companies (see Table 6.7). In addition to the three giants, other subsidised companies,
such as the Zhongyuan Oil Company and PetroChina, also successfully access the
African oil sector.27
27 In 2005, PetroChina paid USD 800 million to the Nigerian National Petroleum Companies
to supply 30,000 barrels of crude oil per day. In 2006, Zhongyuan Petroleum Company
started exploratory drilling in the Gambella basin of western Ethiopia.
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Table 6.7: Some Commercial Deals of China’s Three Largest Oil Companies in Africa
Source: Naidu and Davies, 2006; Scott-Meuser, 2007; Meidan, 2006; Taylor, 2006a: 44-45;
Alves, 2006: 10.
During this process, Chinese political leaders paid high-profile visits to the oil producing
states, and Chinese diplomats took advantage of China’s political privilege in the United
Nations to promote bilateral political relations, thereby helping the Chinese companies to
secure oil deals. In addition, China’s national policy banks act as credit-providers to
finance these exploration activities. China’s Export and Import bank is designed to
CNPC
In 1997, CNPC pledged over USD 8 billion for oil concessions in the oil-
producing countries including Sudan; in 1997, CNPC formally acquired a 40 per
cent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company in Sudan; in
1997,CNPC began oil exploration in the Chad Basin under an agreement with
the Nigerian National Petroleum Company; in 1998, CNPC purchased two
blocks (OML 64 and OML 66) in the Niger River delta, Nigeria; in 2003, CNPC
purchased oil refineries in Algeria for USD 350 million and signed an
exploration deal for oil in two blocks; in 2004, CNPC invested USD 1 million in
an oil and gas exploration project in Mauritania; in 2006, CNPC and Sinopec
teamed up to exploit newly discovered drilling rights to an oilfield in Sudan in a
deal worth about USD 600 million; CNPC has invested more than USD 8 billion
in Sudan’s oil sector, including a 900-mile pipeline to the Red Sea.
Sinopec
In 2002, Sinopec signed a contract for USD 525million to develop the Zarzaitine
oil field in Algeria; in 2004, Sinopec signed a technical evaluation deal for three
onshore oilfields in Gabon; in 2005, Sinopec purchased a 27 per cent stake in an
oil field of the coast in Nigeria; in 2006, Sinopec entered into a Joint Venture
Partnership with a local oil company (Sonangol) to build an oil refinery in Lobito,
Angola; in 2006, Sinopec began constructing a 1,500km pipeline to Port Sudan;
in 2006, Sinopec paid USD 1.4 billion for a 40 per cent stake in the oil block 18, in
Angola; in 2006, Sinopec won a 20 per cent stake in block 15 and 25.5 per cent
stake in block 17 in Angola.
CNOOC
In 2005, CNOOC paid USD 2.3 billion for a 45 per cent stake in the Akpo
offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria; in 2006, an offshore exploration deal was
signed with Kenya, allowing CNOOC to explore 6 blocks covering 44,500 square
miles in the north and south of the country; In 2006, CNOOC signed a
production-sharing contract with Equatorial Guinea.
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implement the state policy and serve economic and diplomatic strategies by providing
financial services to key projects.28 These governmental financial assistances allow China
to insert itself in the continent. China has been one of the three largest trade partners
with Africa, following America and France. Bilateral trade has increased from USD 10
billion in 2000 to USD 733.11 billion in 2007 (see Table 6.8). Africa has become a reliable
oil-exporting area, by supplying approximately one-third of China’s oil imports,
increasing from 11 per cent in the year 1995 (see Table 6.9). Angola, Sudan, and Congo
have become important oil-suppliers (see Table 6.10).
Table 6.8: China’s Trade Volume with the World andwith Africa (USD Billion)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.
Table 6.9: China’s Imported Crude Oil by Region 1995-2006(%)
Source: Lai, 2007: 522, cited from Yearbook of China’s Economic Foreign Relations and
Trade, 2002, 2003; Zhao, 2008: 101; Medeiros, 2006: 130.
Year Total trade
volume
Trade with
Africa
Weight (%)
2007 21738.3 733.11 3.4
2006 17606.9 554.64 3.2
2005 14221.2 397.4 2.8
2000 4743 10 0.2
28 In 2005, the bank granted a USD 1 billion oil-backed loan to Angola, which was increased to
USD 3 billion in 2006 for upgrading of the local infrastructure. The boosted funds were
expected to enable Sinopec to secure deals for oil exploration in the coming years (Naidu and
Davies, 2006:76).
Regions 1995 2000 2003 2005 2006
Middle East 46 53.6 51.3 46 45
Africa 11 24.0 24.4 31 32
Asia-Pacific 41 15.0 15.3 8 8
Others 2 6.7 9.4 15 15
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Table 6.10: China’s Crude Oil Imports in 2005
Source: Medeiros, 2006: 131.
Consequently, the search for overseas oil supplies seems to play a primary role in
shaping China’s African policy, however, it is more accurate that China has entered
Africa for the extraction of raw materials to fuel its impressive economic growth. Taking
note of China’s top five imported commodities from Africa, Beijing’s main trade
connections in Africa include other raw materials, besides oil (see Table 6.11). The
Chinese domestic manufacturing sector has created massive demand for copper,
aluminium, nickel, iron ore, and so on. China is, as a matter of fact, the world’s largest
importer of crude oil, iron ore, manganese, plastic materials, metal ores, oil seeds, textile
fibres, pulp and paper, the second largest importer of copper, the importer of 40 per cent
of the world’s soybeans, and the consumer of 50 per cent of global wood. Importantly, it
is expected that the demand for these commodities will continue in the foreseeable future
Rank Country Percentage of total
Chinese imports
1 Saudi Arabia 18
2 Angola 14
3 Iran 13
4 Russia 10
5 Oman 9
6 Yemen 5
7 Sudan 5
8 Congo 4
9 Indonesia 3
10 Equatorial Guinea 3
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(see Table 6.12). As long as China continues to demand the primary resources, the
interest in the African continent will not wane, as many African countries have become
major contributors to China’s resource inputs and thus to China’s importance as a centre
of world manufacturing (see Table 6.13).
Table 6.11: Top Five Chinese Imports from Africa: 2004-2007 (USD Million and %)
Source: Morrison, 2008: 16
Table 6.12: Projections for China’s Commodity ImportDemand
Source: DeutscheBank Research Report
Commodity 2004 2005 2006 2007 % of total
2007
Mineral fuel,
oil, etc.
10,135 14,676 21,083 25,997 71.8
Ores, slag, ash 1,393 1,577 2,116 3,298 9.1
Precious
stones and
metals
742 967 1,196 1,358 3.8
Wood 473 524 705 915 2.5
Iron and Steel 439 475 315 851 2.4
Commodity Unit Latest Demand Predicted Demand in
2020
Iron ore m tons 148 710
Oil m tons 91 1861
Soy m tons 26 50
Coal m tons 11 810
Copper m tons 3 20
Manganese m tons 3 13
Meat m tons 0.3 4
Wood m cubic 34 150
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Table 6.13: Share in Total Imports and Origin of the Primary Commodities in China’s
Imports, 1999-2003
Source: Rocha, 2007: 59, cited from COMTRADE
iii) Commercial considerations
Certainly, of immediate importance to China are Africa’s abundant resources. However,
it is insufficient to argue that China treats Africa purely as a resource base. Taking note of
China’s top five trading partners in Africa, it includes not only oil-producing states such
as Angola, Sudan and Nigeria but also relatively well-developed economies with large
populations such as South Africa and Egypt (see Table 6.14). On the policy level, the
released white paper and the Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009) show the bilateral ties
cover not just resource extraction, but also agriculture, infrastructure, science and
technology. As apparent from the visit of President Hu Jintao to Africa, other commercial
deals include automotive works in Namibia, opening a fruit market to South Africa,
expanding investments in infrastructure, telecommunications, tourism in Seychelles, and
increasing the number of duty-free commodities in Mozambique.
Product Group % of Imports by China in
World Imports
% of African Imports in Total
Chinese Imports
Nickel 8.9 4.3
Iron and Steel scrap 9.5 0.1
Residual petroleum
products
8.3 0.7
Iron ore and concentrates 29.1 5.9
Crude petroleum 4.7 24.1
Base metals 15 5.5
Copper 17.1 1.7
Other wood 23.4 20.5
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Table 6.14: Top Five African Trade Partners with China in 2007 (USD Billion)
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.
There are a number of incentives driving the commercial engagements with Africa. In
particular, economic expansion in China has brought significant opportunities for the
Chinese state and private enterprises, which have been actively seeking new markets for
their goods and investment. The outward expansion is motivated by the governmental
‘Going Out’ Strategy. By the end of 2000, the Chinese had 499 companies in Africa with a
total contractual investment of USD 990 million (Taylor, 2004: 92). In 2003 there had been
7,470 Chinese foreign affiliates extending across 168 countries, and Central and Eastern
Europe, ASEAN, and Middle East and Africa were the top three destinations among the
developing states (see Table 6.15).
Rank Country Trade Volume
1 Angola 141.20
2 South Africa 140.41
3 Sudan 56.15
4 Egypt 46.01
5 Nigeria 43.29
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Table 6.15: Geographical Distribution of Chinese Enterprises Abroad in 2003
Source: Wu, 2005: 4-5, cited from theCommercial Ministry of China.
The pattern ofChinese commercial involvement in Africa can be grouped into four major
activities: increasing investments in the energy and resource sector; participation in
infrastructural projects; participation in global production networks; and small-scale
entrepreneurial investments (Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2006: 17). In terms of
involvement in production networks, textiles and clothing companies have invested in
Africa, mainly in the form of joint ventures with African enterprises. This seeks to take
advantage of the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act and the European
Union’s Cotonou Agreement (replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreement), which
provides preferential clauses for textile and apparel goods of eligible African countries
In Developed
Countries
Number of Chinese Enterprises
Hong
Kong/Macau
2,336
United States 786
EU-15 432
Japan 250
Australia 225
Canada 155
In Developing
Country/Region
Number of Chinese Enterprises
Central and
Eastern Europe
865
ASEAN 857
Middle East and
Africa
769
Latin America 384
The Rest of the
World
411
Total 7470
200
into the American and European markets. Besides, with 900 million potential customers,
the untapped African continent itself is a rather suitable market. Those countries with
large populations, such as South Africa and Egypt, have become export destinations for
Chinese commodities (see Table 6.16).
Table 6.16: China’s Top Five African Export Markets: 2004–2007 (USDMillion)
Source: Morrison, 2008: 17.
With regards to participation in infrastructure projects, Chinese firms have been bidding
for construction deals in the continent. Some think that one of the distinguishing features
of China–Africa relations as opposed to OECD–Africa has been Beijing’s responsiveness
to Africa’s infrastructure developments, which has not been a priority in Western
investment in Africa. In 2006 alone, Chinese operated 259 projects in Africa, 79 per cent
of these promoting infrastructures, such as building pipelines, dams, railways etc.29(see
Table 6.17). The participating companies, particularly state-owned enterprises, have the
advantage of access to skilled and low-cost labour emigrating from China, access to
cheap building materials through supply chains from China, and most importantly,
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007
Africa Total 13,815 18,687 26,705 37,314
South Africa 2,952 3,826 5,769 7,429
Egypt 1,389 1,935 2,976 4,432
Nigeria 1,719 2,305 2,856 3,800
Algeria 981 1,405 1,952 2,709
Morocco 944 1,206 1,570 2,162
29 China engages mostly in infrastructure for resource extraction (28 per cent),
telecommunications (19 per cent) and transport (19 per cent) (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008: 37).
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access to cheap capital through Chinese state-owned banks. The Export–Import Bank of
China is authorized by the Chinese government as the sole lender of the governmental
concessional loan. According to the concessional loan requirements, in principle, Chinese
contractors must be awarded the infrastructure contract financed by the loan, and they
must be contracted for procuring equipment, materials, technology and services, with no
less than one-half coming from China. For example, the Angolan government signed 12
individual accords of credit, relating to a USD 2 billion loan from the China
Export–Import Bank in 2005. Part of the credit was destined to support the acquisition of
construction equipment for use in projects undertaken by Chinese construction
companies.30 Given these advantages, the arrival of Chinese construction companies,
which now control more than 30 per cent of African infrastructure markets, has had a
significant impact on the local industry as well as other foreign companies, mainly from
Europe, South Africa and the Middle East.
Table 6.17: Some Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Africa
Country Projects
Ghana Journalism facility (2002)
Officers’ barracks (2003)
Nigeria Railway refurbishment (2002)
Propane and butane extraction(2003)
Two power plants(2004)
Development of oil blocks (2004)
Road and drainage improvements (2004)
30 Other similar finance-for-contract exchanges made by Export–Import Bank to support
Chinese commercial activities are set out as follows: between 2002 and 2006, a loan in excess
of USD 4.5 billion was committed to 10 infrastructure projects in Angola; USD 8.8 billion was
granted for natural resource related infrastructure during 2004 to 2006 in Nigeria; Sudan
received USD 1.9 billion for infrastructure investment between 2001 and 2005 (Reisen and
Ndoye, 2008: 33; 2006 Annual Report of the Export-Import Bank of China; Official Webpage of
the Export-Import Bank of China).
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Source: Sunders, 2006: 47.
With the strategy of packaging contracts with the promise of assistance, Chinese firms
have established a considerable commercial presence in certain African markets. In 2006,
the Chamber of Commerce for Chinese Companies in Angola was founded, which had
26 members, including China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export
Corporation, ZTE Corporation, China National Overseas Engineering Corporation, and
China State Shipbuilding Corporation and so on. In 2007, China had around 800 state-
Country Projects
Sudan High-power electric line(2003)
Power lines for hydroelectric dam(2003)
Ethiopia Hydroelectric power plant(2002)
Water resource development (2004)
Pharmaceutical joint venture (2004)
Uganda Channel construction (2004)
Kenya Port upgrade (2004)
Tanzania Airport in Zanzibar (2004)
Mozambique Foreign ministry building (2003)
High school (2004)
Madagascar Road construction (2003)
Zimbabwe Irrigation project (2003)
Coal mines (2003)
Rural power grid upgrade (2004)
Zambia Copper mine (2003)
Explosives plant (2003)
Angola Army camp (2004)
Gabon Senate palace (2003)
Broadcasting facility (2003)
Iron mine (2004)
Equatorial Guinea Road construction (2003, 2004)
Cameroon Hospital maintenance (2003)
Guinea Broadcasting facility
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owned companies operating in Africa on 900 projects in 52 countries (Reisen and Ndoye,
2008: 35). Other ongoing commercial plans include the China–African Development
Fund to provide start-up capital to Chinese companies investing in Africa, and the first
group of overseas economic trade and cooperation in which three countries of the group
come from Africa: Nigeria, Mauritius and Zambia. By massively investing in the African
economic sector, China is trying to internationalise Chinese companies and diversify
export channels.
Concl usions
China’s foreign policy towards Africa has undergone a dramatic shift over the last half-
century. Since China became more aware of the importance of the developing world as
allies in 1989, Africa has been considered as a steadfast political partner of the Beijing
government. Since Chinese companies started to internationalise at the end of the 1990s,
Africa has been a commercial focus for Chinese outward-bound companies, especially in
the extraction industries and related infrastructure sectors. The study argues that the
renewed significance that Beijing accords Africa nowadays results in the
conceptualization and creation of a new mechanism on China–Africa relations, which
may coordinateChinese foreign policy objectives towards Africa at the current stage.
The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation has become the institutional mechanism for
bilateral multi-levels engagement, which is driven by a number of political, diplomatic,
and economic factors. As has been argued, China’s goal in Africa is seen as ensuring a
reliable source for oil and other materials, a potential market for Chinese commodities,
and in turn, a political ally for China’s global interests. These are in accordance with
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Beijing’s version of global strategy, ultimately leading to the shape of an advanced
economy inside China and a multi-polar world order externally.
However, in the pursuit of these objectives, the dilemma that China faces has been its
emergence as a competitive force to certain Western countries and in certain ways,
producing a detrimental effect on African economies. No one can question the rising
influence of China on both African countries and the traditional stakeholders. The
presence of 48 African leaders at the 2006 Beijing summit and the reaction of the
international community over China’s exploration in Africa are evidence of this. The
Western countries begin to view the new rival sceptically and observe Chinese
commercial activities in Africa, which has challenged the established business practices.
6.2.2 Potential obstacles to the China–Africa engagement
In this section, the US ambitions in Africa, and the negative effect of Chinese commercial
activities on Africa are defined as two major obstacles to the China–Africa engagement.
i) The US factor
America is chosen, rather than another traditional stakeholder such as the EU, as the
focus of this section for four major reasons. First of all, it is the biggest energy consumer
in the world, followed by China. Both are consuming far more than their share of world
reserves, but there is a reduction in oil consumption in the EU.31 Second, America’s oil
31 Taking note of 2005 data, the United States possessed 2.5 per cent of the proven oil reserves
in the world but consumed 24.9 per cent of global oil production, while China consumed 8.2
per cent of the world production but only held 1.4 per cent of reserves (Pollack, 2008: 232,
cited from BP Statistics Review of World Energy 2006).
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imports are primarily from the Western Hemisphere (more than 50 per cent), West and
North Africa (less than 20 per cent), the Middle East (18 per cent), and others. China
meets its imports requirement from Africa (25 per cent), Saudi Arabia (17 per cent), Iran
(14 per cent), Russia (8 per cent) and others (Pollack, 2008: 232). It appears that the
African continent is an important oil-exporting region for both Chinese and US markets.
Third, given the significant position of Africa in the world oil market, Washington has
worked on redefining the relationship with Africa as a sort of mutually beneficial
partnership, through the passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000.
Similarly, China has established the Forum of China–Africa Cooperation and held
regular dialogues. In comparison, the EU held the Second EU–Africa Summit up to 2007
following the first EU–Africa Summit in 2000. Last but not least, the traditional
dominance of former colonial European countries such as Britain, Portugal, and France,
has been declining gradually after US accession. Given its global strategic ambition of
energy interests, the United States will continue to seek the dominant position in the
continent. As a result, the conflict of interests is more likely to come to a head between
the United States andChina.
The United State’s foreign policy towards Africa
As the biggest economy in the world, America is more acutely aware of the energy
shortage than smaller economies. In 2001, when it faced the first serious nationwide
energy shortage since the Oil Crisis of the 1970s, the National Energy Policy
Development Group produced the ‘National Energy Policy’, which calls for numerous
efforts to increase the domestic oil production on onehand, and to deepen dialogue with
major oil producers on the other hand. Several African countries, Nigeria, Angola, Gabon,
Congo, andChad are shown on the list.
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The decision to include Africa at the table is a combination of several considerations. To
begin with, the Washington government recognises that the US economy is confronted
with a different scenario in the present energy crisis. The competition for resources not
only exists between the industrial countries, but also faces exacerbation with the
involvement of developing countries. In the 1970s, when the West plus Japan struggled
with the insurmountable challenges caused by two Middle East oil crises, little attention
was given by Asian economies, as many Asian nations such as China and Indonesia were
not only energy self-sufficient but also benefited from the rising oil prices by exporting
oil. Nevertheless, the situation is quite different today. Both phenomenal economic
performance and the expansion of the middle class in these developing countries have
significantly increased the energy demands and swiftly converted these countries into
net oil importers. A new energy struggle is likely to accelerate among global consumers,
as every state puts energy security on the core of national concerns.
Also, the reduction of production capability in the Middle East is another issue. Saudi
Arabia has announced plans to increase production capacity, but there is still an annual
decline in existing Saudi fields ’ production.32Iran, another large-reservation country in the
area, is under economic sanctions, so that America cannot expect Iran to supply their
markets.33 Similarly, the complicated situation in Iraq is not conducive to the exploration
32 The plan includes the expansion of the Ghawar field, the Khursaniyah field, the Shayba
field and the Khoreis field. But the consequences are unlikely to be very significant in
boosting production, as there is still an annual decline of 6 or 7 per cent in existing Saudi
fields ’ production (Jaffe, 2005: 12).
33 A related point is that the oil supplies to the United States from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates and others have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s
geographic position and military capability give it leverage over the strait. If US relations
with Iran deteriorate further, it is quite possible that Iran could cut off oil transportation to the
Americamarket.
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of large-scale oil resources, and other oil exporters like UnitedArab Emirates, Kuwait, and
Qatar lack not only the organisational capability but also the willingness to increase oil
production. Furthermore, the 9/11 terrorist attack raised awareness that the Middle East
may not be a reliable source of oil imports. The investigation into 9/11 exposed that Saudi
Arabia-funded organisations or charities were involved in terrorism activities. 34 The
outcome of the distrust is that both the United States and Saudi Arabia are looking for
alternative partners: we may see the importance thatAmerica attaches to Africa and the
frequent national visits to the Asian area by the King of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the US
military action in Iraq as well as its backing to Israel increases the hostility that the Arabic
ordinary people hold towards Washington and provokes some Islamic extremists, who
may take actions to sabotageAmerican oil interests in the region.35
These realities in the Middle East and the upheaval by the Chavez government in Latin
America drives the US to target Africa, where is a swing production region that allows
oil companies to leverage production capabilities to meet the fluctuating world
demands.36 West African oil has the characteristics of being high quality, easily accessed
offshore, and well positioned to supply the North American market. After the National
Policy Paper issued in 2001, the US oil companies have been encouraged further to
promote output capability of the African oil industry by increasing their investment.
34 It is reported that a Saudi-based charity, al Haramain Islamic Foundation, had allegedly
financed assistance to the Egyptian terrorist group Gamma al Islamic, and some half dozen of
the most visible charities, including two of Saudi Arabia’s largest – the International Islamic
Relief Organisation and the World Muslim League – have financial links to Islamic terrorist
organisations.
35 In February 2006, terrorists associated with al-Qaeda attempted to destroy the processing
facility in SaudiArabia, which accounted for almost two-thirds of total Saudi production.
36 In West Africa’s five key producing countries—Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of
Congo Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea, their combined production is expected to rise by
2–3 million barrels per day in the next 5–10 years and by 3–5 million barrels per day in the
next 10–15 years (Klare andVolman, 2006: 611).
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Meanwhile, Washington government has actively taken measures to support these
commercial investments.
First, Washington seeks to remove the restrictions on the participation of American oil
companies in certain African countries, such as Libya and Sudan. Libya has the biggest
energy reserves in Africa, but due to the charge of sponsoring terrorism, it faced
sanctions imposed by America as well as the United Nations. In 2003, the Libyan
government agreed to take responsibility for their officials’ actions in the 1988 bombing
of Pan American Flight 103 and offer compensation to the victims’ families. This was
seen as ‘pay-for-removal of sanctions’ settlement. In 2004, Libya declared to abandon the
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and then comply with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Immediately after the declaration, Washington lifted the travel ban
and the trade sanctions on Libya, paving the way for their oil companies to bid on new
deals or to resume production in oil fields which they were forced to abandon years ago.
In the case of Sudan, since 1997 Washington has prohibited American companies to
either trade or invest in Sudan, due to its civil war and possible involvements in terrorist
activities. Although the relations have shown some signs of warming after 9/11 because
of Sudan’s help in the war on terrorism, sanctions will not be removed until there is a
peace agreement reached by the participants of the civil war. Given that Sudan is capable
of extracting 186,000 barrels of oil a day, it is predictable that Washington would remove
the ban as soon as the situation in Sudan improves.
Second, Washington’s strategies are accompanied by FDI and foreign aid packages. The
United States is a leading financial provider to Africa.37 In 2008, the Overseas Private
37 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United States
accounted for more than 37 per cent of total flows to sub-Saharan Africa from developed
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Investment Corporation was announced to support five new private equity investment
funds focused on sub-Saharan Africa, with a combined target capitalisation of USD 875
million. In addition to direct investment, it provided more than USD 1.2 billion in food
assistance in 2005, and offered over USD 4 billion in humanitarian and development aid
to Africa in 2006, increasing from USD 1.4 billion in 2001. Furthermore, Washington
pledged USD 15 billion over five years to fight HIV in Africa and promised to provide
drugs for AIDS victims (Thompson, 2007; Usborne, 2007). Not surprisingly, the largest
chunk of US assistance flows to Angola and Nigeria, Africa’s two leading oil supplies to
the United States.
Third, Washington issued the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000,
which offered tangible incentives for African countries to open their economies further
and set up free trade markets. Among the clauses of the act, the most impressive one is
the duty-free and quota-free treatment for eligible apparel articles made in 40 qualified
sub-Saharan African countries through 2015. The AGOA appears to provide these
African countries with the most generous access to the US market, but indeed the act
more supports American interests by encouraging reform of Africa’s economic and
commercial regimes, which produce easier accessible markets for American businesses.
In 2007, the total US–Africa two-way trade under the AGOA increased by 15 per cent.
American exports to South Africa rose by 24 per cent, to Nigeria by 25 per cent, and to
Gabon by 253 per cent. On the importing side, petroleum products still accounted for the
largest portion with a 93 per cent share of overall imports. The imports from the oil
producing countries grew with imports from Nigeria up by 18 per cent, Angola by 7 per
countries during the period 1996–2000, followed by France (18 per cent) and the United
Kingdom (13 per cent) (US Trade and Investment Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa: the
AfricanGrowth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, 2008: 10).
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cent, Gabon by 60 per cent, and Chad by 12 per cent (US–African Trade Profile, P2-3).
There are few economic benefits to other African states.
Fourth, although America does not possess a military base on the African mainland, they
protect their interests by sponsoring military capability to oil-producers on the onehand,
and relying on the agreement with certain African countries to use their local military
facilities on the other hand.38 In 2003, Washington designed an African Coastal and
Border Security Program providing specialised equipment, training, and intelligence
data to selected African countries. The provision of US arms, military equipment and
technical assistance, again, are mainly earmarked for Nigeria and Angola.39 On the other
hand, the US navy has increased its presence in African water, mainly in the Gulf of
Guinea, which is the closest to Nigeria, the major West African oil producer to America
and the site of some promising offshore oil reserves.40 In addition, the United States is
planning to establish a basing infrastructure on the continent. The proposal of the US
Africa Command was raised in early 2006, and the Bush Administration re-claimed the
plan in 2007. So far, the majority of African countries along with the African Union show
strong resistance to the plan.
38 In 1980, Kenya signed an agreement with Washington, which allowed US troop to use the
port of Mombasa, as well as airfields at Embakasi and Nanyuke. Afterwards, the United
States has signed agreements with Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Namibia, and Zambia to allow
America aircraft to refuel at local air bases.
39 In 2003, America commenced the delivery of seven surplus US Coast Guard cutters to
Nigeria, significantly enhancing the Nigerian Navy’s ability to protect offshore oil
installations and oil tankers (Volman, 2006: 1). During the period between 2004 and 2006, the
security aid to Nigeria and Angola provided by America amounted to more than USD 180
million (Klare and Volman, 2006: 617).
40 In 2003, NATO Supreme Commander General, James Jones, indicated that US naval force
would spend much less time in the Mediterranean Sea; instead, it would spend half its time
patrolling the west coast of Africa; in January 2005, the US Navy commenced a two-month
Gulf of Guinea Deployment; in September 2005, the US Navy operated a five-week West
African Training Cruise exercise (Volman, 2006: 6-7).
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For the United States, to better balance the domestic oil market it needs to increase the
supply from sources outside the Persian Gulf. These efforts, including removing
obstacles for oil companies, providing economic aid and weapons to the major African
partners, as well as enhancing the military presence in the Gulf of Guinea, aim at
improving the investment climate for US oil companies, and importantly, ensuring
American long-term interests on the African continent. In 2000, Africa just supplied 14
per cent of the total oil imports, whereas the Western Hemisphere accounted for half of
American oil imports and Middle East contributed 24 per cent (National Energy Policy,
2001: 130). But in 2006 the volume of crude oil exported from Africa has slightly
exceeded that from the Middle East, becoming the biggest source of crude oil for the
American market, and it is estimated that African oil exports to the United States will
account for 25 per cent of total American imports by 2015 (Liu, 2007; African Oil: a
Priority for US National Security and African Development, 2001: 5). However, the
United States is not the only country having energy interests in Africa. The increasing
involvement of China in seeking African markets for its products and pursuing energy
supplies causes US awareness of the potential rival, and raises the concern that the
Chinese presence would undermine US influences and then threaten US interests in a
longer run.
i)Impacts of China–Africa cooperation on the US
There are several remarkable phenomena in the global energy market. First of all, energy
dependence causes the consumers to form partnerships with suppliers for energy
objectives. For example, the United States has been aligning itself to Canada and Saudi
Arabia; China is creating close interaction with Iran, Nigeria and Sudan. Second, major
energy consumers find that their growing dependence on imported energy increases
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their strategic vulnerability. The consuming countries in some circumstances have to
modify their policies to avoid confrontation with their suppliers, and they are more
constrained in dealing with producing countries when oil markets are tight. This may
explain why some EUmembers are evasive over the Georgia–Russia military conflict and
are reluctant to deal with the issues of relevance to Iran. Third, the limited sources cause
direct competition among consumers, notably between the biggest economy—the United
States and the rapidly growing economy of China. Although the United States andChina
have different energy suppliers (the United States imports the most from Nigeria
whereas China imports the most from Angola), American strategy is to take primary
advantage in international political battles by controlling global oil resources and in turn
manipulating world economy. Thus the only superpower must consider the oil market as
a global one, in which a shortfall of oil anywhere would not only affect the oil price
everywhere including America but also trigger the collapse of the global economic
system. Chinese energy-hunting has already challenged American influence in Central
Asia, and China’s presence in Africa may have an impact on US interests as well. The
best outcome is that China’s search for energy will just challenge America’s foreign
policy, but the worst outcome could be a long-term energy battle between the two.
In some American views, the emergence of China in Africa as a visible player has been a
striking feature, so that not only can China be portrayed as a strategic rival in the battle for
energy but also China’s interests in Africa should be seen as a threat. China has formal
diplomatic relations with 50 of the 54 African countries, and China has been an important
participant by granting commercial loans with generous terms, removing debt, and
assisting infrastructure development.41 These have caused alarm in Washington. Former
41 China Exim Bank has been providing generous financial loans to drive trade, investment
and development, and the accumulated investment by Chinese companies had doubled from
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Deputy Secretary of States, Robert Zoelick, called for China to emerge as a ‘responsible
stakeholder ’ in the international society, and urged China to reduce the prospect of
heightened rivalry with the United States in Africa (Pollack, 2008: 239). However, the
Chinese level of economic engagement inAfrica is still modest and far from constituting a
threat for America. The primary position of the United States in the sub-Saharan African
economic sector has not faced any challenges (See Table 6.18).
Table 6.18: Sub-SaharanAfrica’s Principal Trading Partners (USD Billion and Market Share)
USD 6.27 billion to almost USD 12 billion between 2005 and 2006 (Brautigam, 2008: 3).
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Source: US-African Trade Profile; IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2007, and
2008; US Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: the African
Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond; Holder and Jackson, 2008:67; World
Investment Report 2007.
The table highlights several points:
• Both the United States and China are top three trade partners of the Sub-Saharan
region. But in terms of total trade volume, China stands far behind America’s
position.
• The United States imported 29.5 per cent of total Sub-Saharan African goods in
2006, whereas American exports to the region only accounted for 5.6 per cent of
the total demand. In comparison, China contributed 12.6 per cent of the exports
Sub-Saharan
Africa’s imports
Volume 2005 % share Volume 2006 % share
China 13.4 7.8 19.0 8.9
United States 10.3 6.0 12.1 5.6
Germany 11.7 6.8 13 6.1
France 10.8 6.3 11.3 5.3
United
Kingdom
8.1 4.7 8.9 4.1
Sub-Saharan
Africa’s Exports
Volume 2005 % share Volume 2006 % share
United States 52.4 29.6 61.5 29.5
China 19.3 10.9 26.3 12.6
United
Kingdom
12.6 7.1 13.0 6.2
Japan 9.4 5.3 12.5 6.0
Spain 9.3 5.25 10.8 5.2
Sub-Saharan
Africa’s FDI
Inflow
2004 (USD 12.8 bn in total) 2006 (USD 36 bn in total)
United States 3.90 (30.5%) 13.8 (38%)
China 2.7 (21.1%) 5.7 (15.8%)
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of Sub-Saharan countries, while Chinese goods accounted for 8.9 per cent of total
imports in Sub-Saharan region. China is more like a modest exporter and
America is a major importer for the Sub-Saharan economies.
• In terms of FDI, America supplied the majority of FDI into sub-Saharan Africa.
Taking into consideration the trade volume, FDI contribution, plus the military existence
of the US Navy in Africa, it is high unlikely that China would be able to challenge
America’s leading position in Africa in the coming years. As a matter of fact, there exists
the possibility that the two could cooperate on the African energy sector. China’s
national interests determine that Beijing must continue its present energy strategy in
Africa. In the game of asymmetric power with the United States, the only solution is to
steadily push the energy diplomacy through enhancing ties with African countries on the
one hand, and to eliminate America’s suspicions by addressing ‘common interests’ on
the other hand. China and the United States have shared interests in the energy sector.
Both have to ensure a predictable availability of energy at affordable cost, to protect
against any potential disruption in the transport of energy resources, and to prevent
further environmental degradation. Besides, according to economic expectations, if the
oil price could return to normal market place, the total benefits may reach USD 500
billion per year, and USD 150-200 billion of this amount could go to America (He and
Guan, 2006: 67). If both sides take long-term benefits into consideration, a cooperative
approach appears to be a dominating strategy. It has been suggested to the Washington
government that only when America sets up close cooperation with other major oil-
importing countries such as China, can they effectively confront the supply problem. An
annual energy policy dialogue between China and the United States, initiated in 2005,
should be taken as the first step of such coordination.
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ii) Negative effects on African economies
For Africa’s political elites, China’s commercial deals come with no conditions except the
recognition of the ‘one-China policy’, and the political clout that China holds as a
permanent member on the Security Council is particularly attractive for countries which
are under the scrutiny of international community for human rights violation. Therefore,
it seems that African countries may not only benefit from the financial resources of the
Chinese government, but also do not have to worry about questions on issues like
governance or transparency by the international community. However, when the
Chinese package of assistance allows the African states to exploit their untapped
resources, it raises the concerns that China’s emergence may jeopardise vulnerable
African economies and undermine the efforts of international society to promote
transparency.
Many scholars, including Alden (2006) and Taylor (2007), have analysed the negative
consequences resulting from China’s policy towards Africa: China may prolong
authoritarian rule in ‘pariah states’ such as Sudan and Zimbabwe and in ‘weak
democratic governments’, such as Angola, through injecting investment and aid; in the
case of ‘democratic states’, such as South Africa, there may be direct competition
between Chinese enterprises and local businesses. Differently, this section will not
discuss the issue on the basis of different types of political regimes, but focuses on
another three aspects: negative impact on certain African economies, illustrated by the
apparel industry; the unbalanced trade mode with the continent; and the impediment to
African stability.
To begin with, the most significant effect of Chinese exports on Africa is the phenomenon
of the textile tsunami. Chinese textile goods flood into not only the African markets but
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also replace the market share of African products in the Western markets. Some accuse
the Chinese of bringing about the collapse of textile industries in many African countries.
Since Chinese products began to pour into the continent, thousands of African workers
in the apparel sector have lost their jobs, and numerous factories closed their doors: 8
closed in Kenya, 6 in Lesotho, 4 in Swaziland, and so on (Wilson III, 2005: 10). By the end
of 2002, around 75,000 had lost their jobs in the sector (Lyman, 2005). In the competition
for the third markets, after the ‘Multi-Fibre Arrangement’ was terminated in 2005, there
is no longer any advantage for African goods and no further incentives for investors to
set up factories in African countries. 42 In the first quarter of 2005, South Africa’s clothing
exports to the United States dropped to only USD 12 million from USD 26millon in the
same period of 2004 (Lyman, 2005).
Second, it is quite important to pay attention to the economic nature of the two entities.
At the first glance, the differences in the economic endowments of the two economies
could make them complementary partners, as Africa has ample raw materials while
China has huge foreign currency reserves, which it may invest in the continent. However,
the fact is that one is a manufacturing economy and the other is based on natural
resources and primary commodities. There exist severe trade imbalances. In 2007 China
benefited to the effect of USD 370.28 billion from trade with Africa, while Africa gained
USD 362.83 billion. It appears a balanced trade relationship, but considered individually,
Benin earned USD 1.13 billion from its exports toChina whereas it paid USD 19.71 billion
for buying Chinese commodities. The scenario of Benin is not isolated, but quite common
for the African counterparts such as Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Togo (See Table 6.19).
42 Before January 2005, African textile manufactures had privileged protection under the
‘Multi-Fibre Arrangement’. The policy granted duty free status to textile products imports
from Africa, so that African goods may have a competitive advantage of price in American as
well as in EU markets.
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Only energy deals with the limited number of resources-exporting economies like
Angola, Sudan, and Congo may moderate the overall China–African trade surplus (See
Table 6.20). This is, in a great part, because China’s economic initiatives in seeking
material inputs determine the asymmetric exchange mode towards African states.
Table 6.19: China’s Trade Surplus with Certain African Counties (USD Billion)
Source: the Commercial Ministry of PRC.
Table 6.20: China’s Trade Deficit with the African Economies (USD Billion)
Country Export to China Import from China Trade Surplus
Egypt 2.40 43.62 41.22
Benin 1.13 19.71 18.58
Togo 0.26 13.74 13.48
Ghana 0.53 12.13 11.6
Kenya 0.28 9.21 8.93
Ethiopia 0.87 7.20 6.33
Tanzania 2.00 5.93 3.93
Liberia 0.03 8.03 8.00
Tunis 0.30 4.82 4.52
Namibia 1.58 2.43 0.85
Guinea 0.92 2.64 1.72
Mauritius 0.05 2.84 2.79
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Source: the Commercial Ministry of PRC.
Third, much of the condemnation of China’s African policy focuses on Beijing’s support
for the repressive states. In the case of Sudan, since other firms such as the US oil
companies are excluded due to trade sanctions, Chinese firms have taken the business
opportunities ahead of the others by investing heavily in the oil fields in the South area
and building a pipeline for smooth oil transportation. To ensure its oil interests not being
violated, Beijing threatens to use its veto right against the proposals of imposing
economic sanctions against Sudan, in the United Nations Security Council. However, in
2006, under the pressure of world propaganda, Beijing endorsed the sanction proposal
and the mission of peacekeeping. Also, China’s National Development and Reform
Commission removed Sudan from the list of the target countries for a new investment by
Chinese oil and gas companies in 2007. In 2008, China’s Special Envoy on Darfur Issue,
Liu Guijin, conveyed willingness to strive with other Western nations for the peace and
development in Africa. In the Zimbabwe scenario, Chinese investments in copper fields
and the offers of financial loans enable President Mugabe refuses to make any further
progress on human rights. Angola is another African state in relation to which China has
faced harsh condemnation. Human Rights Watch says that the investments from China
allow the Angolan government to ignore international pressure of strengthening
Country Export to China Import from China Trade Deficit
Angola 128.89 12.31 116.58
Sudan 41.32 14.83 26.49
Congo 28.31 4.19 24.12
Libya 15.47 8.59 6.88
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transparency in oil revenue.43 In addition, Beijing’s weapon-export policy is accused of
inflaming some states’ long-running civil wars anddamaging African stability.44
However, China’s influence in Africa has been exaggerated. While people condemn
China’s arms policy, they ignore the fact that several OECD countries, including France,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Belgium continue their military sales to the
continent andprofit from the deals with undemocratic, militaristic governments.45 France
even conducted direct military intervention in conflicts between the Chadian
government and the rebels. Although China is currently the world’s fifth-largest arms
exporter, it stands far behind the United States, Britain, France andRussia with regard to
sales volume, so that it is unlikely to produce significant difference in African stability if
only Beijing revises their arms-sales policy. Also, given the principle of ‘non-interfere’
policy that Beijing always insists on its foreign policy, there is little expectation that
China would make any steps further. Especially when China itself relies heavily on
energy supplies, it has to be constrained in dealing with these countries.
What really puzzle China are the shocks to African economies and the asymmetric trade
43 According to Pere, between 1997 and 2002, approximately USD 4 billion oil incomes in
Angola disappeared from the public purse (Pere, 2008: 16).
44 According to Human Rights First, an America-based non-profit organisation, since 1997
Sudan’s military expenditures have increased significantly, and much of the money has gone
directly back to China, for purchases of small arms and other military equipment. China
supplied 89.95 per cent of Sudanese small arms in 2004, 94.16 per cent in 2005, and 87.66 per
cent in 2006 (The Facts: China’s Arms Sales to Sudan). In 2004, China sold Zimbabwe fighter
aircraft and military vehicles for USD 200 million (Brookes and Shin, 2006).
45 Taking note of data in 2003, five members of the G8—United States, United Kingdom,
France, Germany and Russia—were responsible for 89 per cent of arms sales to developing
countries. The United States is the biggest arms exporter to Africa, contributing to about 50
per cent of all arms to the continent. The United Kingdom and France account for around 10
per cent of the total arms market in Africa (Brautigam, 2008: 31).
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mode. China always believes that its development mode with a non-imperialist method
could act as an example to be introduced to the African countries, but their neo-
mercantilist pursuit of national interests in the quest for resources reflects the ignorance
towards the sustainable development of African economies. In Beijing, policy-makers and
scholars have been engaging in debates about how to advance China’s interests in the
continent with a win–win consequence. The agreement on voluntary export restraints for
Chinese textiles with South Africa in 2006 should be considered as one of the positive
measures.
Nevertheless, it is debatable whether a more accommodating Chinese trade policy could
help Africa. For most African states, the biggest problem is not the trade policy itself, but
the fact that they do not have much to exchange in terms of value-added commodities.
China ought to take more responsible measures to help them develop their economy, if
Beijing intends to sustain a long-term relationship. In other words, China should change
the mode that most foreign aid flows to the energy sector of certain oil-exporting
countries.46 Instead, the incentives from the Chinese government should cover a wider
framework, assisting African sustainable development. For example, when infrastructure
building and fundamental industries, which may lay foundations for economic growth,
goes out of fashion in the West, China should take over these tasks, as they have been
doing, helping boost the agricultural development, building public infrastructure like
transportation, improving education system and public health, assisting the development
of telecommunication, and exporting technologies to help build a competitive
manufacturing sector. Only when African economy diversifies, not just relying on
resources exports, can Africa trades more commodities with China, and can the two
46 In terms of the geographical distribution of Chinese finance, it is estimated that 40 per cent
goes to Angola, another 40 per cent to three economies (Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sudan), and 3
per cent each to Ghana and the republic of Congo (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008: 37).
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develop a long-term strategic relationship.
6.2.3 The strategy of economic incentives
In Africa, the Western influences have been able to build upon generations of
engagement that dated back to the colonial period, allowing them to secure their
interests in Africa. To compete with these influences and successfully insert itself in
Africa, Beijing’s approach has been constructed as follows:
Diplomatic attention : based on the ‘one-China policy’, China shows willingness to engage
with any African state, including the pariah governments that Western states are
reluctant to interact with. Frequent high-level visits undoubtedly increase the political
coordination with African countries in international affairs (See Table 6.21).
Political discourse : the role of being a permanent member of the UN Security Council
helps Beijing support the position of either individual African state or the African Union.
Conversely, China also needs the votes of African countries for the success of its own
proposals.
Economic diplomacy: The major government bodies, including the Ministry of Commerce,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the China Exim Bank, and China Development Bank,
play decisive roles in promoting various assistance projects, such as the zero-interest
loans, concessional loan program, direct debt relief, and the delivery of medical and
education teams.
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Table 6.21: Major High-Level Visits to Africa between 2000 and 2009
Year Diplomatic Events
2000 24–27 April 2000, President Jiang Zemin visited SouthAfrica.
10–12 Oct 2000, China–Africa Forum — Ministerial Conference.
2001 17–20 Jan 2001, Vice President Hu Jintao visited Uganda.
16–28 April 2001, President Li Ruihuan visited the Republic of Mauritius, South
Africa, and the Kingdom of Morocco.
31 Oct to 17Nov 2001, Li Peng visited Algeria and the Republic of Tunisia.
2002 13–18 April, 2002, President Jiang Zemin visited Libya, Nigeria, and the Republic
of Tunisia.
19–27 April 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji visited Egypt and Kenya.
25 August to 6 Sep 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji visited Algeria, the Kingdom of
Morocco, and the Republic of Cameroon.
2003 9–19 Feb 2003, Chairman Li Ruihuan visited Tanzania, Namibia, and Zambia.
2004 20–29 June 2004, Vice President Zeng Qinhong visited the Republic of Tunisia,
Togo, Benin, and South Africa.
29 Oct to 8 Nov 2004, Chairman Wu Bangguo visited Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia,
and Nigeria.
2006 Jan, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, Senegal,
Nigeria and Libya.
18–29 April, President Hu Jintao visited the Kingdom of Morocco, Nigeria, and
Kenya.
17–24 June, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Egypt, Ghana, Congo, Angola, South
Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
1–6 Nov, the Third China–Africa Summit.
2007 30 Jan to 10 Feb, President Hu Jintao visited Cameroon, Libya, Sudan, Zambia,
Namibia, South Africa, The Republic of Mozambique, and The Republic of
Seychelles.
23–27 April, Chairman Jia Qinlin visited the Republic of Tunisia, Ghana,
Zimbabwe and Kenya.
2008
7–11 Jan, Foreign Minister visited South Africa, Congo Republic, the Republic of
Burundi andEthiopia.
17–24 June, Premier Wen Jiaobao visited Egypt, Ghana, Cango, Angola, South
Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.
11–13 Nov, Chairman of People’s Committee, Wu Bangguo, visited Algeria, Gabon,
Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Seychelles.
2009 14 Jan, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Republic of Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi,
and South Africa.
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Source: official announcements
Among the three features of China’s strategy, economic diplomacy is a remarkable
approach. As noted previously, throughout the Sino-Africa diplomatic history, from the
initial engagement with the first African counterpart—Egypt, to the establishment of the
mechanism of FOCACwith the majority of countries in Africa, China’s foreign policy has
always been accompanied by economic incentives. The only difference is that earlier aid
recipients were those declaring themselves to be socialist countries, whereas the targets
nowadays are those which could serve China’s national and global strategy. The
economic assistance to Africa could be measured in two ways: the weight of Africa in
China’s Official Government Expenditure for External Assistance, and the specific
assistance plans (see Table 6.22).
Table 6.22: China’s Official Government Expenditure for External Assistance 1998–2007
Sources from Brautigam, 2008: 20.
Year Diplomatic Events
10–17 Feb, President Hu Jintao visited Mali, the Republic of Senegal, Tanzania, and
Republic of Mauritius.
Year Total (USD Million) To Africa (USD Million) Share (%)
1998 449 198 44.1
1999 474 208 43.88
2000 554 244 44
2001 569 250 43.9
2002 604 266 44
2003 631 278 44.05
2004 734 323 44
2005 926 407 43.95
2006 1050 462 44
2007 1421 625 43.98
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Since the founding of FOCAC, there have been three symbolic summits on the Sino-
Africa diplomacy. Every summit came out with an action plan, including plenty of
economic incentives.
• The first summit was held in Beijing in 2000, and the Beijing Declaration along with
Program for China–Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development were
announced.
• The Second summit was held in Addis Ababa in 2003, and the Addis Ababa Action
Plan (2004–2006) as well as the Special Preferential Tariff Treatment Program was
released.
• The Third Summit was held in Beijing in 2006, and the Beijing Action Plan (2007-
2009) was published.
In comparison to the Africa plan by G8, these action plans involve practical commitments.
• So far, there are 900 economic and development projects in Africa that have been
completed. In 2005 alone, China assisted 26 complete plant projects and 36
technological cooperation projects in Africa.
• By the end of 2005 China’s Exim Bank approved loans worth USD 6.5 billion for
260 projects in 36 African countries.
• The provision of scholarships for 18,000 students from 50 African countries to
study in China was undertaken.
• By 2007 China had held 2,500 short and medium term training courses in 20
different fields, including management, economics with more than 80,000 people
participating.
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• Since the first medical team was sent to Algeria in 1963, more than 16,000 medical
personnel have been sent to 47 African countries and treated 240 million patients.
In 2006 alone, there were more than 1,000 Chinese doctors and nurses working in
36 African states. In 2007, 48 Chinese medical teams were working in 47 countries
worldwide.
• China has cancelled USD 10 billion debts of more than 30 African countries since
2000. The cancelled debt amounts to 60 per cent of the total owed toChina.
• Zero tariff treatment to an unspecified number of exports from Africa’s least
developed countries.
• Two pharmaceutical plants in Africa were founded for the purpose of
manufacturing artemisinin for treating malaria; around USD 8 million were
donated with the aim to enhance African countries’ capability in public health.
• The China International poverty Alleviation Centre has hosted the training
courses that introduce China’s poverty reduction experiences to African officials.
Other on-going commitments in the Action Plan (2007-2009) include:
• To commence a USD 5 billion China–Africa development fund to support
reputable Chinese firms investing in Africa.
• To create five preferential trade and industrial zones for Chinese business entry,
located in Zambia, Mauritius, Egypt, Nigeria andpossibly Tanzania.
• To provide USD 3 billion for preferential loans andUSD 2 billion for preferential
export credit by 2009.
• To make a USD 20 billion pledge for infrastructure development, investment in
human skills in Africa over the next years.
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• To ncrease the number from 190 to more than 440 of commodities exported from
the least developed African counties eligible for zero-tariff treatment.
• To dispatch 100 senior agriculture experts, set up 10 agriculture technology
demonstration sites in Africa by 2009, and to organise working groups for some
African countries to plan collaboration on seed production technologies,
biological technologies in animal health and food safety.
• To increase the number of Chinese government scholarships from 2,000 to 4,000
for African students to study in China by 2009.
• To set up 100 rural schools.
• To build 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers and an additional USD 38
million for the provision of attemisinin by the end of 2009.
(Source: Wilson III, 2005: 11, cited from Thompson, Economic Growth and Soft Power:
China’s African Strategy; Tull, 2006: 463; Gill, Huang and Morrison, 2007: 5-7; Naidu and
Mbazima, 2008: 755; Pere, 2008: 15; Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action
Plan 2007-2009; and other official announcements.)
6.3 Conclusions
There already exists a consensus that in international politics, national interests are the
most influential factor and the basic motivation for a state’s foreign policy. Since the first
contact with some African countries at the Bandung conference in 1955, driven by
political as well as ideological motivations, China intensified the supports in African
nation’s struggle against European domination. To this end, Beijing offered abundant
assistance, including the weapon transfer and the infrastructure construction. These
volunteered projects were politically or psychologically significant to shape a ground for
subsequent re-engagement. After a temporary reduction of interests in Africa as China
began to focus on inwards development in the 1980s, Africa has been considered as one
of the most important counterparts and regained the attention from the Chinese.
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If China’s contacts with the developing countries were modest with less ambition in the
past, nowadays these developing countries are no longer an element of the concept of
South–South cooperation in China’s diplomacy, but some of them have become political
allies in international organisations as well as trade partners in international economic
system. It is certain that the present influences of China on the African continent deserve
more consideration. The profound changes in Africa’s relations with China are an
impressive factor in the phenomenal growth in trade and investment, placing these
bilateral engagements at the centre of political debate, and ensuring that Beijing will be a
crucial actor in the continent’s future. Furthermore, the offer from China, to a great
extent, is a type of leverage that gives Africa opportunities in bargaining with the North.
Therefore China’s activities in Africa rehash and attach both geopolitical and economic
importance to the African economies in the international scene.
This chapter suggests that at the contemporary stage, one of the primary characteristics
of China’s African diplomacy has been the involvement of the new security concept,
which lies in the consideration of economic security, energy security to be more precise,
apart from the conventional motivations as the Taiwan issue. China is already an
extraordinarily resource-inefficient economic power. The hunger for raw resources has
sent Chinese national enterprises searching every corner across the World, from the iron
mines of Australia in Asia Pacific to the oil fields of Venezuela in Latin America. For
China, the strategy that they pursue towards Africa, not surprisingly, also aims to secure
an uninterrupted supply of resources. Taking note of the top ten African trading partners
in 2008 (Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt), all are either resource-rich,
specifically oil-endowed countries, or the countries with potential markets, and the
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resources-related commodities signify the majority of total African exports to China.47
Compared to other regions, Africa’s vast resources have remained relatively unexploited.
The relative neglect of Western companies allows China to do business without having
intensive competition, and the lack of funds, technologies, and management in Africa
also promote the Chinese presence in the capital-intensive energy industries.
The second feature of China’s African policy has been the remarkable use of economic
incentives. Traditionally, the donors of foreign finance mostly come from the Western
world or the international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Today, the
new emerging economy of China becomes not just a destination for Western aid, but also a
source of finance. In this regard, the presence of China in Sub-Saharan Africa as an aid-
provider is of significance. This chapter argues that these incentives serve to smooth the
way for China’s economic security. Given China’s main interests in Africa are to secure
energy assets as well as to boost foreign trade, economic incentives are supposed to
undertake the role of securing resources contracts and Chinese business overseas. It has
turned out that bilateral trade volume has experienced a remarkable rise annually.African
resource exports have grown by the extension of resource-backed loans, and Chinese
exports to Africa also have been stimulated by credit facilities for African governments
such as export buyer’s credits.
Furthermore, the strategy of economic incentives aims not only to secure short-term
economic security, but also to create conditions for a permanent strategic security in Africa.
As noted previously, there are two factors that may affect the long-term strategic
relationship with Africa: the US factor and the negative effect on African sustainable
47 The top import products to China in 2008 were Mineral products (82 per cent); Precious
stones and metals (3 per cent); Spec class/parts for motor vehicles (3 per cent); Wood products
(2 per cent) and Base metals (1 per cent).
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development. The US ambition in oil is obvious. Reviewing the major oil-producing
regions (Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and so on), we see the ongoing wars triggered
by the struggle for oil in Middle East and Central Asia, and we witness the direct
intervention of Washington in these conflicts. Africa is the only remaining oil-producing
area without breaking a real war, but we already see the shadow of US force to protect
their energy interests in the continent. As both the US and China seek to further their
energy interests in Africa, whether they work together or at cross-purposes remains an
open question. Conflicts of interest may reveal themselves if the United States comes to
see China as a competitor for African resources, and China could see the United States
attempt to promote the model of stability and democracy in Africa as an effort to cut off
China’s access to raw materials and to further contain China’s professed ‘peaceful rise’.
Even though current Chinese influence is far behind that of the United States, a potential
conflict exists in the coming years if China fails to get full supports fromAfrica.
In comparison, how to promote African sustainable development is a more imminent
issue, which may determine whether Africa recognises China as a permanent ally. China
has been the most successful developing country in the process of globalisation, whereas
Africa is viewed as an irrelevant bystander with no important economic interests. The
resources in the continent are one of the few impressive exceptions to this perceived
insignificance. China’s African policy should help African countries turn their
advantages in the resources sector into development strengths, and the presence ofChina
as a key investor and consumer could provide a unique opportunity to unlock the
continent’s vast economic potential and development prospects. However, such
development assistance should not be narrowed in the energy or related resource sector
only. These developing countries, which are struggling to grow and reduce poverty, are
interested in what is the source of sustainable growth. The lesson from Chinese economic
success itself is the development of high-quality infrastructure, and one of the greatest
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constraints faced by the African economies is exactly its poor infrastructure. Chinese
companies in Africa have been active in various infrastructure projects, including roads,
bridges, schools, shopping centres, office buildings and low-cost housing, which create
conditions and much promise for further diversification of African countries' economies.
In the context of Africa’s willingness of asserting its independent authority and
sustainable development path in the global setting, if Beijing continues to expand the
coverage of its assistance initiatives and ensure more African countries and people
benefit from that assistance, the strategy of foreign aid may create the conditions for
securing Beijing’s long-term strategic position in Africa.
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Chapter Seven: The China–ASEAN Engagement and the FTA Strategy
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, joined by Brunei in the 1980s, and by Cambodia,
Laos, Burma and Vietnam in the 1990s. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the
Framework Agreement on ASEAN–China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation at the
ASEAN Plus China Summit. China has benefited significantly from the economic reform
of 1978 and the WTO accession of 2001. ASEAN views the growth of China with a mixed
sense of hope and concern. It is a certainty that the size of China’s economy, its rising
industrial and military capability will impact on regional prospects in the Southeast
Asian area, not only in economic terms.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold:
First, to provide a brief overview of the development of ASEAN and the relations
between ASEAN andChina respectively.
Second, to identify the intentions behind the China–ASEAN engagement. The study
argues that economic prosperity remains the most important task for both sides. The
ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) may drive economic growth for both
regions and narrow the disparity between the developed countries and the less
developed countries within ASEAN, and between the rich coastal and poor Southwest
provinces within China. Besides, ACFTA is expected to restraint the South China Sea
disputes with the maritime ASEAN states and to promote the construction of strategic
land corridors through the continental ASEAN states. The second section will also
explore the implications on the interests of the United States and Japan in this region,
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and on the ASEAN economies themselves, as the three are major influencing factors for
China–ASEAN engagement.
Finally, the study draws the conclusion that China’s ASEAN policy represents a
combination of national security and economic diplomacy. The uses of economic
incentives, the establishment of free trade area in particular, are intended to defend
China’s surrounding security environment in addition to the pursuit of economic
interests.
7.1 China–ASEAN diplomatic interactions
This section presents the evolution of ASEAN and China–ASEAN relations from the
founding of PRC to the contemporary era.
7.1.1 ASEANcommunity
At the 2003 ASEAN Bali Summit, the heads of the Southeast Asian states released the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, which revealed the attempt to establish a
sophisticated community made up of three organs: the ASEAN Security Community, the
ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The
decision to form a more integrated ASEAN community is a big step forward in ASEAN’s
solidarity and cooperation, which has gone through a long-term evolution since ASEAN
was formed.
In August 1967, the ASEAN Five (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand) was formed at Bangkok—an organisation aimed to conduct a joint effort to
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promote the welfare of their nations andpeople. One of the central objectives of ASEAN
was the pursuit of regional security. Internally, ‘Indonesia had just emerged from a
period of confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore; Malaysia and Singapore had just
been through an acrimonious separation, and the Philippines were pursuing its claim to
Sabah, a part of Malaysia. Thailand was bordered by communist Cambodia and Vietnam,
and was itself threatened within by communist insurgency in the Northeast’ (Pasadilla,
2004: 2). Suspicion among the regional states might have led to regional instability, so
that the association was expected to establish norms of mutual respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in member states’ internal affairs,
and the settlement of differences by peaceful means (Overview Association of Southeast
Asian Nations). To date, ASEAN as a confidence-building framework has been able to
consolidate the member states by providing an open regional platform. Issues such as the
border problem between Malaysia and Indonesia, the dispute over the Pedra Branca
Island between Malaysia and Singapore, the Sipatan and Lipatan Islands between
Indonesia and the Philippines, the Sabah issue between Malaysia and the Philippines,
and the Spatley Islands among Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have not
escalated into severe armed confrontation.
Another objective was to exclude the interference of external actors and limit the
expansion of Communism. When the colonial powers withdrew, there would have been
a power vacuum, which could have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains.
Uncertainties about big states’ commitment to the area and the spread of Communism in
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia forced these states to pursue mutual support. Nowadays
to avoid a single external power dominating the area is still an important objective for
ASEAN.
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Besides security matters, the promotion of economic development also appeared on the
list of the Bangkok Declaration. However, political realities forced the ASEAN members
to delay the implementation of the blueprint of economic prosperity. Due to the
hangover of unsolved bilateral conflicts, the members could not immediately begin to
foster trust between one another. They spent almost the entire first decade of the
association considering the basis and methods of mutual cooperation. Before 1976, the
major outcome was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, just
repeating the association’s primary principles – the peaceful settlement of disputes and
non-interference in internal affairs. In the second decade, the defeat of the United States
in Vietnam and its withdrawal from mainland Asia nurtured Vietnamese ambitions in
Southeast Asia, which saw the taking over of the rest of French Indochina as well as the
north-eastern provinces of Thailand. The invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent
disputes did not end until Vietnam entirely withdrew its troops in the late 1980s and the
Paris Conference in 1991.48 The unexpected violence undermined the attention on intra-
regional economic cooperation, though in 1977, the original ASEAN five signed the
Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, which encouraged the
member states to take cooperative action in stimulating economic development programs.
The continuous focus on security matters can be deduced from the major documents
released during this period. All address regional stability without mentioning specific
economic policies. (See Table 7.1).
48 On October 23 1991, the Paris Conference convened to sign a comprehensive settlement
giving the UN full authority to supervise a ceasefire, repatriate a displaced Khmer along the
border with Thailand, disarm and demobilize the factional armies, and to prepare the country
for free and fair elections.
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Table 7.1 Major Documents during the 1970s and 1980s
Source: ASEAN official website.
Moving to the 1990s, there were several events showing the improvement of the situation
in Southeast Asia region. The first was ASEAN’s enlargement. Since its foundation,
ASEAN claimed to be open for all states in the regionwhich had the desire to participate.
After the formal admission of Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in
1997, the unification of all Southeast Asian nations came about when the last member,
Cambodia joined in 1999. Through the enlargement program, the region reached a
common identity, with no difference between ASEAN and non-ASEAN status. The
participation of Vietnam, being an authoritarian state, is viewed as a historical event in
the regional strategic outlook, as this changed the status of the association from an
ideology-oriented union to a regional organisation in real terms.
The Foreign
Minister Summit
of ASEAN 1971
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ASEAN members were
determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of,
and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside
Powers)
The Bali Summit
of 1976
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (ASEAN members called for
strengthening political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of
views, coordinating positions and, where possible and desirable, taking
common action).
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (The treaty
reaffirmed the following principles: mutual respect for one another’s
sovereignty; non-interference in internal affairs; the peaceful settlement of
intra-regional disputes and effective cooperation. In addition, it mandated
the establishment of a high council made up of ministerial representatives
from the parties as a dispute-settlement mechanism).
The Manila
Summit of 1987
Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia
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Secondly, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s relieved the political tension in East
Asia, so that ASEAN could move from a solely political unity towards a more
sophisticated mechanism including economic interaction. At the Singapore summit in
1992, ASEAN endorsed the documentary of Framework Agreement on Enhancing
ASEAN Economic Cooperation, and passed the Agreement on the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, in which they approved the
establishment of a regional free trade area and promised to take measures to accelerate
tariff reduction. As Pasadilla (2004) notes, ‘unlike the ASEAN Preferential Trade
Agreement in 1977, the Free Trade Agreement includes a greater number of products
subject for lower tariff, but it also includes provision of the elimination of non-tariff
barriers, quantitative restrictions, and other cross-border measures’ (Pasadilla, 2004: 4).
Since then, the intra-regional trade grew steadily, but due to the diversified economies,
extra-regional trade increased faster (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Intra-ASEAN andExtra-ASEAN Exports, 1993-1996 (USD Million)
Sources: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2003,
Note: ASEAN group included Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, andVietnam
Intra-ASEAN Exports Extra-ASEAN Exports
1993 43,681.1 162,957.1
1994 58,571.5 188,193.3
1995 70,178.9 226,517.8
1996 80,973.7 242,387.6
1997 85,351.8 257,318.3
1998 69,312.9 247,337.9
1999 74,903.5 266,908.3
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Thirdly, in spite of internal divergence, the association began to show political solidarity
on strategic issues of common concern, for example, the concern over the Cambodia
issue and the South China Sea. On Cambodia, from the end of the 1970s to the early
1990s, ASEAN not only denied the legitimacy of the Vietnam-supported regime, but also
persuaded the UN to pass resolutions that accused Vietnam of violating Cambodia’s
sovereignty. Moreover, ASEAN successfully prevented the United States, Japan and
West Europe from assisting Vietnam, which effectively forced the Vietnamese
withdrawal. On the South China Sea issue, ASEAN made a proposal in the Manila
Declaration of 1992, which urged all claimants to exercise restraint, and endorsed the
ASEAN–China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea in 2002. These to a large extent
forced China to discuss this issue multilaterally with ASEAN at the ASEAN Regional
Forum, abandoning the long-standing principle that they only negotiate territorial
disputes bilaterally with individual claimants.
Fourthly, ASEAN began to intensify the contact with non-ASEAN countries. The external
states also showed the willingness of consulting with ASEAN. Australia, Japan, andNew
Zealand joined the dialogue system with ASEAN. In 1993, the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting andPost Ministerial Conference agreed to set up the ASEAN Regional Forum to
interact with these dialogue partners.49 In 1997, ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and
South Korea) held the first leaders ’ meeting in Chiang Mai, and in 1999 the grouping was
institutionalised formally. In 2005, the East Asia Summit composed of ASEAN plus Three
groups, India, Australia, and New Zealand was announced. The increasing interaction
49The inaugural meeting was held in Bangkok in 1994. The current participants in the ARF are
as follows: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European
Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Russian Federation,Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste,United States, and Vietnam.
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between ASEAN and their outside counterparts undoubtedly gave the union speaking
weight in regional and global affairs.
Over the past 40 years, although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations experienced
intra-members territorial conflicts, the campaign against Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia, and the 1997 financial crisis, ASEAN managed to transform itself from an
insignificant sub-regional organisation into an important community which called for the
means of negotiation and the goal of peace and development in East Asian and global
affairs. ASEAN’s achievement does not just lie in preventing regional military conflicts,
but also in creating a political environment where members and non-members may
exchange views on security, political, military, and economic problems.
7.1.2 China–ASEAN interactions
In East Asia, China stands at the centre and has dominated the region throughout history.
Chinese influence, culture and power have always moved southward since the first age
of which there is reliable historical evidence. When a group of small entities
geographically stand next to a giant, the consequence is likely to be that the latter exerts
almost unchallengeable influence over the former. This was a long-held experience of the
Southeast Asian states in relation to China before the Opium War. 50 This section traces
the complicated relations between China and its South-eastern Asian neighbours,
considering the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 to be a significant turning point in bilateral
diplomacy.
50 Since the Opium War and subsequent invasion of Western powers, the regional structure
has changed fundamentally and produced tremendous historical problems.
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i: The first period from the founding of PRC in 1949 to the Tiananmen event in 1989
Since the Communist Party took over Chinese government in 1949, relations with the
Southeast Asian countries have experienced much fluctuation. After the PRC was
founded, Indonesia and Burma recognised the new China immediately in 1950. The
warm relationship with Jakarta was evident as China was invited to attend the 1955
Bandung Conference of Asian–African Countries. However, fairly estranged relations
with the original ASEAN members appeared from the mid-1960s to the 1970s, attributed
to Beijing’s radical foreign policy. Chairman Mao Zedong showed the ambition in
controlling the Southeast Asian region:
We must without fail get hold of Southeast Asia…Southeast Asia is a very rich
region, it abounds in minerals. In the future it will be very useful for the
development of Chinese industry (Mondejar andWai, 2005: 217, cited fromGahrana,
1984: 7).
The aggressive mindset was evident in actively supporting communist insurgence in
non-Communist countries and deliberately granting ethnic Chinese in the region PRC
citizenship. In Indonesia, Beijing was suspected of involvement in a major conspiracy
which almost assassinated the entire military command in 1965; in Thailand and
Malaysia, Chinese support for communist guerrillas continued until the late 1970s and
party-to-party relations ended until the late 1980s (Whiting, 1997: 302). These policies
aroused suspicions over China’s motivations, led Thailand and the Philippines to work
on containing any expansion of communist influence by participating in the Southeast
Asian Treaty Organisation in 1954, and forced Indonesia to cut diplomatic relations with
China in 1967.51
51 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was an international organisation created to block
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In general, these Southeast Asian countries did not view China as a trustworthy
neighbour. They were anxious to protect their hard-earned independence, with zero
tolerance for any attempt to undermine their sovereignty. The Chinese-instigated
communist revolution directly challenged their fundamental interests. Moreover, the
majority of the Southeast Asian population followed Islam or Christianity, so that the
ideology of Communism had little appeal in the region. Therefore, the Southeast Asian
countries were reluctant to pursue a friendship with a country which they considered as
a threat.
From the 1970s to the end of 1980s, the bilateral relations began to show positive signs,
facilitated by three factors: Mao Zedong’s decision to realign China’s foreign policy
towards the United States in the early 1970s; Deng Xiaoping’s announcements that China
would stop support for the communist movements in the region; end of the ‘Dual
Nationality’ policy and pursuit of economic construction in the late 1970s; and regional
re-alignment after the onset of the Cambodia war in the 1978. The first factor followed. In
1972, American President Nixon’s historic visit to China, both signed the Joint
Communiqué of the USA and the People’s Republic of China, which marked the
rapprochement of Sino-America relationship. The improvement of diplomatic relations
with the United States caused a great shock to the Southeast Asian region and pushed
them to follow. In 1974, Malaysia andChina set up diplomatic relations. In 1975, both the
Philippines andThailand established relations with China.
Second, the decision to halt the support for communist activities in Southeast Asia and
the abandonment of the policy of ‘Dual Nationality’, in a great part, showed that China
further communist gains in Southeast Asian. The organisation was dissolved in 1977.
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viewed the Communism-exporting ideology as outdated. Also, the open policy of 1978
not only suggested the coexistence of Communism and capitalism, but also confirmed
Chinese commitment to economic development, rather than communist revolution. At
this stage, both China and the Southeast Asian countries cooperated on trade and
investment, temporarily putting political divergence aside. In 1980, Singapore andChina
exchanged commercial representative offices in the absence of formal diplomatic
recognition. In 1985, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Indonesia,
resuming the interrupted direct trade.
Third, in December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Although all ASEAN members
agreed that Vietnam’s attack violated the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia, they differed in strategic views. Due to a shared border with Cambodia, Thailand
was eager to seek support from the ASEAN allies in its confrontation with Vietnam,
whereas the Maritime countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia insisted on considering
China as a real long-term threat and Vietnam as a potential ally (Narine, 2008: 415–416;
Ma, 2000: 251–252). China’s strong position against the Soviet-sponsored invasion of
Vietnam succeeded in winning the appreciation of some ASEAN states. In particular,
China formed an informal security alliance with Thailand as the ‘front-line state’
opposing the Vietnamese forces in occupied Cambodia, which resulted in increasing
cooperation between China and Thailand. Afterwards, Thailand acted as a bridge
between ASEAN and China, and worked to eliminate the fear that China would again
support the communist insurgences within the member states (Chambers, 2005: 17).
In spite of these positive signs, Beijing did not achieve a breakthrough in relations with
ASEAN as China had not formalised bilateral relations with Singapore, Indonesia, and
Brunei. Another reason was that China maintained its sceptical approach towards
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multilateral mechanism. China viewed the multilateral institutions as nothing more than
a tool manipulated by the hegemonic power to interfere in other countries’ internal
affairs. China interpreted the formation of ASEAN as a product of the US imperialism
and a threat to China’s position. Furthermore, Beijing was concerned that ASEANmight
either use the forum to internationalise the disputed Spratly Islands, or unite to contest
the islands’ ownership with China. Moreover, the economic reform of 1978 required
abundant capital and technology inputs, which were mainly accessed from the West. The
less developed ASEAN members were not able to contribute to China’s economic
construction except for exporting certain raw resources which China did not need as
much as they presently do. As a result, though China recognised the legitimacy of
ASEAN as a regional organisation in 1975, it continued to maintain a distance and
observed ASEAN’s development, in case it would harm China’s sovereignty and
interests.
ii. The second period from the Tiananmen turmoil of 1989 until now
As discussed in Chapter Five (China’s Economic Statecraft in its Diplomacy), the
Tiananmen crisis had an impact not only on China’s diplomatic perspective, but also on
China–ASEAN relations. Beijing’s foreign policy switched focus away from the
developed countries as a result of the Western sanction on China for humanitarian
violations. Instead of isolating China as the West suggested, this period saw a new stage
of China’s diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian countries. In 1989, China
exchanged diplomatic recognition with Laos; in 1990, Indonesia restored full diplomatic
relations with China, and China–Singapore as well as China–Vietnam relations were
normalised; the diplomatic recognition with Brunei was followed in 1991. The diplomatic
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exchange with all ASEAN countries is widely seen as a significant breakthrough in
Chinese diplomatic history.
In 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited the five founding states of ASEAN, and invited
the leaders of Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand to pay visits. In 1991, China attended
the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting, in which the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen sincerely expressed China’s interests in enhancing cooperation with ASEAN. In
1994, the ASEAN–China Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation along
with the ASEAN–China Joint Committee on Science and Technology were formed. In
1994, China joined ASEAN Regional Forum as a Consultative Partner. In the same year,
China joined the Indonesia-sponsored South China Sea informal workshops. In 1996,
ASEAN upgraded China to a full dialogue partnership.
ASEAN–China relations improved further after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis
exposed the incapability of ASEAN to respond to a regional crisis and to take effective
measures at a global level. Being considered as the ‘last resort’, both the United States
and the International Monetary Fund’s policies were disappointed.52 Their reluctance to
help the East Asian countries helped China build an image of ‘a responsible power’ in
the surrounding region. Although preventing the crisis from wheeling out of control was
in accordance to China’s self-interests, Chinese active behaviour in refusing to devalue
52 The performance of the United States in this crisis was quite different from that at the time
of the Mexico financial problem, in which Washington lent support immediately.ASEAN also
noted that the United States strongly opposed the plan of founding an Asian Monetary Fund.
Furthermore, the solutions offered by the international organisations such as the IMF were
viewed as inflexible and punitive.
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the RMB and providing unconditional loans to sufferers drove ASEAN and China
closer.53As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir put it:
China’s performance in the Asian financial crisis has been laudable, and the
countries in this region…greatly appreciated China’s decision not to devalue the
yuan. China’s cooperation and high sense of responsibility has spared the region a
much worse consequence (Ba, 2003: 637, cited from Sino-Malaysian Forum Held on
Economic Recovery 1999).
The financial crisis of 1997 was undoubtedly a positive catalyst in advancing bilateral
relations. In 1997, the first informal summit between China and ASEAN was held in
Malaysia, in which both sides agreed to adopt the strategy of ‘good neighbourliness’ and
‘mutual trust’. During the period from 1999 to 2000, the Chinese government signed a
bilateral cooperation agreement with every ASEAN member, covering political,
economic, and cultural and security aspects. As well, after the military clash between
China and Vietnam in 1992–1994 and between China and the Philippines in 1995, the
release of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002
offered some prospect for peaceful resolution to the disputed area, which promoted
bilateral political relations and laid a stepping-stone for economic cooperation. In 2002,
the China–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement was released and
both agreed to form an ASEAN–China Free Trade Area by 2020. In 2003, China and
ASEAN announced the formation of a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,
and China became the first country outside ASEAN to accede the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation. Since then, Beijing actively participated in regional dialogue, such as
53 China pledge USD 1 billion to help Thailand, and it offered export-credit to the countries
such as Indonesia and Thailand.
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ASEAN Plus Three, East Asian Community and ASEAN–China Economic Cooperation
Framework.
Apparently, the relations between China and these Southeast Asian countries underwent
significant changes over the past decades. Beijing established official contacts with
ASEAN in 1991, and 12 years later, the two sides formed a strategic relationship for
peace and prosperity and signed the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. The
transition in Chinese perception of ASEAN was influenced by a number of factors.
Politically, in the wake of Tiananmen events, China revived the objective of pushing for a
multi-polar world, in which no state may dominate others. ASEAN became the target of
Chinese diplomatic efforts, since to establish good diplomatic relations with the
neighbouring countries may not only create a breakthrough in combating political
isolation, but also ensure the presence of a new polar group in the global system. From
ASEAN’s perspective, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 sharply reduced its
regional role, and the end of the bipolar confrontation led to the reduction of the US
military deployment in this area. The Southeast Asian states without the backing of
major states decided to thaw the relations with China, when Chinese influence was
increasing.
Economically, since the introduction of the open policy, China’s economy developed
swiftly. The Southeast Asian region represents a rich source of natural resources
necessary to fuel China’s industrial growth, and a potential market of 500 million people
for Chinese manufacturing products. From the late 1990s, China embarked on a ‘going
out’ policy, encouraging its enterprises to invest overseas. Due to cultural, language, and
geographical advantages, the Southeast Asian region became one of the top options for
Chinese investors (see Table 7.3). Similarly, the Southeast Asian states, relieved from the
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tense Cold-War situation, began considering economic construction and welcomed
Chinese investment.
Table 7.3: Geographical Distribution of Chinese Enterprises in Developing Countries in
2003
Sources from Wu, 2005: 4-5, cited from the Commercial Ministry of China.
7.2 China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the Motivations behind It
In the post-Tiananmen era, it is obvious that China has gradually left behind the
perception that multilateral forums akin to ASEAN may be harmful to China’s national
interests. Conversely, they think that such forums could be utilised to serve Chinese
national strategy. In the first section, the study will submit that China–ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement represents the objective of strengthening bilateral full-range
cooperation along two tracks, in terms of geography. One is the maritime track, between
maritime ASEAN states and China’s coastal provinces, and the other is the land track,
between continental ASEAN economies and China’s Southwest provinces. The
development on the maritime track is more significant in terms of regional security, since
the South China Sea issue, including sovereignty and resources struggles with maritime
ASEAN claimants, and navigation rights in theMalacca strait, are involved in this line. In
Developing
Country/Region
Number of Chinese Enterprises
Central and
Eastern Europe
865
ASEAN 857
Middle East and
Africa
769
Latin America 384
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contrast, the land track is more involved in the economic and energy security. China’s
Southwest part is much less developed than the Southeast coast, so that the increasing
economic interaction with continental ASEAN is expected to narrow economic disparity
between the east and the west, and most importantly, to reduce social disability by
eliminating the gap between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, the continental ASEAN
countries, which are also the Greater Mekong States, may help open land transportation
corridors linking the South-western provinces of China with the energy-rich Middle East
andAfrica, resolving the Malacca Dilemma.
Furthermore, the second section will define the influencing factors which may affect the
China–ASEAN relations. Some scholars rank the United States or the territorial disputes
as the biggest obstacle, while economic competitiveness of these economies is generally
not seen as a big factor (see Appendix II). Instead, the study argues that the US
involvement, the regional role of Japan, and the nature of competitiveness ofASEAN and
Chinese economies are the three major factors which may pose challenges to bilateral
engagement.
7.2.1. Motivations behind the Strategy of Free Trade Agreement
Current literature suggests different pictures in terms of the motivations.
• Muni (2002) makes a list of the objectives of China’s strategy in the Asian
countries: ‘the tapping of energy potential in Central Asia and islands in the
South China Sea; seeking access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and
Pakistan; securing, enlarging, and integrating markets, and mobilizing capital,
technology, and managerial skills from ASEAN; filling the power vacuum in
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Central Asia and Indochina created by the collapse of the Soviet Union’ (Ku, 2006:
118, fromMuni, 2002: 16).
• Other scholars, such as Storey (2007), add the Taiwan factor. They argue that if a
conflict takes place in the Taiwan Strait, the United States is likely to intervene
militarily to protect its democratic ally, and the ASEAN states might have to
choose a position.
• According to my interviews with the officials in ASEAN, the Foreign Ministry of
PRC, and some Western scholars, the opinions from the three different
backgrounds reach a consensus that the China–ASEAN partnership today is not
motivated by a single factor, but a combination of political, economic and
security considerations. However, they differ in the weight given to each element:
Chen Shaofeng, a scholar at National University of Singapore, John Ravenhill
from Austrian National University, and Termsak Chalermpalanupap from
ASEAN Secretariat all think political motivation contributes to the most of the
engagement; Jorn Dosch, an expert in Southeast Asia at Leeds University believes
political and economic factors take equal weight; John Weiss from the University
of Bradford insists economic motivation is the biggest driver; and the officials
from the General Staff Department of PLA consistently consider the security
element as one of the most important (see Appendix II).
In this chapter, I exclude Taiwan’s role due to the following reasons. First, the Taiwan
issue is indeed a debate over whether Washington andBeijing would militarily intervene
if Taiwan pushed for independence. At the diplomatic level, Beijing repeatedly
demonstrates its determination to protect territorial integrity, while Washington
continues to remind Beijing of their allied relations with Taiwan. It appears that both
sides have no exact information about the motivations of the other party, so that they
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draw their own conclusions. In the current stage, where Washington is preoccupied with
two wars andBeijing is concerned with both economic development andpolitical reform,
not only is it not the right time to establish Taiwan’s status, but also neither is confident
enough to control the situation if a war erupts. Second, both the United States and China
are big states with ambitions, which behave according to their global strategic plan. For
Washington, the final goal is to prevent any state from challenging or replacing its
hegemonic position worldwide, so that in East Asia, both Japan and Taiwan are
perceived as the front line in limiting China’s rise. Without US instigation and
endorsement, there can be no Taiwan independence or Japanese struggle for East Sea
resources. In this scenario, the resolution of the Taiwan issue can only be determined by
bargaining and negotiation between China and the United States. These two decide
whether to take measures over this question according to the changes in their global
plans. ASEAN has a limited role in the process. For these reasons, the Taiwan factor
would not be a key role in the ASEAN–China cooperation, except in acting as another
excuse for the United States to project military presence in the area.
Instead, I consider the incentives for China–ASEAN engagement to include:
• Generating economic prosperity with ASEAN as a whole, by expanding trade
volume;
• Increasing bargaining power on the South China Sea by facilitating economic
interdependence with maritime ASEANclaimants;
• Developing China’s less-developed Southwest provinces and looking for land
strategic corridors with access to the Indian Ocean across continental ASEAN states,
which are also Greater Mekong Sub-region states, by promoting Greater Mekong
Project within the free trade agreement.
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i) Promoting mutual economic prosperity
After experiencing tough diplomatic relations, there are more factors that unite the
Southeast Asian countries with China than separate them in this stage. Economy is
certainly the main impetus. ASEAN has long portrayed itself as a united political and
economic bloc, but indeed, it put much effort on maintaining regional political stability
instead of economic growth. ASEAN seeks to re-energise its economic program, initially
because economic incentives may provide ASEAN with a new purpose to unite in the
aftermath of the Cold War and later because of the fear that the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum might marginalise the role of ASEAN. This becomes a more pressing
concern due to the urgency of rebuilding Southeast Asian economies after the 1997
Financial Crisis, which damaged confidence in an ‘East Asia economic miracle’ and
exposed the lack of responsive economic mechanisms to economic shock. Furthermore,
considering that the new ASEAN members like Burma, Laos, and Cambodia are less
developed countries while Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia have better economic
circumstances, the association needs to narrow the economic disparity. Otherwise the
disparity may diminish the collective capability of ASEAN.
ASEANmay choose to shape a trade area internally or to develop free trade agreements
with external states. In 1992, ASEAN agreed to form a Free Trade Area with tariff
reduction to 0–5 per cent by 2002, and to zero by 2010 for ASEAN-6 and by 2015 for new
ASEAN members. The 1998 Hanoi plan included the acceleration of the ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement date to 2002, the implementation of the ASEAN Investment Area, and
the liberation of trade in services. By 2002, the ASEAN-6 realised the target of tariff
reduction, covering 95.7 per cent of tariffs and 90 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade in goods.
In 2003, the Economic Community under an ASEAN Community was set up to make
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ASEAN become an integrated single market and production base (Narine, 2008: 420;
ASEAN official website).
On the other hand, China’s rise as a global economic power, the close geographic
location, and the image of a reliable partner enhanced in the financial crisis make China a
good option. China’s phenomenal growth comes at a time when Japan’s economy, being
a driving engine in the 1990s, slows down. There is a perspective spread over the region
that China would be able to replace Japan as a new force of growth in East Asia. In
December 1997, ASEAN members and China agreed to work towards a Free Trade Area
at the ASEAN Plus Three Summit. In August 2001, China put forward tariff reductions
and other economic measures to be settled before 2009. In November 2001, Chinese
Premier Zhu Rongji presented the blueprint of building a China–ASEAN Free Trade
Area in 10 years, and promised to open Chinese markets in advance to the original
ASEANmembers as well as to grant special preferential tariffs for commodities imported
from the less developed ASEAN members. At the 2002 summit, the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and the Memorandum of
Understanding on Agriculture Cooperation was signed. The Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation set the basis for negotiations towards the
realisation of an ASEAN–China Free Trade Area by 2010 for the 6 original ASEAN
members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei) and by 2015 for
the 4 new members (Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar). Meanwhile, the framework
agreement lists ‘Early Harvest Program’ and special treatment to the weak ASEAN
economies. In 2009, the China–ASEAN Investment Agreement, which marks the final
step of the FTA negotiation process, was signed at the 12th ASEAN–China Summit.
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For China, this is the first FTA after the accession into the WTO, and it also represents the
first agreement concluded with an external state for ASEAN. In theory, ACFTA is
expected to forge closer economic relations through lowering of trade and investment
barriers, which may result in an enlarged integrated market and the promotion of
economic exchange, on the basis of comparative advantage. According to the ACFTA,
the tariff reduction involves two tracks. Track one refers to the Early Harvest Program,
which calls for the implementation of tariff reduction and elimination on certain
agricultural goods before the ACFTA is fully effective. Around 600 items are covered,
including live animals, meat, fish, edible vegetables, fruits and nuts. The reduction on
trade tariffs has come into effect on July 2003. Track two will entail a zero tariff regime
which is envisioned for trade in goods by 2010 for the more advanced ASEAN-6 and by
2015 for the less advanced members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, andVietnam).
It is estimated that the agreement could increase ASEAN’s export to China by 48 per cent
and China’s exports to ASEAN by 55.1 per cent, and it could foster the GDP growth by
up to 0.9 per cent for ASEAN and 0.3 per cent for China respectively (Wang, 2005: 71;
Acharya, 2003: 10; Purba, 2006: 2-3). Promoted by the tariff reduction, ASEAN–China
trade has reached USD 2,025 billion in 2007 from USD 547 billion in 2002 (see Table 7.4).
ASEAN has become the fourth highest trade partner of China in 2007, and China’s
exports to and imports from the region have increased significantly with ASEAN as well
as individual ASEAN states (see Table 7.5).
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Table 7.4: Trade Volume between China andASEAN during 2002-2007
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the PRC.
Table 7.5: China’s Trades with the ASEANMembers (USD Billion)
Source: Vaughn, 2005: 7; Ministry ofCommerce of the PRC
Year Trade Volume
(USD Billion)
2002 547.67
2004 1058.80
2005 1303.70
2006 1608.40
2007 2025.08
China exports to China imports from
Year 2002 2004 2007 2002 2004 2007
Brunei 0.21 0.48 1.13 2.42 2.51 2.42
Cambodia 2.52 4.52 8.82 0.24 0.30 0.51
Indonesia 34.27 62.57 125.99 45.01 72.24 123.98
Laos 0.54 1.01 1.64 0.10 0.13 0.85
Malaysia 49.75 80.87 176.90 92.96 181.74 287.07
Burma 7.25 9.39 16.86 1.37 2.07 3.71
Philippines 20.42 42.69 74.98 32.18 90.59 231.16
Singapore 69.66 126.87 296.34 70.52 139.97 175.19
Thailand 29.58 58.02 119.74 56.03 115.42 226.65
Vietnam 21.49 42.61 119.00 11.15 24.82 32.16
ASEAN 235.69 429.02 941.39 311.98 629.78 1083.69
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ii)
Restraining the South China Sea Disputes
China’s size determines that it has a long border with numerous countries, mainly with
those in continental Asia and the maritime part of East Asia.54 In themaritime Asian part,
the countries which have territorial problems with China are mainly member states of
ASEAN, such as Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Chinese ‘good-
neighbour’ diplomacy has succeeded in convincing the majority Southeast Asian states
that economic cooperation is feasible and beneficial to both sides, but it has failed to
dismiss the suspicions that China would regain the disputed territory under the claims.
Chambers (2005) observes that Southeast Asian perceptions of threat from China has
shifted from ideological to territorial, with the South China Sea as the primary focus of
attention (Chambers, 2005: 16). This perception is also shared by my interviewees: 12 of
the total 16 interviewees consider the South China Sea issue as the biggest problem that
both ASEAN and China confront with. China’s approach to the dispute with the four
ASEAN states over the ownership of islands in the South China Sea is a severe test for
China’s relations with its smaller neighbours.
In the South China Sea, the hundreds of islands, islets, and reefs comprise four main
archipelagos: the Pratas (Dongsha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), Paracels (Xisha) and
Spratlys (Nansha) (see Table 7.6).
54 The mainland of China has a coastline of more than 18,000 kilometres long, a sea area of
4.73 million square kilometres, and islands of more than 80,000 square kilometres in area (Yan,
1995: 5). In continental Asian part, the border issues with central Asian states have been
solved and the negotiationwith India is ongoing.
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Table 7.6: Situation in the South China Sea
It appears that the South China Sea dispute mainly focuses on the Spratly Islands (see
Table 7.7). The complexity arises due to the overlapping claims and military presence.
According to international law, a claim on territory ‘must be perfected by subsequent
continuous and effective acts of occupation, generally construed to mean permanent
settlement’ (Joyner, 1999: 59). This is to say, only permanent occupation and settlement,
rather than just discovery, is sufficient to invest a valid title of territorial ownership on
the discoverer. From this perspective, in comparison to other claims on the basis of
historic records or temporary occupation, only Taiwan’s militarily control over Itu Abas
since early 1956 may be viewed as a condition for supporting a legal claim and qualifies
as a display of continuous sovereignty.
Pratas (Dongsha) Claimed by China and Taiwan; Taiwan has controlled since the
end of SecondWorld War.
Macclesfield Bank
(Zhongsha)
Claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam; no military or
civilization presence.
Paracels (Xisha) Claimed by China and Vietnam; militarily controlled by China.
Spratlys (Nansha)
China, Taiwan, Brunei, Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam each
claims part or all; except Brunei, other states militarily occupied
part of it.
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Table 7.7: Situation on Spratly Islands
Source: Joyner, 1999: 59-66; Valencia, 1995: 6; Cossa, 1998: 2, B3; Baviera, 2005: 345.
Indeed, few islands in the Spratlys have fresh water or land-based resources to support
permanent human settlement, but the significance of the South China Sea lies not just in
sovereignty, but the strategic geography in terms of key sea-lanes and the abundant
living and mineral resources. First, the navigation through the South China Sea,
especially across the choke points of the Taiwan Straits in the north and the Straits of
Claimant Claims and references Current situation
Taiwan Claims all; Militarily controlled Itu Abas,
the largest feature
Vietnam
Claims all based on historic activities
during 17–20th century and a French
claim to the islands first made in 1933;
but the historic documentations fail to
identify and distinguish between the
Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, and
the French made no subsequent efforts to
perfect title to the Spratlys by occupation;
Militarily controlled at least 27
Spratly land formations
The
Philippines
Claims 60 islands based on discovery of
certain islands in 1947;
Militarily present on 11
islands
Malaysia
Claims over 12 islands based principally
on certain continental shelf provisions in
the 1982 LOS Convention, rather than
the legal means of validating claim to
title over territory through permanent
occupation;
Militarily stationed on 10 islets
Brunei
Claim Louisa Reef based on certain
continental shelf provisions in the 1982
LOS Convention;
No military presence, but it
has 9 oil fields and 5 gas fields
China
Claims all based on historic references in
12th century and the record of navigation
in 18th century, but international law
recognises as insufficient to make valid
the claim.
Militarily occupied 14 reefs
and rocks
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Malacca in the South, link Northeast Asia with the rest of the world. It is the second
busiest international sea lane in the world, conveying almost one-fourth of the world’s
crude oil and oil products, over half of the world’s merchant fleets andmore than half of
the world’s super tanker traffic (Wang, 2006: 108; Gao, 2005: 330). In other words, a
military presence in the area offers a potential staging location for blocking ships going
through the South China Sea.
Second, more than 500 million people living in the coastal areas, to a great extent, depend
on the South China Sea for resources and transportation. It is reported that the Spratlys
area, which covers 390,000 square kilometres, is one of richest fishing areas in the world,
yielding up 7.5 tonnes of fish per square kilometre (Gao, 2005: 331; Joyner, 1999: 66). The
fishing zone around the area ranks fourth among the world’s 19 fishing zones in terms of
total marine production each year (Dutta, 2005: 272). Furthermore, according to Russian
research, the equivalent of six billion barrels of oil may be located in the Spratly Islands
area, of which 70 per cent would be natural gas (Gao, 2005: 331). However, taking the
insufficient geological data and the difficulty of deep-sea drilling into account, it is
expected that the extent of usable resource deposits in the area may not as large as
initially predicted. Given these two points, the issue of South China Sea should be seen
as a sovereignty and resources struggle, and a dispute for navigation control over the
Malacca Strait.
China’s strategy:
Historically, little attention was paid to sea territory or maritime power as in the view of
imperial rules, the Northwest (Xinjiang, Tibet, andMongolia) andNortheast China were
of greater strategic importance. The northern part of Southeast Asia, like Vietnam, were
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merely periphery states. Since the 1950s, China’s attention on the South China Sea was
security-oriented, to avoid being encircled by the influence of the Soviet Union and to
protect itself from a sea-launched attack. Nowadays, Beijing has shifted the security focus
away from land-based to maritime-based territorial issues. The claim for the Spratly
Islands is motivated by a strong sense of territorial integrity, pragmatic economic
interests, andmaritime security.
From the territorial integrity perspective, the Chinese believe that the Spratlys have been
part of their territory since ancient times, and other claimants simply occupy China’s
islands and reefs, taking advantage of China’s turbulent domestic politics and the
preoccupation with superpowers.
‘An area of more than 800,000 square km within China’s traditional maritime
boundaries has been illegally delineated into the domain of other nations, with
410,000 square km taken by the Philippines, 270,000 by Malaysia, 70,000 by Vietnam,
50,000 by Indonesia, and the remainder by Brunei’ (Yuan, 2006: 8, cited from Liu,
1994: 36-37).
Having been coerced by Western powers a century ago, if China were to lose this
territory, not only national dignity but also the legitimacy of the Communist regime
would be questioned.
From the resources perspective, since the 1990s, China has seen the end of domestic self-
sufficiency in terms of oil. Faced with declining domestic production, China has turned
to offshore areas and started a global energy pursuit, including in the East China and
South China Seas, which may produce abundant resources which are easy to transport.
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Furthermore, it was reported that ‘other claimant states were already running 120 oil
wells that were capable of extracting between 30 and 50 million tonnes of crude oil,
which was almost one-third of China’s annual extraction and surpassed China’s South
China Sea oil production by 40 times’ (Yuan, 2006: 8). Taking Vietnam as an example,
since 1991, its offshore oil production has increased annually. In 2002, oil exports
amounted to more than 20 per cent of total exports, and the figure grew to 28 per cent in
2003. Oil revenue has become a key source of foreign currency for Vietnam (Yu andZhu,
2006: 14). The economic losses are enormous, enhancing Chinese determination to
compete for resources with other contenders.
From the security perspective, China’s dependence on sea-lanes is a strategic
vulnerability. Almost all the oil imports have to pass through the Strait of Malacca,
which is patrolled by US naval forces. Chinese President Hu Jintao identifies the
excessive and vulnerable dependence on this route as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. In addition,
China faces the two island chains in the maritime periphery, which could be used by the
United States as ocean barriers to contain China.55 If the Chinese wish to break through
the encirclement, a counter strategy is needed to build a defensive zone from Korea in
the North, through the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu islands), Taiwan, Hainan island, to the
Paracels and the Spratly islands (Dutta, 2005: 281). This requires China to occupy Taiwan
and the Spratlys.
In dealing with the dilemma, China has been using both hard and soft strategies. The
hard approach involves:
• Insisting the claims by issuing national law.
55 The first island chain begins in Japan, to the Liuqu Islands of Taiwan, and to the Philippines;
the second starts in Jaoan’s Ogasawa-gunto Islands, to the Io-retto Islands, and to the
Mariana Islands.
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• Steadily modernising military capability to secure the claim, and pursuing military
occupation if necessary.
The soft approach involves:
• Diplomatically express the abandonment of military settlement and call for
negotiation for a confidence-building framework.
• Call for joint exploration onmaritime resources.
• Propose a free trade area between ASEAN andChina.
In terms of hard strategy, China has repeatedly sustained its claims. In 1987, when
congress of the Philippines passed a bill defining the maritime boundaries to include 60
islets in the Spratly archipelago, for the first time China conducted three public protests
in threatening terms, such as ‘this would obstruct Sino-Philippines relations’(Chen, 1994:
898). Also in 1987, for the first time China andVietnam exchanged fire at Johnson Reef; in
1988, China took over several islets in Spratlys after a physical clash with Vietnam, for
the first time realising its claim with military force; in 1992, the PRC’s Law on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which enabled China to exercise its sovereignty
over the territorial sea and its control over the contiguous zone, was passed by the
National People’s Congress;56 in 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef which was
previously claimed by the Philippines and began construction on the reef; at the 1995
ASEAN Annual Meeting, the Chinese Foreign Minister insisted that China had
indisputable sovereignty over the islands and the adjacent waters; in 1996, three Chinese
naval ships engaged in a gun battle with the Philippines navy near Campones Islands;
56 The Law claimed exclusive sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys, and authorised the
PLA Navy to evict foreign naval vessels from its territorial waters.
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and in 1999, China completed the construction at Mischief Reef, which was viewed as a
symbol to establish a military facility in the area.
In addition, China’s South China Sea policy was manifested in developing a strong
navy.57 According toChina’s National Defence in 2006:
The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation
consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of
operations…Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield
capabilities (China’s National Defence in 2006).
One of the Navy’s goals is to improve capability to not only defend China’s sovereignty
within the South China Sea and its rich resources, but also to seek control over the Strait
of Malacca. The Navy has been ordered to broaden the traditional mission of conducting
coastal patrols for purposes of force projection into the South China Sea and beyond,
safeguarding trade and the offshore resources’ transportation.
In terms of soft strategy, as Beijing continued to assert its exclusive sovereignty in the
South China Sea, it tried to adopt a low-profile diplomatic approach in order to minimise
the negative effects. This was because of the technical weakness of the Chinese navy and
the necessity to maintain a stable regional environment. In 1995, the Chinese Foreign
Minister stated that China would be willing to use international law as a base for
negotiations with ASEAN claimants. Between 1992 and 2000, seven rounds of
negotiation took place between Beijing and Hanoi. In 1999, both sides signed a Land
57China spends almost one-third of the military budget on the navy, and they maintain the
largest navy in Asia, including 69 submarines, 62 surface combatants, 56 amphibious ships
and 368 coastal patrol craft (Spinetta, 2006:32).
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Border Treaty, and in 2000, the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas,
Exclusive Economic Zones, and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin were passed.
In 2002, Beijing signed a Joint Declaration on a Peaceful Settlement on the South China
Sea Issue. In 2003, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, which called on all
claimants to not take any action with potential to damage regional stability, was
approved between ASEAN andChina.
At the same time, China initiated joint exploration with other claimant states, shelving
the sovereignty issue. In 1991, China set out a specific plan to regulate navigational
channels and exchange meteorological data; in 1992, China offered a proposal to
Malaysia on the development of oil and gas production in the disputed area; in 1993, the
Philippines and China in principle agreed to conduct joint exploration; in 2000, the
Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Beibu Gulf was passed alongside Vietnam; in
2003, China and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding; in 2005, an
Agreement to Conduct Joint Exploration for Oil and Gas in the South China Sea was
signed by national oil companies from China, the Philippines and Vietnam. Currently,
the China National Offshore Oil Corporation and the Philippines National Oil Company
are working on selective blocks.
In addition, the proposed Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN is another soft strategy.
Beijing believes that ‘if the economic gap between ASEAN and China widens, these
countries will be more concerned about the outcome of the Spratly problem. On the
contrary, if these countries can benefit from China’s growing development, there will be
more room for all parties to give emphasis to common consultation [on the Spratly
issue]’(Kuik, 2003: 13, from Tang, 2002: 42).
264
Since the Tiananmen incident, China has focused on enhancing relations with developing
countries, including the neighbouring ASEAN. On the one hand, they try to skip the risk
of being further isolated and in turn to avoid jeopardising the barely-built relations with
ASEAN. On the other hand, after the Hu-Wen administration took power, they attempt
to convince the world that China’s development is peaceful. Therefore, although China
endeavours to upgrade its navy equipment, it is expected that China would try to avoid
taking military approach. Instead, they incline to influence the decisions of other
claimant states by soft strategy, including bilateral free trade agreement.
ASEAN’s strategy
China’s vast size, population, economy and growing military force make the nation a
formidable regional power. The Southeast Asian states shared the consensus, to different
extents, that the PLA’s action, from military occupation of the Mischief Reef claimed by
the Philippines in February 1995 to the publicised force exercises centring on the
Taiwanese elections in November 1995, were more assertive than ever before. These
anxieties caused concentration on the expansion of China’s military budget and the
improvement of China’s military capability. Considering no single Southeast Asian state
is able to curtail China’s rise, ASEAN recognised the need to have a common position on
moderating China’s regional influence.
Although not all members have maritime claims and each has a different relationship
with China, ASEAN decided to restrain China by facilitating the negotiations over the
code of conduct. In 1992, ASEAN unveiled the ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea. In 1995, ASEAN called for all parties to adhere to the 1992 Declaration, and for the
first time, they placed the issue on the agenda of the annual ASEAN Regional Forum,
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although China strongly opposed the multilateralism of the issue. Confronted with
ASEAN pressure, China passed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea later in 2002. However, as a bilateral confidence-building measure, the
declaration inhibits the use of force and rules out the possibility of any external influence,
but it lacks specific provisions on how to settle the issue fundamentally. In the disputed
area, the Philippines continues to expel Chinese fishing vessels, Vietnam is busy setting
up administrative bodies, andMalaysia keeps constructing concrete facilities.
On the other hand, these claimant states look for military agreement with external states,
such as Indonesia–Australia Military Cooperation Agreement and Philippines–Great
Britain Military Cooperation Understanding. Being the most important stakeholder in
East Asia region, the military alliance with the United States is prominent. Due to the
Mischief Reef conflict in 1995, Manila tried to hedge with Washington after they denied a
base treaty with the United States in 1991. In 1998, the Visiting Forces Agreement was
signed. In 1999, the Philippines publicly welcomed the participation of the United States
and the United Nations on the Spratlys disputes. A new Mutual Logistics Support
Agreement of 2003 and a Joint Defence Assessment with the United States of 2005 allow
the US forces to do regular exercise in Philippine water territory. In comparison to
Manila, Hanoi practices limited and quiet security cooperation with the United States,
which initiates with less sensitive activities such as counter-terrorism, anti-drug
smuggling, search and rescue.58 In addition, Malaysia has the tradition of relying on both
Britain and the United States to safeguard national security, and it maintains defence and
intelligence cooperation with the United States.
58 In 2003, Vietnam began sending observers to the annual America-Thailand joint military
exercise.
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Through military engagement with external powers, these ASEAN states expect to limit
Chinese ambition on the South China Sea. However, the United States claims that ‘it
takes no position on the legal merits of competing sovereignty claims and is willing to
help in the peaceful resolution of the competing claims if requested by the parties’
(Valencia, 1995: 25). At least on the diplomatic level, the US position over the territorial
disputes is neutral so that the expectation to rely on the USmilitary interference has to be
discounted.
Concl usion
It has turned out that both ASEAN and China have taken hard and soft approaches on
territorial disputes. While Beijing insists on the claim diplomatically and enhances its
military capability, it simultaneously expresses willingness to negotiate with ASEAN on
the possibility of economic engagement. To shelve the sovereignty issue is favourable to
Chinese interests. The tendency towards greater ASEAN–US military cooperation only
allows the United States to increase its military presence in this region, which poses more
threat to China’s security interests. In the current stage, at least China may dominate the
issue and in the eyes of international society, China’s behaviour, such as the adherence to
international law and peaceful settlement, comply with the norms of international
community, helping build an image of a responsible political state.
In principle, ASEAN’s approach is rather similar, signing military treaty with outsiders
while doing business with China. The difference is that, they have to resort to external
powers given their restrained capability. Especially after the 1997 Financial Crisis, the
countries have to limit budgets on arms modernisation. However, it should be noted that,
the United States has informed the Philippines that the Mutual Defence Treaty does not
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automatically cover the disputed area. Weapon sales, training and military exchanges
should be seen as nothing but a reassurance that Washington has commitments to
Southeast Asian regional security. From this perspective, external states are unlikely to
operate direct military intervention except pressurising diplomatically on China.
Moreover, it appears that none of the claimants wishes to jeopardise bilateral political
relations, given China’s economic potential. For example, the second Mischief Reef
dispute in 1998 between China and the Philippines did not trigger strong critique from
the ASEAN side as happened in 1995, when ASEAN released denouncement
immediately. Since 2008, the situation in the South China Sea has become more tense:
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam frequently show an uncompromising posture on
the claims, and the US patrol vessels conduct activities in ‘international water’, which is
claimed by China as its exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea. But when
China send out the biggest fishery patrol vessels to protect its rights and dispatch the
most modern patrol ship to the South China Sea, both ASEAN and the United States
suggest working the conflict through diplomatic channels. I rather consider these
unusual actions stem from the attempts to divert public attention from domestic
economic failure, rather than these states intending to antagonise China.
Therefore, the study may conclude that Chinese economic incentives are effective
complements to their hard strategies, which make ASEAN less radical on this issue. The
proposal of the ACFTA is one of the soft strategies to avoid military escalation, indicating
Chinese desire of keeping the territorial disputes under control andASEAN’s willingness
in binding Chinese interests with that of ASEAN. This may explain why the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the two was signed only
one year after China introduced the idea of trade agreement.
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iii)
Land transportation corridor through the Greater Mekong Project
The Mekong River has its origins high in the mountains of Southwest China, and winds
through Yunnan Province before crossing Southeast Asia to complete in the South China
Sea. The Mekong Basin includes around 70 million people in six counties (Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and the Yunnan province of China), and 80 per cent
of the population depend on the river for a subsistence or semi-subsistence farming
lifestyle. Taking Thailand, the most urbanised country in this area, as an example, its
North and Northeast parts are mainly living in an agricultural economy in the Mekong
Basin (Kao and Sisowath, 2005: 320).
Supported by the Asian Development Bank, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) was
formed in 1992, including China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Since
then, a series of cooperative mechanisms have been founded, such as the GMS
Cooperation, the ASEAN–Mekong Basin Development Cooperation, the Mekong
Committee, and the Growth Quadrangle of China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. Other
economic institutions such as the ASEAN Investment Area, the Initiative for ASEAN
Integration, and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement also endeavour to facilitate the freer
trade flow within the sub-region.
China’s interests in the GMS cooperation has two major considerations: one is to create
an economic corridor, which may drive the economic development of China’s less-
developed Southwest provinces, Yunnan in particular; another is to build a
transportation corridor. If Beijing opened alternative land transportation corridors,
269
linking the western provinces with the rest of the World through Thailand, Cambodia
andBurma, this route could help China solve the Malacca Dilemma.
Economic corridor
Since the introduction of reform policy in 1978, Beijing’s strategic design has been to
develop the eastern coastal provinces as the first step, and then use the growth of the east
to drive the economies in middle and western parts. After three decades’ construction,
the eastern provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu have become the
growth centres, whereas the western provinces such as Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guizhou
have significantly lagged behind (see Table 7.8). The economic disparity has not only led
to a huge economic gap but also produced negative potentials, which may trigger social
disability. This is not in accordance with the governmental slogan of building a
‘harmonious society’, and the national plan of becoming a middle-income country by the
middle of the 21st century may not be achieved.
Table 7.8: Comparison of the Rich and Poor Provinces (in 2004, RMB Billion)
Source: the Ministry of Commerce of PRC
Province GDP Trade volume Fiscal revenue
Yunnan 295.9 0.48 66.6
Guizhou 159.1 0.19 29.6
Guangxi 332 0.55 40.4
Guangdong 1604 45.8 354.8
Zhejiang 1124.3 10.93 142.4
Jiangsu 1551.2 21.9 221.6
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In 2000, the central government initiated the ‘Western Development’ strategy, with the
intent to provide direct fiscal supports, expand investment on infrastructure projects,
education, and health care system, and offer a favourable policy on taxation to the
western provinces. The target area includes 12 provinces, such as Yunnan, Guizhou,
Guangxi, Xijiang and Xizang and so on. Among them, Yunnan Province is called the
Southern Silk Road, which used to link China and Southeast Asia. ASEAN is Yunnan’s
largest trade partner, making up 70 per cent of the provincial foreign projects. In 2007,
the foreign trade with ASEAN reached USD 2.67 billion, of which more than 70 per cent
was with the GMS countries of Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. The cooperation
can be found in agriculture, mining, tourism and science (see Table 7.9). Though these
economies mainly rely on exporting natural resources, they actually complement one
another since they possess different resources and develop different industries (see Table
7.10).
Table 7.9: Trade Volume of Yunnan Province with GMS in 2007 (USDMillion)
Source: Commercial Department of Yunnan Province, China
State Trade volume Weight
(%)
Export Import Trade
balance
Total foreign trade 877975 100 473612 404363 69249
Trade with ASEAN 297880 33.9 217510 80370 137140
Vietnam 97167 11.1 7773 19394 58379
Burma 87357 9.9 64068 23289 40779
Laos 8339 0.9 3591 4748 -1157
Cambodia 990 0.1 990 0 990
Thailand 22021 2.5 15680 6341 9339
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Table 7.10: Major Resources and Industries of Greater Mekong Countries/Province
Source: He and Sheng, 2005: 297.
In order to promote bilateral trade, in 2002 China along with other GMS economies
planned to shape economic corridors not only connecting one another but also
connecting them and other ASEAN states. Three North-South corridors, one East-West
and two Southern corridors are included:
Countries/
Province
Major resources Major Agriculture
products
Major industries and
minerals
Myanmar Forest, farmland,
petroleum, tin,
tungsten, gems,
copper
Rice, wheat, sugarcane,
peanut, beans
Rice grinding, timber
process, non-ferrous
metals
Thailand Tropical fruits,
aquatic products,
tin, iron, lignite
Maize, cassava, natural
rubber, cotton
Mineral melting,
construction materials,
petrochemical, textile,
food processing,
automobiles
Cambodia Manganese,
phosphorus, zinc,
gold
Rice, maize, natural
rubber
Food processing, light
industry
Laos Farmland, forest,
tin, lead, coal
Rice, tobacco Power generation, cement,
cigarette, cotton spin
Vietnam Coal, iron,
chrome, tin
Aquatic products,
banana, coconut,
pineapple, rubber,
coffee
Mineral melting, electric
power, machinery,
chemicals, construction
materials, food process
Yunnan Metal, minerals,
coal, waterpower
Tobacco, tea, sugar,
fruits and vegetables of
temperate zone
Tobacco, non-ferrous
metals, steel, phosphate
chemicals. Electric power,
machinery, hi-tech
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The North-South corridors:
• Kunming–Bangkok Highway
• Yunnan–Vietnam Highway (Kunming–Hekou–HaNoi–Hai Phong Highway)
• Kunming (China)-Nanning (China)–Hainoi (Vietnam) Highway
The East-West economic corridor:
• Danang City (Vietnam)-Laos-Thailand-Mawlamyine (Cambodia)
The South corridors:
• Bangkok (Thailand–Phnom Penh (Cambodia)–Ho Chi Minh City
(Vietnam)–Vung Tau(Vietnam)
• Bangkok (Thailand)–Siem Reap (Cambodia)–Stung Treng
(Cambodia)–Ratanakiri (Cambodia)–Pleiku (Vietnam)–QuyNhon (Vietnam)
According to this plan, the North–South corridors may go north through Yunan and
Guangxi provinces of China towards other parts of China, go south through Thailand,
Malaysia and Singapore towards other ASEAN states. It may interact with the East–West
corridor in Thailand, and then towards the Andaman Sea (Indian Ocean) and the South
China Sea (News Press on GMS Economic Corridors, 2008). At the second GMS Leader
Conference in 2005, the parties agreed that the East–West corridor is to be completed by
2008, and the North–South as well as the Southern corridors are to be finalised by 2010.
The first North–South corridor is the most important linkage between Kunming and
Bangkok, with the Kunming–Bangkok Highway andLancang–MekongWaterway as two
connections. In 2000 the heads of China, Laos and Thailand agreed to make this highway
further links with the land route in Malaysia and Singapore. The sections in China and
Thailand have been done, and they each will finance one-third of the Laos section. The
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chief of Yunnan Logistics Company estimates that the trade volume through the
Kunming–Bangkok highway will reach USD 100 billion per year after the realisation of
China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (Economic Corridor with GMS States, 2008). As
well, another two North–South highways were completed in 2008.
On the promotion of GMS development, the Asian Development Bank has invested USD
775 million in infrastructure of the GMS countries, of which Yunnan obtained USD 400
million for highway construction. In 2002, the governments of six GMS countries
announced 11 projects accounting for around USD 1 billion investments in the next ten
years, including sophisticating the North–South and the East–West corridors (He and
Sheng, 2005: 296). China, as the relatively developed economy among the GMS states,
pays more efforts on financing these projects. By 2003, China had invested USD 260
million on the GMS states, and in 2004 alone the figure reached USD 40 million
(Economic Relations between China and GMS, Yunnan new, 2008). Beside, China had
provided USD 5 million to improve the waterways of the Mekong River (Kao and
Sisowath, 2005: 325).
Transport corridor
Through the program of Greater Mekong Sub-region, China is creating a mutual
beneficial market with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand. Of particular
importance to Beijing in terms of this sub-regional cooperation is that, not only are
countries, such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, bordered with China, but they
may also provide open access to the Middle East oil-production area and African
continent. China relies on the South China Sea to bring in natural resources and take out
made-in-China products, which does not allow even a short-term disruption. But the
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Malacca Dilemma and the overlapping claims over the South China Sea discount the
reliability of the sea-lane. If China found alternative land transportation to the Indian
Ocean, it would contribute to China’s economic security, energy security in particular.
It is reported that the Beijing government has considered building a pipeline from
Kunming (Yunnan Province) across either Myanmar or Cambodia to the sea, or from
Jinghong (Yunnan Province) to the Laem Chabang port near Bangkok across Laos. This
line is expected to reduce transportation costs and shorten the period by at least one
week. The Yunnan–Myanmar Highway (Kunming–Mandalay–Rangoon Passageway) is
under construction and the Yunnan section has been identified in the tenth five-year plan
(2001–2005) and the eleventh five-year plan (2006–2010). Furthermore, there is another
proposal of building a pipeline from Sittwe, or Bhamo on the Irrawaddy River, across
Myanmar to Chongqing (China). China has negotiated with Myanmar to build port
facilities there, and they have been constructing and upgrading the naval facilities at
Hanggyi Island at the mouth of Bassein River, and Great Coco Island near India’s
Andaman Islands, trying to insert a strong presence in the Indian Ocean 59 (China’s
Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa, 2008: 93-94; China
Plans to Build China-Europe Corridor Through Burma, 2004; Ong, 2002: 4; Vaughn &
Morrison, 2006: 23; Vaughn, 2005: 16 ).
As analysed above, the significance of GMS projects in Chinese eyes rests on the role of
the GMS states in assisting economic as well as transportation corridors for China’s
59 The plan of accessing the Indian Ocean through Myanmar has attracted particular attention
from the United States, which tries to overturn the pro-China regime in Myanmar. When the
cyclone hit Myanmar in 2008, the French and American governments delivered the
humanitarian aid through the US naval task force and French warship. After being refused to
assess the port, France called for UN resolution to access Myanmar without the Junta
government’s permission, but they failed to move further.
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development. However, there are two obstacles for Chinese projects. First of all,
insufficient capital is a major difficulty. These countries, especially Vietnam, Laos,
Myanmar and Cambodia, are less developed countries, not only having little foreign
exchange reserves, but also suffering foreign debts with low capability of payment.60
Nevertheless, the GMS development needs around USD 15–20 billion investments in
infrastructure in the coming ten years, which certainly these countries could not afford.
Second, Chinese activity in damming and channelling of the Mekong River may damage
relations with other GMS states. In order to meet its energy needs, in the upstream
Chinese section, two hydroelectric dams have been completed, with an additional two
under construction while four more are planned. However, the projected dam
construction in China will limit the ability of fish to spawn upriver, impacting the
majority of the population who make a living on fisheries related to the river.61 In the
Mekong River Committee formed in 1995, the formal members include Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam. China just takes part as a dialogue partner. Some suspect that
China has not joined the commission as a member since it is reluctant to explain the
decision of damming theupper Mekong to the downstream nations.
Beijing has been working on promoting the GMS cooperation and trying to dismiss the
dissatisfaction on their dam construction in the upstream. In 2002, the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the ASEAN and China
identified the GMS cooperation as one of the priority fields requiring implementation of
medium and long-term cooperation programs. Also in the agenda of ASEAN–China Free
60 By 2002, Cambodia owned USD 2 billion with a debt payment ratio of only one per cent;
after debt reduction and exemption, Vietnam’s foreign debt was USD 4 billion; and Myanmar
suffered USD 6 billion debts that it even hardly paid interests (He andSheng, 2005: 301).
61 It was reported that the fish catch in Cambodia declined by 15 per cent in the fishing
seasons in both the 2001/02 and 2002/03 year, and in 2003/2004, it declined further by 50 per
cent (Vaughn, 2005: 23-24).
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Trade Agreement, China promises a favourable treatment exclusively for the Mekong
riparian states. Through the Asian Debt Reduction Plan of the Early Harvest Package,
China has not only partially reduced or totally exempted Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
of the debts to China, but also offered the duty-free treatment for goods flowing from or
to the three states. Furthermore, Beijing has granted Most Favoured Nation status
benefited only by the WTO members to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the three non-
WTO members. In addition to the sphere of free trade area, China uses the means of
foreign aid, and has become one of the largest sources of aid to Cambodia, Burma, Laos
andVietnam. According to related data:
China has been the largest source of economic assistance to Burma, including
USD 1.4 billion to 2 billion in weaponry to the ruling junta since 1988 andpledges
of nearly USD 5 billion in loans, plants and equipment, and investment in
mineral exploration, hydro power and oil and gas production, and agricultural
projects….
China may be one of the largest sources of aid to Cambodia, including loans and
support for public works, infrastructure, and hydropower projects in the
kingdom. In 2007, foreign donors reportedly pledged a total of USD 689 million
in assistance toCambodia, including USD 91.5 million from China…
For the 2007-2009 periods, China pledged USD 236 million in unspecified aid
compared to Japan’s USD 337 million and the EU’s USD 215 million. China, the
second largest aid donor by some estimates, has provided Laos with critical
grants, low-interest loans, high profile development projects, technical assistance,
and foreign investment…
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In 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Vientiane and offered USD 45
million in economic and technical cooperation and debt forgiveness (Lum, 2008:
85).
7.2.2 Potential obstacles on the China–ASEAN engagement
This section defines the US presence in the Southeast Asia, the regional role of Japan, and
the nature of competitiveness of China and ASEAN economies as influencing factors on
advancing bilateral engagement.
i) TheUS factor
The relationship between China and ASEAN has transformed from one of suspicion,
driven initially by the communist revolution and then by territorial disputes, to one of
cooperation on security and economy. Few major international relationships have
changed as much or as quickly in recent years. While the harmonious relations contribute
to regional stability and economic prosperity, the Southeast Asian states are expected to
reduce the reliance on the protection or balance from the external power, which in turn
minimise the possibility of external intervention. For the US, the development of
China–ASEAN relations could produce effects on their long-term interests in the region,
particularly if such a relationship evolves into an exclusive regional bloc under the
shadow of a more influential China. This section will discuss the effects on the US from
three aspects: the US intention in the region, China’s challenge and the US response.
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The US intention in the region
The US intention in the Southeast Asian region lies in two strategic considerations.
Firstly, in this area, the South China Sea issue is viewed as the thirdmost important point,
after the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, and it is considered as another important
challenge for the US to establish its security order in Asia Pacific region. The South China
Sea and the Strait of Malacca transport around 90 per cent of oil destined for the US
Northeast Asian allies – Japan and South Korea, and 80 per cent of energy to China. Also,
the US trade with the region is larger than that with Europe (Wang, 2006: 110; Baviera,
2005: 344). If other states succeeded in gaining control of the Strait, then the cargo and oil
supply would be required to look for alternative routes, which in turn would lead to
massive economic losses. More than that, if the United States failed to secure the
transportation, both Japan and South Korea would take their own defensive measures,
which may weaken the role of the US military force in the area.
Secondly, the US global foreign policy is indeed an extension of Cold War thinking,
sustaining its hegemony while preventing any state or coalition, mainly referring to EU,
Russia andChina, from emerging within the region. In Southeast Asia,
From the US perspective, if it could establish its hegemony status in this region, it
would then be able to go beyond Taiwan Strait to Japan Sea to the north east, thus
strengthening the coastal defence of Japan Sea. To the south, the US would be able to
cover the South Pacific Region and strengthen the South Pacific Region’s alliance with
Australia. To the west, it could reach past the Strait of Malacca to enhance the US
interests in the Indian Ocean andPersian Gulf region. To the north, it would be able to
directly contain China’s expansion efforts toward the south. (The Worrisome Situation
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of the South China Sea – China Facing the Stepped-up Military Infiltration by the US,
Japan and India, 2004).
For this reason the ASEAN region is a very high priority for the overall geo-political
interests and commitments of the United States, so that Washington must pay close
attention to other actors’ behaviour in the region. A key question here is how China’s rise
challenges the US leadership in Southeast Asia.
China’s challenges to the US in the area
In the economic sector, driven by the ASEAN–China Economic Cooperation, the trade
with ASEAN has increased not just in volume but also in share of ASEAN’s total trade.
In 2006, the trade volume with China accounted for around 10 per cent of total foreign
trade in comparison to 11.5 per cent with USA (see Table 7.11). Differing from the US that
focuses on the well-developed ASEAN economies such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the
Philippines, China has outpaced US assistance to the less developed Southeast Asian
countries.
Table 7.11: ASEAN Trade with America, Japan and China in 2006 (USDMillion)
Source: http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table19.pdf.
Value Share to total ASEAN trade
Exports Imports Total trade Exports Imports Total trade
ASEAN 189,176.8 163,594.5 352,771.4 25.2 25 25.1
Japan 81,284.9 80,495.6 161,780.5 10.8 12.3 11.5
USA 96,943.5 64,252.5 161,196.0 12.9 9.8 11.5
China 65,010.3 74,950.9 139,961.2 8.7 11.5 10.0
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In the political and security sector, after ASEAN and China agreed to form a Strategic
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in 2003, a five-year (2005–2010) Plan of Action was
adopted in 2004, which included bilateral defence and security cooperation, such as
cooperation in the field of non-traditional security and military exchanges. In addition, at
the 10th ASEAN Regional Forum in 2003, China circulated a concept of an ARF Security
Policy Conference (ASPC), and the only security forum in Asia received endorsement
from ASEAN in 2004.
• The first Asian Regional Forum Security Policy Conference was held in Beijing in
2004, in which both exchanged views on a package of issues such as Korean nuclear
crisis, maritime security, and terrorist threats to the region.
• At the second policy conference held in 2005, China and the ASEAN members,
especially those adjacent to Yunnan Province, agreed to cooperate in the area of non-
traditional security, including money laundering anddrug trafficking
• At the fifth policy conference in Singapore, 2008, parties exchanged opinion on
regional defence and security outlook, and recognised that the region continued to
face a range of traditional and non-traditional trans-national security challenges
such as terrorism and energy security (Yuan, 2006: 16; Official Announcements).
So far China has successfully created at least 27 separate ASEAN–China mechanisms at
different levels, and the leaders meet regularly, whereas 28 years after the US–ASEAN
dialogue was formalised in 1977, there are currently only seven US–ASEAN bodies and
they meet infrequently (Dillon andTkacik, 2005).
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The US response
In the economic field, the US is always the top trade partner of the ASEAN. In 2002
Washington announced the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) that sought to enhance
trade and investment ties with ASEAN. In 2006, both signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Arrangement (TIFA), which was expected to boost trade and market access
in major areas such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals, and to pave the way for a full-
fledged regional free trade agreement. In theory, the US–ASEAN TIFA reflected their
commitment to shape an architecture which may facilitate more vigorous economic
engagement. Under the TIFA, Washington pictures the prospects of bilateral free trade
agreements with the ASEAN countries which are WTO members and have a TIFA with
America. However, both sides are reluctant to reveal when the FTA negotiation could
begin. It is estimated that talks could not start until 2010 when the ASEAN members
fully implement trade liberalisation programs. A senior ASEAN official revealed that the
TIFA was nothing but an outcome of political reaction to ASEAN–China relations: ‘talks
began in 2002 but US interest was not there. Now they realise the importance of ASEAN,
they want to keep their influence in the region here, they are aware that trade between
ASEAN andChina is increasing’ (Jegathesan, 2006).
In the security aspect, the Southeast Asian region has a tradition of relying on a variety of
overlapping arrangements to ensure individual as well as regional security. The security
equilibrium in Southeast Asia consists of a series of comprehensive and cooperative
bilateral alliances with external players. The military ties with the United States have
remained central to the regional security structure. Although Malaysia publicly criticises
the US interference in their political and economic affairs, they consider the US military
presence in the region as an approach to promote regional stability. Furthermore, both
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Vietnam and the Philippines had the experiences of exchanging fire with China, with
China winning the battles. Due to the fear that Chinese forces might target them again,
they are much more reliant on the US balancing power. One may argue that on either
human rights or democratic issues, ASEAN is likely to stand on the side of China, since
the issues involve interference in domestic affairs which is controversial with the ASEAN
norm. However, when it comes to the territorial issue or the possibility of Chinese use of
force, ASEAN is more likely to see the continuous US presence as necessary.
Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia for the US global interests, since the
1990s, the United States has stepped up to increase military presence in Southeast Asia,
including a series of joint exercises with the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, in the
name of helping maintain regional peace. After 9/11, in the name of anti-terror
cooperation, such as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training and Southeast Asia
Cooperation against Terrorism, Washington has had more sufficient excuses to insert
itself in the region. On the issue of the South China Sea which concerns ASEAN the most,
the US is playing political manoeuvres. It used to hold a policy of neutrality when it
comes to conflicting territorial claims. However, Washington is reluctant to behave like
an outsider, and their policies towards the issue have moved away from diplomatically
neutral to active intervention. It reminds all parties of their commitment to maritime
security and regional stability, and it dispatches naval destroyers in the disputed water
for ‘routine patrol’. But its ambition in stationing troops in the Malacca Strait with the
anti-terrorism purpose has met resistance from some ASEANmembers such as Malaysia.
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ii) The role of Japan in Southeast Asia
Like China, which has acknowledged the need for economic cooperation, stability and
prosperity in Southeast Asia, Japan has intentions on this area. First, Southeast Asia is
long considered as an important market, a source of supply, and a platform for Japanese
regional leadership. Second, Japan itself has great interest in securing maritime security
in Southeast Asia, as 90 per cent of Japanese imported crude oil passes through the
Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. For the country reliant heavily on resources
supplies, a safe navigation is essential. Third, the dispute of the East China Sea with
China makes Japan particularly concerned with China’s strategies on the South China
Sea with the Southeast Asian states. In consideration of these factors, Japan has always
put Southeast Asia as one of its diplomatic priorities. The continuing presence of the
United States and the balance diplomacy played by the ASEAN countries in the relations
with great powers reassure a political role of Japan in the area.
There are two perspectives on the role of Japan in Southeast Asia. One perspective
considers Japan’s position as a frontline partner of the United States, which hinders
Japan from creating an image of truly reliable partner for Southeast Asia if the US
interest is contradicted with that of ASEAN. The other position insists that Japan has
succeeded in constructing good relationships with ASEAN through economic diplomacy.
As a matter of fact, the two opposed positions should be combined to picture the entire
role of Japan in Southeast Asia, and it is exactly Japan’s two-sided policy that acts as an
anti-model for China’s foreign policy towards ASEAN.
Japan and China are both interested in promoting regional cooperation, but they are
guided by different visions of foreign policy. Japan appears to have some advantages
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over China in approaching ASEAN. When China had a hostile relationship with these
states in the 1950s, Japan attentively reconstructed its ties with Southeast Asia.62 At the
current stage, the much more affluent Japanese economy ensures that it is a crucial
economic partner for the Southeast Asian states. Japan is ASEAN’s largest source of
imports, FDI as well as Official Development Assistance (ODA), where China is unable
to compete. 63 However, when Japan’s foreign economic policy has succeeded in
constructing a good economic relationship with ASEAN, its foreign policy is flawed in
some aspects, whereChina could learn from them.
To begin with, the Japanese Prime Minister ’s annual visit to a war shrine, which is seen
as a symbol of Japan’s militarist past, provokes the diplomatic protests of the Southeast
Asian states like Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam. To a lesser extent, Japan’s
reluctance to fully admit to its responsibilities of the war not only fuels lingering
resentments amongst Southeast Asian elites, but also imposes constraints on Japan’s
endeavours to create close political relationships with ASEAN.
Furthermore, Japan’s foreign relations are Western-oriented and underpinned by the
Japan–US alliance. Though Japan’s propagates developmental models and has
aspirations for an enhanced role in the region, it has to prioritise the US–Japan bilateral
relationship over its commitment to any form of regional multilateral cooperation. This
factor has caused difficulties for Japan in taking the initiative to address regional
62 By that time, the US considered Southeast Asia’s assistance to Japan as necessity of
constructing an economic recovery in Japan, which would act as a strong barrier against
Communist infiltration into Asia.
63 ASEAN has long been the major destination of Japanese foreign aid. Japan’s Office
Development Assistance to ASEAN countries amounted to USD 23 billion in the last ten years
or about 30 per cent of Japan’s total ODA. ASEAN is expected to continue gaining the lion’s
share of Japanese ODA for the foreseeable future (Pushpanathan, 2004).
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problems. For example, in the financial crisis, the ASEANmembers looked to Japan as an
economic mentor for assistance, and the Japanese government was indeed generous in
providing financial assistance. 64 However, there was a perception that Japan failed to
grasp the moment to establish strong leadership credentials, primarily due to the failed
proposal of Asian Monetary Fund.65 Differing from Japan’s crumbling in the face of US
pressure, China’s decision not to devalue its currency tried to deliver a message that
Beijing could be a reliable partner in managing regional affairs. To some extent, China’s
foreign policy appears to be a combination of ‘Looking West’ and ‘Looking East’. Beijing
always addresses its role of being a developing state and portrays itself as one of the
representatives of the developing world, which helps it ally with ASEAN and conversely
grants it with moreweight when dealing with the West.
Moreover, in addition to FDI and ODA, Japan is currently undertaking a ‘two-track’
economic approach to an FTAwith ASEAN: bilateral FTAs with the relatively developed
ASEAN members, and an Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership with
ASEAN as a unit.66 However, these bilateral FTAs were made possible mainly through
the ASEAN states’ offer to exclude agricultural products from tariff elimination:
Thailand agreed to exclude rice from its FTA with Japan; Malaysia excludes pineapples
and milk products; and the Philippines conceded to resume negotiations for tariff
64 In 1997 the Export-Import Bank of Japan joined a USD 17.2 billion rescue package to
Thailand, led by the IMF, by contributing USD 4 billion to it. In 1998, Japan announced a USD
30 billion initiative to provide financial assistance to the East Asia region, known as the ‘New
Miyazawa Initiative’. A number of ASEAN states, including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
the Philippines, got Japanese financial assistance under the plan (Hook, Gilson, Hughes and
Dobson, 2002: 9-13).
65 In 1997, ASEAN and Japan initiated talks on a plan to establish the AMF for the purpose of
complementing the IMF. However, the project was opposed by the US and China mainly,
since the US sought to maintain the IMF-centred financial order, while China suspected that
Japan could bolster its leadership role.
66 The ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic PartnershipAgreement was signed in 2008.
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elimination on sugar in four years. Japan remains tied down by the politics of
agricultural protection, which causes it to appear unable to make a full commitment to
trading relations with ASEAN, considering most of the ASEAN economies are heavily
agricultural. Some ASEAN members have expressed frustration over the slow progress
in the opening of Japan’s agricultural market. In comparison, China treats an FTA with
ASEAN in a more significant way. China actively initiated an Early-Harvest Program
with individual ASEANmembers, and made compromises on the agricultural products,
which effectively promotes bilateral trade.
In all, when the relations between Japan and ASEAN have achieved significant
accomplishments in political and economic sectors, an economically rising China has
emerged in the area. Beijing’s increasing dialogue with ASEAN has triggered Tokyo’s
bid for a closer partnership with the Southeast Asian region. The Japan–ASEAN–China
triangle has been coloured by both coordination and competition: the three parties share
a similar concern on a stable regional environment; Japan and China are competing for
regional leadership whereas ASEAN wants to have an independent identity and a voice
in regional affairs; both Japan and ASEAN are reluctant to see a powerful Communist
neighbour and some ASEAN states expect Japan to counterbalance China; ASEAN also
expect to benefit from China’s economic growth. Although Japan is still ASEAN’s major
trade partner and financial source, the mixed feeling of ASEAN grants China
opportunities to enhance China–ASEAN engagements, if China could prioritise regional
interests andmake moreASEAN economies benefit from China’s economic growth.
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iii) Challenges on the ASEAN economies
It is undeniable that a rising China could offer more economic opportunities to the
ASEAN states, but subsequent economic cooperation depends on how the economies
could complement. Scholars are debating over the issue. The mainstream view favours
that ASEAN’s economic structure is more competitive with that of China in export
sectors and in FDI flows. This study disagrees with the competition for FDI inflow, but
agrees with their competitive industrial structures.
Taking a close look at the trade structures of China and ASEAN, despite the increase in
bilateral trade volume and share, the two markets do not account for a significant
proportion of each other’s total export. Noting their major exports commodities, there are
overlapped export products: machinery and electric products, mechanical appliances and
so on (see Table 7.12). Furthermore, the United States, Japan, and EU are the three major
export markets for both China and ASEAN. For example, 49.4 per cent of China’s total
exports and 46.3 per cent of ASEAN’s total exports in 2006 were destined to these
markets (see Table 7.13, 7.14). Similar exports commodities destined to the same markets
lead to strong competition. According to the data from Zhang (2006), from 1996 to 1999,
the share of ASEAN in these markets dropped from 5.6 per cent to 5.5 per cent, while it
saw China’s share climb from 4.2 per cent to 5.4 per cent (Zhang, 2006: 175).
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Table 7.12: Major Exports of China and ASEANby Categories in 2006
Source: Ministry of Commerce of PRC; ASEAN Official website.
Table 7.13: China’s Top Five Exports Markets in 2007 (USD Billion)
Source: Commercial Ministry of PRC
Rank China’s top export commodity ASEAN’s top export commodity
1 Machinery and electric products Electric machinery, equipment and
parts, sound equipment, television
equipment
2 High and new technology
products
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and
products of their distillation, mineral
wax
3 Accessories of garment and
dress
Nuclear reactors, machinery and
mechanical appliance, parts thereof
4 Automatic data processing
equipment and component
Yarn, fabric and products
Organic chemicals
Rank Country or
region
Value Share
1 United States 2,034.7 21
2 EU 1,819.8 18.8
3 Hong Kong 1,553.9 16
4 Japan 916.4 9.5
5 ASEAN 713.1 7.4
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Table 7.14: ASEAN’s Top Five Exports Markets in 2006 (USD Billion)
Source: http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table20.pdf
In terms of FDI, in the early 1990s, three-fifths of FDI to Asia was channelled into
Southeast Asian countries and less than one-fifth to China, but by 1999–2000, over two-
fifths went to China while only one-fifth to Southeast Asia (Rajan, 2003: 5). However, the
argument that investment to ASEAN is diverted to China is indeed flawed. First, their
FDI come from different sources. The United States, Japan and the EU are the top three
foreign direct investors of ASEAN. 59.8 per cent, 52 per cent and 53.5 per cent of
investment flowing into ASEAN came from the three sources in 2004, 2005 and 2006
respectively (see Table 7.15). However, in China’s case, the bulk of investment has been
from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In 2001, capital from Hong Kong,
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea contributed to more than 54 per cent of FDI to China
(Wong and Chan, 2003: 518–519). According to the World Investment Report 2006, most
FDI inflows toChina were from the Great China Area: among China, Hong Kong (China),
Taiwan Province of China and Macao (China) (World Investment Report 2006: 41–43).
Rank Country/Region Exports value Share
1 ASEAN 1,891.76 25.2
2 America 969.43 12.9
3 EU 944.72 12.6
4 Japan 812.85 10.8
5 China 650.10 8.7
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Table 7.15: ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflow
Source: http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table26.pdf.
Second, there is no evidence to show that ASEAN’s key investors have diverted
investment to China: 1998 was the only year in which US data recorded FDI flows to
China exceeding those to ASEAN. By 2002, the ASEAN countries were again receiving
two-thirds of all US FDI into the combined area of ASEAN, China and Hong Kong
(Ravenhill, 2006: 662). In 2006, the EU total FDI outflows were USD 426.25 billion, USD
9.3 billion to China (excluding Hong Kong), whereas USD 13.36 billion to the ASEAN
economies. In 2007, EU invested only €1.8 billion of €420 billion on China (Data from
Ministry of Commerce of PRC andASEAN official website).
Therefore, the study argues that the real impediment for ASEAN–China economic
prosperity does not lie in the competition for FDI, but rests on the competitiveness of
their industrial structure. ASEAN is competing with China in the developed countries’
markets in terms of exports of both traditional and non-traditional manufactured goods.
In the area of traditional labour-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing and
footwear, China’s benefits come at the expense of ASEAN. For example, from 1990 to
Value (Million USD) Share (Per cent)
2004 2005 2006 2002-2006 2004 2005 2006 2002-2006
ASEAN 2,803.7 3,765.1 6,242.1 19,377.7 8.0 9.2 11.9 11.3
USA 5,232.4 3,010.6 3,864.9 13,736.1 14.9 7.3 7.4 8.0
Japan 5,732.1 7,234.8 10,803.3 30,813.7 16.3 17.6 20.6 18.0
EU 10,046.1 11,139.6 13,361.9 44,955.6 28.6 27.1 25.5 26.3
China 731.5 502.1 936.9 2,302.9 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.3
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2001, China-made textiles, clothing and footwear accounted for one-fifth of the US
market, in comparison to only a one-tenth share by the ASEAN-4 states. Since China
became a WTOmember, it is expected that the removal of trade limitation on textile and
apparel exports will enable it to increase its share of global apparel exports from 20 per
cent to 47 per cent (Wong and Chan, 2003: 519, 521). Taking the USmarket as an example,
the United States imported 27.2 per cent of textiles and apparel from China in 2005, in
comparison to 3.4 per cent from Indonesia, 3 per cent from Vietnam, 2.7 per cent from
Thailand, and 1.4 per cent from Malaysia. In the EUmarket, China supplied 24.2 per cent
of total demands, whereas only 1.7 per cent for Indonesia, 1.3 per cent for Thailand, and
0.8 per cent for Vietnam (World Trade Report 2006: 14-15). In the non-traditional and
more capital-intensive sectors, China’s exports of office machinery, including computers,
to the United States were less than one-fifth of the value of those from ASEAN in 1995,
but it has surpassed that of ASEAN since 2003. In terms of electrical machinery like
semiconductors, electrical switching machinery and household electrical equipment,
ASEAN’s exports exceed Chinese only in the Japanese market (Ravenhill, 2006: 665-666).
The lack of complementarities between Chinese and the ASEAN economies limits their
capability of absorbing each other’s products, and their competition in the same export
markets results in direct confrontation. Indeed, despite the similarity in the industrial
structures of China and ASEAN, there still exists a potential for trade expansion by
specialising in what they make. As it is unlikely for ASEAN to replace the Chinese share
in the export markets when China’s industrialisation is fostering rapidly, a significant
expansion of intra-industry trade, which suggests that components and raw materials
from other economies may be shipped to China for assembly and then exported to
industrialised countries’ markets, may lead to complementarity of the two economies.
The two-third of inputs for China’s processing activities relies on the supplies in Hong
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Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. If the Southeast Asian economies could be integrated
into the intra-industrial process, the trade volume between the two is expected to
increase. Ravenhill’s research find that the China–ASEAN trade triangle is shaping,
exemplified in: ASEAN’s share of China’s imports of components increased from 0.9 per
cent in 1992 to 19.3 per cent in 2004; and China run a sustained trade surplus with the
Western economies and a deficit of about the same magnitude with ASEAN (Ravenhill,
2006: 699-672). If the situation could persist, China may become an engine of growth for
ASEAN as an export transition market.
Apart from vertical specialisation in industrial integration, less-developed ASEAN states
may benefit more if they could increase agricultural exports to China. In addition, as
China continues to industrialise, there will be massive demands in the service sector,
such as in finance, consulting, tourism and education system, which leave opportunities
for more developed Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, which
have strengths in these fields. In the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, these
considerations are reflected:
• Expansion in the depth and scope of liberalisation of trade in services beyond those
undertaken by ASEANMember States andChina under the GATS;
• Enhanced co-operation in services between the Parties in order to improve efficiency
and competitiveness, as well as to diversify the supply anddistribution of services of
the respective service suppliers of the Parties;
• All agriculture products covered under the Early Harvest Program (Live Animals,
Meat and Edible Meat Offal, Fish, Dairy Produce, Other Animals Products, Live
Trees, Edible Vegetables, and Edible Fruits andNuts) shall be divided into 3 product
categories for tariff reduction and elimination as defined. (Framework Agreement on
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Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between ASEAN and the People's Republic
of China, PhnomPenh, 5 November 2002).
It is expected that trade creation between China and ASEAN would be greater if the
industrial structures of China and ASEAN could be integrated, and if trade barriers
could be removed on agriculture and service sectors under the China–ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement.
7.3 Conclusions
After the Tiananmen turmoil, instead of isolating China as the West suggested, Beijing
normalised diplomatic relations with all ASEAN members in 1991, which was widely
seen as a significant breakthrough in Chinese diplomatic history. In 2002, the
China–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement was released and
both agreed to form an ASEAN–China Free Trade Area by 2020. The study argues that
China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is motivated by a group of political, economic and
security considerations, although there is a difference in the weight given to each element.
The free trade agreement is designed to meet these motivations along two tracks in
terms of geography: one is the maritime track, between maritime ASEAN states and
China’s coastal provinces; the other is the land track, between continental ASEAN
economies andChina’s Southwest provinces.
Beyond the purpose of creating economic mutual prosperity, the maritime track is more
associated with security significance, as this line concerns the South China Sea issue. The
issue of the South China Sea is seen as the struggle for resources and the fight for
navigation power over the Malacca Strait, besides the sovereignty issue. From the
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resources perspective, China has seen the end of the era of domestic self-sufficiency in oil,
and it has turned to offshore areas. The South China Sea, which is expected to produce
abundant resources, is certainly a target of Chinese global energy hunting. In terms of
navigation power, the sea-lane along the Malacca Strait is a conduit for almost all the
imports of the oil but is patrolled by the US Navy. Furthermore, there are two potential
island chains in the maritime periphery which could be used by the US as ocean barriers
to contain China. If China wants to break through the encirclement, it needs to control
the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Therefore, the maritime track has significant
meaning for China’s energy security and surrounding security.
In contrast, the cooperation in the land track between continental ASEAN economies and
China’s Southwest provinces is more involved in the consideration of energy
transportation, in addition to fostering economic growth of these less developed
economies. Since the South China Sea is a complicated issue with the overlapping claims
and the sea line involves the US presence, this route could not be considered as reliable
given China’s weak naval force. If Beijing could open land transportation corridors
linking its western part, through either Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia or Vietnam,
with the energy-abundant Middle East and Africa, it may help China cut the
transportation period and costs, and solve the Malacca Dilemma. Therefore, the
significance of GMS projects for China rests on the role of the GMS states being not just
economic but also transportation corridors for China’s external trade.
For these reasons, the Southeast Asian countries are the key target of China’s new
security theory, in which regional security and economic security dominate. Notably, the
new concept was initially enunciated at the 1997 ASEANmeeting. Furthermore, China’s
new security theory introduces the concepts of cooperation security, multilateral
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dialogue, confidence-building structure and peaceful solution to international conflicts.
Beijing government states that regional security can be reached only through
neighbourly mutual efforts. The thinking of cooperation security with the exclusion of
external interference does not contradict the ASEAN norm. On the contrary, the key
ASEAN documents, including the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, the Zone of Peace,
Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration of 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia of 1976, are replete with the rejection of outside interference, the
promotion of regional stability and the denunciation of use of force. In regard to this
point, both China’s new security theory and the ASEAN norm may form a common
ground for bilateral coordination.
Indeed, China–ASEAN engagement will serve as a helpful trial and practice of China’s
new security concept. This study further deduces that the ASEAN–China Free Trade
Agreement is another example that economic statecraft of regional economic mechanism
comes into play for security objectives in the absence of an explicit security course. The
intensified building of economic framework in ASEAN–China relations is expected to
work as a security platform to produce stability in the South China Sea and promote the
alternative transportation corridors towards the Indian Ocean.
For ASEAN, they respond to Chinese strategy by uniting with external powers while
trading with China. This reflects a situation that few ASEAN states are ready to
accommodate China, which grows so rapidly, and meanwhile, few are determined to
isolate their neighbour by entirely leaning on the outsiders. The US is the most powerful
stakeholder among the external actors. They have acknowledged that tense relations
between China and its neighbours may create an opportunity for them to exert influences ,
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so that they are not reluctant to use the historical controversies between the Southeast
Asian states andChina to reap their own benefits.
Washington has created a stake in the Southeast Asian security. Thailand and the
Philippines are their formal treaty allies; Singapore is a close security partner and an
important host to military assets; the military-to-military links with Indonesia have been
restored, and relations with Vietnam have also showed enormous potentials. However,
Washington has been accused of employing unilateralism without respecting ASEAN’s
interests. Since the 2001 terrorist attack, the Bush administration has labelled Southeast
Asia the ‘second front’ in the war on terror, andWashington persuades these countries to
line upwith them in the war on terrorism, in the ignorance that this may cause problems
for these states whose majority population are Muslims. Balancing these negatives is the
significance of the US military presence, which ASEAN expects to contain China’s
expansion in the area, and the remarkable trade and investment connections between the
United States and the Southeast Asian states.
In contrast to the United States, China has made great efforts to create incentives to the
Southeast Asian neighbours. The incentives rest on China’s phenomenal economic
growth and tailored diplomacy, by burgeoning trade networks and developing
multilateral mechanisms, with the expectation to exclude external intervention and leave
little space for the US ambition. However, Chinese leaders view their influences as
growing but far from being able to dominate the region. Both external and internal
factors limit their behaviours. First, China’s development relies on the continuous
economic growth, which in turn is based on the exports of abundant manufactured
products. The US is a key export destination, meaning that much of China’s position as a
leading economy rests on American consumers unless China finds alternative markets.
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Furthermore, taking into account that the United States invest many times more in
ASEAN than China, and that the supplies of critical resources to Chinese market heavily
depend on the sea-lanes of communication patrolled by the US navy, it is unlikely that
Beijing are able to challenge the US position in Southeast Asia at this moment.
Second, since the Deng Xiaoping era, Chinese foreign policy has been associated with
cautious efforts to build comprehensive national power at home while avoiding high
profile abroad. His successors so far have been steadfastly following his rule, setting high
priority on nurturing relations with potential allies, including the Southeast Asian states,
and on dealing with the US power not through confrontational tactics, but through
multilateral cooperation approach, in order to steer US policy in directions not adverse to
Chinese interests. To this end, China calls for the promotion of regional trade to surpass
the World Trade Organisation that is created and manipulated by the West. The
establishment ofASEAN–China Free Trade Area and the Greater Mekong Sub-region are
sound initiatives for regional economic cooperation. In addition, China proposes that the
regional financial organisations such as the Asian Development Bank should play a
bigger role so as to reduce the reliance on the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund. The heads of ASEAN Plus Three have agreed to establish the ‘Foreign Currency
Reserves ’, in a joint effort to deal with the current global financial crisis, which is
considered to be a significant step towards regional financial integration in the future.
From this perspective, ASEAN and China, share the interests of promoting economic
stability and growth through coordination. The China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is
exactly a product of joint efforts to shape regional security through economic mutual
prosperity, though this could not eliminate all concerns immediately.
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Chapter Eight: Comparison with regard to China–Africa and China–ASEAN
Engagements
The year 2006 witnessed two high-level diplomatic summits held in China: the
China–ASEAN Summit of 30–31 October at Nanning and the China–Africa Summit of
4–5 November at Beijing. The China–Africa summit of 41 Heads of State coincided with
50 years of diplomatic relations with the first African partner, Egypt in 1956. Not only
were giant photographs of spectacular African scenery shown all over Beijing, but the
media also gave exceptional coverage to advertise the theme of the summit: friendship,
peace, development and cooperation. The summit resulted in the Beijing Action Plan
(2007–2009), enveloping massive economic exchange and assistance. At the
China–ASEAN Summit, which marked the 15th Anniversary of China–ASEAN dialogue
relations, leaders of China and ten members of ASEAN attended the conference and
drew up a blueprint for future cooperation.
It seems that 2006 might be a significant year for an analysis of China’s diplomacy, and
the two summits in particular offer a channel for China’s engagements with Africa and
ASEAN in terms of international relations. As the previous chapters suggest, both are
important research subjects in Beijing’s diplomacy, demonstrating how China fosters the
South–South cooperation to ensure its interests, and how China uses economic statecraft
to support the pursuit of a new security concept. This thesis contributes to this trend of
research and makes its own contribution from the direction of national security studies
and the theory of economic statecraft, leading to the following conclusions.
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8.1 Both Africa andASEAN are important partners in China’s South–South cooperation
South–South cooperation refers to cooperative activities between the newly industrialised
southern countries and other lesser-developed nations of the southern hemisphere on the
basis of similar historical experiences and mutual tasks after independence. Such activities
include developing mutually beneficial technologies, services and trading relationships,
which aims to promote self-sufficiency among southern nations and to strengthen
economic ties among states whose market power is more equally matched than the
asymmetric North–South relationships (South–South Cooperation Defies the North, 2006).
At the global level, the Group of 77, established in 2000, is considered one of the biggest
international organisations of South–South cooperation, serving as the broadest
mechanism for consultation and policy coordination among the developing countries.
Also, the UN Development Program and participating countries decided to set up the
South–South Cooperation Fund, which supplemented unilateral efforts by individual
nations such as China, India, and Brazil to assist lesser-developed southern nations. At
the regional level, the largest integration effort in terms of the number of countries is the
52-member African Union (AU). The highest legislative and representative organ of the
African continent may envisage the eventual formation of a common market with shared
political standing. In Asia, the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) continues to be a leader in South–South cooperation, pursuing increased
readiness in the region. In South America, the 12 nations of the South American
Community have been working on boosting economic integration and political cohesion
in the region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the four-member Andean Community
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has taken effect. Individually, certain states, long considered as recipients of Western
inputs, are now emerging as outwards donors to other southern nations.67
With these efforts, over the past 25 years, South–South cooperation in trade has been
expanding faster than international trade. The average annual growth rate of exports
within developing countries during 1995–2005 was no less than 11 per cent, in
comparison to only 6.6 per cent for the whole world (Mehdi, 2008: 1). Other data showed
that in 2005 over 40 per cent of the developing states’ exports were themselves headed to
other developing partners (South–South Cooperation Defies the North, 2006).
Furthermore, the concept of South–South cooperation is no longer limited to a
government driven model of economic collaboration. Instead, it has incorporated
political coordination to improve the political status and the security environment. These
areas of collaboration encompass intelligence sharing and the promotion of equality in
the international community. If the South grows with less dependence upon the North
for their economic well being, the deeper interdependence among the Southern states
may help unite them further, and then amplify into a single voice on issues of
importance to the developing states, such as reform of international institutions to create
a more equitable world order. From this perspective, the strategy of South–South
cooperation is more than just an option, but an imperative for the developing countries
to meet their common concerns, which in turnmay alter the global balance of power.
In China’s case, it always considered its relations with other developing partners as the
foundation of its foreign policies. China and these developing states share common
historic experiences and are faced with the common tasks of preserving national
67Official figures showed that Chinese foreign investments rocketed from USD 2.5 billion in
2002 to around USD 20 billion in 2007, ranking them top among developing countries.
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independence and achieving economic development. The principle of promoting
economic cooperation with developing countries includes: equality and mutual benefits,
stress on practical results, variety of forms, common development. As the biggest
developing country, China not only pledges to help other developing countries promote
economic development and improve people’s livelihood, but also it calls for the
international community to set up an effective oversight regime and ensure the
fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals. The assistance in five areas, including
taxation, debt relief, concessional loans, public health, and human resources
development, has been made.
In the post-Tiananmen era, South–South cooperation for China is not just the promotion
of economic growth, but a solution to the West’s dominance in international system.
There are two steps: the first step is to break through the West’s political isolation by
allying with other developing countries which show understanding on China’s policy on
human rights; and second is to create a multi-polar world system to elevate the position
in the dialogue with the West and then to skip the US-led West’s encirclement.
According to a policy paper Beijing government clearly stated that:
The numerous developing countries should strengthen solidarity, closely cooperate
in international affairs and coordinate with each other. They should take an active
part in formulating the rules of game in international economic field, propel the
reform of the international, financial and trade systems and strive to win over the
right to equal development…only through uniting themselves, can the developing
countries elevate their position in the South–North dialogue andpreserve their own
interests to the fullest possible extent in the process of globalisation (China’s Stand
on South–South Cooperation, 2004).
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China’s cooperative strategy in the South region appears to be proceeding as a long-term
foreign strategy, and this strategy has been deeply reflected in China’s bilateral relations
and its regional cooperation. China has shown good-will initiatives and built multilateral
networks in the regional sphere, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the
Association of South East Asian Nations and the Greater Mekong Sub-region, and in the
global areas with the far African continent and Latin America. Both Africa and ASEAN
are included to be crucial counterparts.
8.2 ASEAN and Africa both embody the employment of economic diplomacy, but have
differed in the means of economic statecraft
South–South cooperation has been assured its role as a viable feature in China’s foreign
policy, and the Chinese government has associated the application of its Southern
engagement with pragmatic economic diplomacy. For China, strengthening unity and
cooperation with other developing nations is the standpoint of China's independent
foreign policy of peace, and economic diplomacy with developing nations has always
been an important component of China's overall diplomacy.
China has been mobilising economic resources for both economic and non-economic
purposes, with the assumption that a developmental South–South political forum with
proper development assistance in place will be more than sufficient to access the
developing world, mainly through the provision of foreign direct investment and
financial aid. In terms of FDI, Chinese national and private firms have started investing
abroad. The ‘going-out’ strategy in the 1990s and a subsequent official plan for the
internalisation of private and public firms in 2002 have caused the spread of Chinese
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companies overseas. Some have been exploring distribution networks for their own
brands in the international market, while others have been in the process of acquiring or
merging with multinational companies. The stock of China’s outward FDI is more
geographically concentrated. It is mostly acquisitions in neighbouring Asian countries
and resource-rich parts of Latin America andAfrica.68
Also, China has shifted its role from receiving to giving foreign aid. This transformation
from a development aid recipient to an impressive donor is a recent development and a
significant mark of its diplomacy towards the South. Since the 1990s, China has not only
increased the amount of aid commitments but also expanded the coverage to include
more recipient countries. It has provided material, technology and capital assistance to
developing states and removed the debts of certain African, Asian, and Caribbean
countries. A recent report shows that if loans and state-sponsored investment are
included, up to 2007, China had pledged a total of USD 31 billion economic assistance to
the Southeast Asian, African and Latin American states, a threefold increase compared to
2005 and 20 times greater than 2003 (Lum, 2008: 33).
This thesis reveals that Beijing has been trying to reinforce the dialogue with Africa
through the means of FDI, and foreign aid in particular. There is a growing interest in
Africa as an investment location, in part because of the complementary nature of
economic development between Asian and African countries. Traditionally, FDI flows
from developing Asia to Africa were mainly from the Asian newly industrialising
economies (Hong Kong SAR, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of
68 By the end of 2005, Asia, Latin America and Africa accounted for 71 per cent, 20 per cent,
and 3 per cent of the FDI stock, respectively. It should be noted that, despite the media buzz,
China’s outward FDI is still relatively small—the stock accounts for only 0.6 per cent of the
world total at the end of 2005 (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2007: 2, 4).
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China). In recent years, however, China has become a significant source of FDI. Chinese-
funded enterprises in Africa operate in many different areas ranging from trade,
processing, manufacture, transportation and agriculture, to resources development. The
main destinations of Chinese cooperation and investment flows are Angola, Nigeria,
Sudan, Uganda and South Africa, all countries with large natural resources.69
In terms of foreign aid, China started economic assistance to Africa almost at the same
time with the West. In the past China’s aid was loaded with the core task of ideological-
exportation, whereas there are now clear signs that China’s assistance has replaced the
ideological approach by an economic initiative. Meanwhile, with the rapid growth in its
economic capability, China correspondingly increases the scale of its overseas aid and
diversifies the forms to the inclusion of commercial loans and debt reduction. A
difference from the traditional Western donors is China’s approach to grant financial aid,
which is channelled not through a development agency but through a national policy
bank – the Export–Import Bank of China, which accounts for the majority of Chinese
commercial projects in Africa. The policy bank provides three major financing tools in
the African area:
• Concessional loan: mainly in sub-Sahara Africa region and focussing on
infrastructure, agriculture and social development.
• Export credit: focussing on infrastructure and industrial projects, to try to promote
trade relationship andprovide efficient contracting services.
• Investment loan: focussing on energy, mining and industrial sectors.
69 Sudan is the largest recipient (the 9th largest recipient of Chinese FDI worldwide), followed
by Algeria (18th) and Zambia (19th) (Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: United
Nations Report Points to a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Countries, 2007).
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In contrast to commercial loans, the media gives almost no attention to the significant
assistance in public sectors such as medical and education, which indeed imply another
difference in Beijing’s approach from the Western donors. In 2006 there were claimed to
be almost 1,000 doctors and nurses from China in no less than 36 African countries. The
range of treatments includes training in traditional Chinese medicine, clinical medicine,
disease prevention and management of rural medical services. In the sphere of
educational exchanges, the African student is the recipient for about one-quarter of the
total China Scholarship Council awards, and Beijing has decided to increase the number
of African students on government scholarships to at least 4,000 by 2009, which will
make Africa the recipient of no less than half of the total official scholarships (King, p.
8–9). In addition, China has cancelled nearly USD 1.3 billion in debts owed by 31 African
countries, abolished tariffs on 190 kinds of goods from 29 least developed countries in
Africa andpromised to do so for more than 400 goods (Berger andWissenbach, 2007: 2).
In the ASEAN case, although China has long endeavoured to push investment in the
Southeast Asian region since the 1990s, and in 2006 it announced to provide USD 5
billion in preferential loans to Chinese companies starting business ventures in the
ASEAN countries, still, EU, Japan and the United States are the major investors.70 With
regard to foreign aid, though China becomes a significant aid-provider to certain ASEAN
states like Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, for ASEAN as a whole, China still provides
relatively little official development assistance in comparison to the United States and
70During 2002 to 2006 China’s total FDI to ASEAN only accounted 1.3 per cent of total FDI to
ASEAN, making China the tenth overall source of ASEAN. In a single year of 2006, the USD
937 million of Chinese investment only contributed to 1.8 per cent of ASEAN’s FDI inflow
(China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa, 2008: 95–96).
During the period of 2002–2006,EU, Japan and the US were the top three investors to ASEAN.
In 2005 alone, the primary sources of investment into ASEAN were the United States, Britain,
Japan,France and Finland.
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Japan. However, the volume of bilateral trade has increased on a year-on-year basis.
ASEAN is the fourth biggest trade partner for China, andChina is the third biggest trade
partner for ASEAN. Looking back over the past 15 years, bilateral trade has increased
over 20 per cent annually. The China–ASEAN trade volume is now 15 times the 1991
figure, when China initiated diplomatic ties with all members of ASEAN. The increasing
trade ties in the background of global economic downturn may result in a deeper
integration, which in turn strengthens China’s role to regional economy. Therefore, the
study defines that economic resource of China on the substance of bilateral relations is
mainly on the basis of a comprehensive economic network on trade, promoted through
the Free Trade Agreement. China’s role as a centre of economic gravity and a potential
market with business opportunities is formulating in a multilateral framework of free
trade agreement.
It has turned out that China has adopted an increasingly active and pragmatic economic
diplomacy to the relations with Africa and ASEAN. Through trade, the Beijing
government has maintained an economic connection with ASEAN. Through FDI and
massive aid in the various African sectors, including infrastructure, energy and public
sectors, China has rooted itself into African economy.
8.3 Both the ASEAN and African cases suggest that economic statecraft may serve
national security, but they differ in primary drivers.
Economic diplomacy, defined as inter-state economic relations manifested through either
firm-specific or government-conducted activities, carries certain distinctive elements of
political and diplomatic overtures. The economic-diplomatic activities therefore cannot
be conceptualised as pure market-based transactions; instead, they should be viewed as
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institutionally mediated interactions between different nation-states that go beyond
profit maximisation and economic efficiency (Yeung, 2004: 3). Both the engagements with
Africa and ASEAN are useful illustrations that economic statecraft may serve national
security interests. A combination of multiple motivations pushes the engagements and
drives the establishments of such mechanisms as Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
andChina–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. The differences lie in the approach which has
been used and the nature of the primary driver.
In analysing the presence of China in Africa, it should be noted that for certain countries
in the continent, China has cooperation credentials which may be traced back to the
1950s. While Premier Zhou Enlai recognised the positive role of the developing world in
the anti-imperialist movements, after a debut in the Bandung Conference of 1955, China
endeavoured to influence Africa through dispatching technicians, providing military
training as well as economic and infrastructure aid. However, if some argue that Africa
provides a showcase to demonstrate China’s main foreign policy themes – anti-
colonialism, People’s war, andNorth-South economic injustice – in the current debate on
China in Africa, commercial interests are ultimately to dominate China’s emergence,
taking note of Chinese national controlled companies in the construction and resource
extraction sectors, as well as private firms in the light-industries like apparel.
This study further argues that the energy security is a primary driver. On the one hand,
China’s hunger for energy is a widely known global phenomenon. China contributed for
half of the global energy consumption growth. On the other hand, compared to other oil-
producing areas like the Middle East and Central Asia, where military conflict is
experienced, the African energy sector has involved less power intervention and is open
to foreign investment. Africa has become the second largest energy exporter to China.
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The oil supplies from the African countries have increased to no less than one-third of
China’s total oil imports, growing from only 11 per cent in 1995. Angola, the second-
largest oil-producing country in the continent, exceeded Saudi Arabia to become the top
oil supplier in 2006, providing 17.46 per cent of China’s oil imports. To this end, the
foreign assistance in Africa is crucial in China’s ability to ensure the resources supplies.
Chinese oil companies have strong support from the Beijing government and the
national policy banks. The former provides foreign aid to African public sectors to
promote bilateral political relations, while the latter, such as the Export and Import Bank
of China, offers soft loans to finance these commercial projects.
In addition to Africa, Southeast Asia is considered one of the most important Third
World areas to China. When discussing China–ASEAN bilateral relations, the US factor
cannot be ignored, since the United States have massive security interests in the area.
Scobell and Wortzel (2006) put these interests in this way:
These interests include freedom of navigation through the region and ensuring
protection of the sea and air lines of communication, keeping the area open to free
trade and investment, promoting the rule of law and values such as democratic
institutions of government, human rights, and religious freedom, and supporting
America’s treaty allies and friends in the region (Scobell andWortzel, 2006: 286).
In this study, the United States’ core interests are defined as ensuring the manipulation
of navigation across the Malacca Strait, and stretching China’s development space. The
Southeast Asian area therefore encompasses strategic significance for China’s regional
security, serving as a regional platform for China’s participation in international politics
and a foundation for China’s economic rising. In addition, considering that the Malacca
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Strait is the most important channel of Chinese materials circulation, this region matters
to China’s economic security.
However, the political relations with ASEANmight not be seen as positive. China used
to finance the Communist insurgencies in the region, which led to antagonism between
the two sides and resulted in concerns about China’s ambitions. Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines formed ASEAN in order to contain Communist
influence. In recent years, China’s military seizure of Paracel Islands and Mischief Reef,
exploration activity of natural resources in the South China Sea, and the growing military
expenditures caused more anxieties. To improve the situation, China called for regular
high-level meetings between governments within the mechanisms of ASEAN plus One,
ASEAN plus Three or East Asia Summit. On the economic sector, China advocates the
promotion of regional trade with an assumption that regional economic interdependence
may come to political accommodation in the end. The establishment of ASEAN–China
Free Trade Area is an initiative for regional integration, by which China may bind their
economic interests with ASEAN’s so as to contribute to its regional and economic
security.
8.4 Conclusions
During the past decades, South–South cooperation maintains its momentum thanks to
integrative movements in global and regional economic communities. Intra-regional
bodies such as the African Union and ASEAN have emerged and played active roles in
facilitating intra-regional exchanges. The new trends in South–South cooperation have
risen as an illustration of the delivery of development assistance and foreign direct
investment between the Southern states, weakening the traditional role of the Northern
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states as financial sources. China’s sense of South–South cooperation is not confined to
conventional government ties, but seeks to promote a community of the Third World in
international affairs, mainly through the promotion of economic interactions between
developing states.
China has actively promoted interaction with the African Union, ASEAN, Arab Union,
and the Latin American states at the contemporary stage. The engagements with ASEAN
and Africa are rather impressive from the perspective of policy analysis, due to the
features of the two cases: first, both cases see the establishments of a mechanism to push
bilateral cooperation – Forum on China–Africa Cooperation and China–ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement; second, since China’s security situation at the current stage clarifies
the priority of regional security and energy security, the energy-abundant Africa and the
neighbouring ASEAN are target audience for China’s security concept; and third, in both
cases, the universal strategy is the growing employment of economic statecraft, with
foreign aid in Africa and with free trade agreement in ASEAN. In the African case, we
may see an aid-for-economic security approach, whereas in the ASEAN scenario Beijing
aims to enhance regional security. From this perspective, the study entirely verifies the
Hypothesis II that in the Africa and ASEAN scenarios, economic diplomacy has been
used to support the achievement of a different security concern of China’s security
concept, but the means of economic diplomacy varies by region.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions
In the first section of this general concluding Chapter, the whole thesis will be
summarised, and in the second section the findings for the three research questions will
be systematised. At the end, recommendations to further researches on China’s economic
diplomacy towards Africa andASEAN will be made.
9.1 Summary of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to study the intertwined correlation between economic statecraft
and national security, taking China as a research focus and considering the application of
economic statecraft on the strategic partnerships with Africa and ASEAN at the
contemporary stage. In Part I, the thesis establishes the theoretical frameworks of
national security and economic statecraft in Chapter Two and Three respectively. The
two conceptual chapters individually lead to two hypotheses that for a rising economy
like China, the focus of government work on economic development influences China’s
security concept which highlights the role of economic security; and on the pursuit of
security interests, China’s foreign policy of a peaceful rising leads China to use soft
economic diplomacy instead of hard power, though the role of economic diplomacy
could vary by region.
Then Part II and Part III are employed to testify the hypotheses. Part II starts with
China’s security concept in Chapter Four and the role of economic statecraft in China’s
diplomatic history in Chapter Five. The analysis on China’s security concept reveals that
for China, economic security has indeed increased its weight given its significance to
China’s political security and social stability, but military security in the regional sphere
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is still prominent, which validates Hypothesis I. Also, the argument on China’s use of
economic statecraft indicates that since its founding in 1949, economic diplomacy has
been used as a political, rather than just an economic policy. The forms of economic
diplomacy have expanded with the inclusion of foreign aid and trade agreement, and the
objectives of economic diplomacy have evolved from the ideological ends of the past to
the security interests of nowadays.
Part III further tests Hypothesis II through the studies on the strategic relations between
China and Africa and between China and ASEAN, given the significance of these two
counterparts to China’s security thinking and practice. Chapter Six on China–Africa
engagement identifies that the importance of African countries lies in their impressive
role as resource suppliers to China’s rapid-growing economy, in addition to the roles of
commercial and diplomatic partners. A sustainable resources supply is a crucial
condition for China’s economic security. The creation of the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation is expected to increase political exchanges at the same time as fostering
economic transactions in resources through the means of economic incentives,
particularly by massive foreign aid. In comparison, Chapter Seven on China–ASEAN
engagement argues that the current plan of a free trade agreement is an example of
economic incentives employed to compensate the potential negative consequences of the
South China Sea dispute with the maritime ASEAN members, and to promote the
transportation corridors as an alternative to the sea line for cargo supplies through the
continental ASEAN members. From this perspective, the engagement with ASEAN has
remarkable relevance for China’s economic security, and regional security in particular.
It appears that both Africa and ASEAN are important counterparts to assist China’s
national security. The difference lies in the dominant means and the primary driver:
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foreign aid for economic security in Africa, whereas trade agreement for regional
security in Southeast Asia. As a result, the thesis entirely verifies the Hypothesis II that at
least in the African and ASEAN scenarios, the strategy of economic diplomacy has been
serving national security interests in the absence of specific security mechanisms, though
the specific approach of economic diplomacy varies.
9.2 Systematising the findings for the research questions
The thesis is structured according to the three research questions and provides
discoveries in the corresponding chapters.
Question One: how should we understand China’s thinking on security in its
contemporary stage; and what role does economic security play in China’s national
security thinking?
The thesis discusses China’s concept of security from two perspectives: to picture the
theory of national security in Chapter Two and to explore China’s security situation at
the contemporary stage in Chapter Four. The theory of International Security stems from
the Second World War, and has gone through an evolution from a conventional
conception to the new theories as a result of the changes in global security environment.
The new security is defined as a multi-faceted notion, including military security,
political security, economic security, societal security and environmental security, in
contrast to the traditional security theory dominated by military security only.
In applying the new security framework on a specific scenario of China, this thesis
indicates that in the post-Tiananmen era, military security in the neighbouring sphere,
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along with economic security particularly with the inclusion of energy security are
considered as the core of the Chinese security framework. Since the 1990s, Chinese
diplomacy has shifted the focus from the superpowers, the Soviet Union and
subsequently the United States, to the regional level, especially the surrounding area, not
just because this area constitutes a crucial context for Chinese development nowadays
and for its rising in the future, but because there are numerous security threats in this
area. First is the territory issue. The reunification with Taiwan is remote, and the
territorial and resources struggle over the Diaoyu Islands (the Senkaku Islands) and the
East China Sea with Japan, and the South China Sea with certain Southeast Asian states
remain unsolved. Since the financial crisis of 2008, these claimant states intensify the
struggle and military escalation appears imminent. Second, the US containment policy
towards China in the area embodies the first islands chain in the Asia Pacific Ocean, the
military presence in Japan and South Korea, and the military influence in the Southeast
and South Asian states, including Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, India,
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Given these factors, regional security with military
predominating in the Chinese scenario must be taken seriously.
At the same time economic security has become prominent. From the Eleventh
Committee Conference of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978 to the Seventeenth
Representative Conference of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007, economic
development has been identified as the core of government work. Whether to keep a
sustainable development and state power is not just the matter of economic security, but
involves the political security of the ruling of the remaining Communist party. With the
existence of state failure like official corruption and institutional inefficiency, if the party
failed to promote economic growth in the less developed provinces and to narrow the
315
economic disparity in the society, both legitimacy and capability of the ruling party is
questioned.
Furthermore, this thesis acknowledges sufficient energy inputs are the key to ensure
economic security. China’s energy security lies in two aspects: supply and transportation.
The Middle East area is the biggest oil source to Chinese market, contributing to around
45 per cent of its total imports in 2006. However, the US-led military attacks on Iraq
compelled China to terminate the already-signed oil contracts with Iraq, and the US
allied relations with Saudi Arabia as well as the antagonistic status with Iran forced
China to diversify the supply channels, turning to Africa, which increased their share to
around one-third of total imports in 2006. Furthermore, transportation is another issue.
The US navy dominates the sea-lanes from Shanghai to the Straits of Hormuz through
which half of China’s oil supplies must pass, and around 80 per cent of Chinese oil
imports are shipped through the Straits of Malacca, which is a natural target of terrorists
and an interdiction point in the prospective conflict. The territorial disputes on the South
China Sea further complicate the sea line, which is seen as the ‘Malacca Dilemma ’.
For these reasons, Chinese thinking on security at the contemporary stage emphasises
military security on the surrounding area and economic security, energy security in
particular. It is certain that economic security plays a key role in China’s security concept,
but the rising significance of economic security has not undermined the importance of
military security.
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Question Two: what is distinctive about the Chinese model of economic statecraft?
The thesis explores the Chinese mode of economic statecraft from two aspects: to
introduce the theory of economic statecraft in Chapter Three and to present the Chinese
mode of economic statecraft in Chapter Five. Chapter Three adopts Baldwin’s definition
of economic statecraft as a combination of economic incentives and economic sanctions,
and indicates the preference of incentives to sanctions. For China, economy diplomacy is
seen as the policy efforts to maximise the political interests or to advance the economic
exchange. Both economic sanctions and economic incentives have not been used solely as
an economic policy, but also as a policy instrument for China’s strategic objectives. The
thesis analyses the role of economic statecraft in Chinese diplomacy since the founding in
1949, by dividing the process into four stages: from 1949 to 1978, from 1978 to 1989, from
1989 to 2001, and from 2001 until now.
In the first stage, Beijing changed its political role from a steadfast ally of the Soviet-led
bloc, an isolated state confronting with both superpowers, to a political partner of the
United States in containing the Soviet Union in the East Asian region. The power
calculation of the two superpowers determined the direction of China’s foreign policy. In
order to place itself in the international community, China offered diplomatic
collaboration to Africa andprovided massive foreign aid in order to sustain the relations.
The assistance to Africa was considered as an initial attempt of China’s economic
diplomacy by the means of foreign aid.
In the second stage from 1978 to 1989, the reparation of China–US relations and the
subsequent relief on China’s global political environment enabled Beijing to pay more
attention to economic work. Diplomatic efforts were designed to improve relations with
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the West in order to attract the investments and technologies. Economic statecraft in this
stage was mainly inwards, evidenced in FDI and foreign aid flowing from the West to
China.
The Tiananmen incident of 1989 was widely known as a turning point in Chinese
diplomatic history. Since then, in order to break the Western isolation, Beijing has
actively coordinated with other Third World countries. South–South cooperation again
dominated the Chinese diplomatic agenda. Furthermore, after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the United States has been taking the engagement while containment
policy towards China’s growing: Washington engages with Beijing when China’s rise is
still modest, whereas it will take the containment strategy if it considers such a rise to be
a potential threat for US interests. Good neighbouring relations appeared critical to deal
with the US encirclement by forming a regional foundation. Regionalism therefore
became another feature of China’s diplomacy in the 1990s. Moreover, economic statecraft
has been used to complement these diplomatic objectives. Massive commercial contracts
were signed with the West, which was expected to dismiss the critique over Chinese
human rights records, an increasing number of investments flowed into Africa and Latin
America to strengthen the South–South cooperation, and a trade framework was
proposed to the neighbouring Southeast Asian and central Asian states, which aimed to
drive regional solidarity. From these perspectives, economic statecraft in this period was
used to assist the political end.
In the fourth stage since 2001, several factors, including the WTO membership, the Iraqi
War and the anti-terror war, caused new concerns on Chinese security. On the one hand,
both the access to WTO and the Iraqi war imposed challenges on China’s economic
security, forcing China to diversify the strategy in three aspects: the energy hunt and
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market expansion are initiated worldwide; the political privilege of being a permanent
member of the United Nations is used to protect the resources-suppliers and trade
partners; and economic incentives are taken to smooth these transactions. These lead to a
conclusion that economic statecraft has served China’s economic security. On the other
hand, in the name of anti-terror battle, the US enhances its military presence in China’s
South and Southeast sides by stationing military force or holding military exercises with
the neighbouring states, which imposed direct threats to China’s surrounding security.
To relieve the situation, China called for all-round cooperation with the Southeast Asian
neighbours, and increased political contacts with the Southern states such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India, by resorting to the platform of SCO. Moreover, China proposed the
free trade agreements with ASEAN and SCO members, with the purpose of collaborating
with the neighbouring states through economic incentives. From this perspective,
economic statecraft has started to serve security interests at the regional level.
Through the four-stage analysis, two distinct styles of Chinese economic statecraft have
been identified. First, the forms of economic statecraft have been diversified, noting
present incentives of trade agreements with the ASEAN and SCO members and foreign
aid to Africa. Second, it serves for national objectives. Chinese diplomatic efforts have
put the focus on the surrounding stability and economic sustainability, going through
the protection of national independence before the 1970s, the provision of conditions for
economic development in the 1980s, and the breakthrough of the Western political
isolation in the 1990s. In each stage, economic statecraft has always been a
complementary leverage to assist the achievement of national strategic objectives.
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Question Three: how does China merge its economic statecraft and security objectives in
practice and how do these objectives vary by region when comparing its differing
approach in diplomacy towards Africa and Southeast Asia?
The thesis demonstrates the coordination between economic statecraft and security
interests through the approach of cases analysis on Africa and ASEAN in Chapter Six
and Seven individually. The discussion on China–Africa indicates that at the
contemporary stage, China’s engagement with Africa is not just driven by oil and other
resource needs, but also by the strategic importance of the African continent.
Diplomatically, China has historically considered the African countries as political allies.
Especially after the Tiananmen incident, China became more aware of the role of Africa
as a very reliable source of diplomatic support in the international community.
Furthermore, in the commercial sector, economic expansion in China has created
significant opportunity for Chinese state and private enterprises, which have been
actively seeking new markets for their goods and investments. The pattern of recent
Chinese commercial involvements in Africa can be characterised by the participation in
infrastructure projects, global production networks and small-scale entrepreneurial
investments. Moreover, the pursuit for raw resources, energy in particular, is recognised
as the primary motivation. As long as Chinese economy is growing, the interest in the
African continent will not wane, as many African countries have become the major
contributors to China’s resource demands and thus to China’s position as a centre of
world manufacturing. From this perspective, the African continent has great significance
to China’s economic security.
Given these motivations, under the mechanism of the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation, a combination of the frequent high-level diplomatic exchanges, the political
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privilege of being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and economic
statecraft is utilised to smooth relations and promote transactions with African
counterparts. Economic diplomacy is an impressive strategy. Taking note of three
symbolic events in China–Africa diplomatic history – the ‘Eight Principles ’ on Zhou
Enlai’s Africa tour in 1963, ‘Four Principles’ on Zhao Ziyang’s visits in 1982, and the
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 2006, in each scenario, either the provision of the
initial small-scope of infrastructure development or present action plan involving large-
scale aid indicates the universal tool of economic incentives.
It appears that, just like other Western powers, China has used aid strategically to
advance their interventions in Africa. Aid has taken the forms of financial investments in
key development projects, debt relief, technical assistance, and tariff exemptions for
selected products from Africa. Since China’s main interests in Africa at the current stage
are to secure energy transactions and boost foreign trade, economic incentives have
supported the Chinese companies in securing resources contracts, and the strategy has
been used as part of a financial package to assist the Chinese business overseas.
Chapter Six argues current China–ASEAN cooperation in two lines: with the maritime
ASEAN and with the continental ASAN countries respectively. The maritime track is
more associated with security significance, as it concerns the South China Sea issue,
which is seen as the struggle for resources and the fight for navigation power over the
Malacca Strait, besides the sovereignty issue. From the resources perspective, China has
seen the end of the era of domestic self-sufficiency in oil, and it has turned to offshore
areas. The South China Sea, which is estimated to produce abundant resources, is
certainly a target of Chinese global energy hunting. In terms of navigation power, the
sea-lane along the Malacca Strait is a conduit for almost all the imports of the oil but is
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patrolled by US naval forces. Furthermore, not only has the US regular military exercises
with the maritime states like Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, but also there are
two potential island chains in the maritime periphery which could be used as ocean
barriers to contain China. If China wants to break through the potential encirclement, a
counter strategy is needed to build a defensive zone from Korea in the North, through
the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao), Taiwan, Hainan Island, to the Paracels and the Spratly
Islands, which requires the control over the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea.
Therefore, the maritime track has significant meaning for China’s energy security and
regional security, and Beijing is taking the dual approaches to deal with it. When Beijing
issued a national law to legalise their claim and assigns force to protect the claim, it also
called for diplomatic negotiation and offered the ASEAN member states a free trade
agreement, trying to compensate for the harsh military strategy by economic incentives.
Considering the increasing economic interaction under the Free Trade Agreement, it is
expected that none of the claimants wish to jeopardise bilateral political relations given
China’s economic potential. As a result, the proposal of ACFTA is expected to keep the
territorial dispute under control and to bind ASEAN’s economic interests with China’s so
as to avoid the military escalation.
In contrast, the cooperation in the land track between continental ASEAN economies and
China’s Southwest provinces is more involved in the consideration of energy security, in
addition to fostering economic growth of these less developed economies. Since the
South China Sea is a complicated issue with overlapping claims and the involvement of
the United States, the sea lane could never be considered reliable given China’s weak
naval force. If Beijing could open land corridors linking its western part, through
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, with the energy-abundant Middle
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East and Africa, it may help China secure the energy transportation and reduce the costs
andperiods.
In the agenda of ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement, China promises certain
treatment exclusively for the continental ASEAN states, which are also members of Great
Mekong Sub-region. Through the Asian Debt Reduction Plan of the Early Harvest
Package, China has not only partially reduced or totally exempted Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia of the debts to China, but also offered duty-free treatment for goods flowing
from or to the three states. Also, China has granted Most Favoured Nation status
normally accorded only to WTO members to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, three non-
WTO members. Furthermore, China has steadily become one of the largest sources of
foreign aid to Cambodia, Burma, Laos and Vietnam. These incentives are expected to
increase economic reliance of the less developed ASEAN members on the Chinese
economy, in an effort to assist the construction of transportation lines.
The case studies on the two important counterparts of China demonstrate that the
Chinese government has merged the employment of economic diplomacy with national
security interests. Economic statecraft is adopted to promote the security interests but the
specific approach is varied by region: to advance regional security through
China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and to support economic security by foreign aid
towards Africa.
9.3 Recommendations for further research
Over the past decades, economic reforms have transformed the Chinese system from an
isolated and backward economy into a rapidly expanding one. The process witnesses
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that Beijing has opened the economy to foreign investors and increased the interaction
with the rest of the world. However, both China’s leaders and people are still naturally
suspicious of foreign powers, and they believe that the West tend to be reluctant to
welcome China’s rise in world affairs andwould prefer to delay or obstruct its progress.
Recent examples cited by Chinese include the Western boycott of the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games and the European leaders ’ meeting with the exiled Tibetan spiritual
leader, Dalai Lama. Thus, China insists that they must proceed on the South–South
cooperation and view an advanced economy as essential to respond to the North’s
hostilities.
In practice, China has repeatedly compromised on strategic issues as necessary to
maintain economic growth, while they have engaged with other developing countries to
respond to the Western challenges. On the one side, when strategic issues threaten to
interfere with the national objective of economic growth, the Beijing government would
take policies which allow growth to continue. This strategy supports the Chinese
leadership’s domestic objectives of maintaining the rule of the Communist Party and
retaining social stability by raising living standards. This may explain why the Chinese
government keeps restraint in Tibet and afterwards Xinjiang chaos. On the other side, by
engaging with the Southern states, Chinese leaders have been pursuing a long-term
grand strategy of creating a peaceful environment, both internationally and regionally,
which allows China to build an economic foundation necessary to become an advanced
economy. For example, in the recent G-20 Summit, China along with other developing
countries such as India and Brazil called for reform of the international system to
increase the representation and voice of the vast number of developing countries.
Furthermore, Beijing has growing anxiety about the spread of colour revolutions
throughout East European and Central Asia and it sees Washington’s increasingly
324
assertive democratisation agenda as an attempt to subvert the one-party regime. The ties
with other Southern partners are expected to keep the US-led democratic cloud away
from China. In the years to come, the two-way strategies will continue to play deci sive
roles in China’s diplomacy.
These economic imperatives and strategic challenges are leading China to expand its
activities into different regions. As the thesis argues, one key motivation of China’s
outwards involvement is the need to secure access to energy and other resources
necessary for continued economic growth. Another major motivation is to produce a
peaceful environment, breaking the US containment strategy in the East Asian region
first while seeking to expand Chinese political influence in the world afterwards. At the
current stage this is concerned mainly with the regional sphere, especially on the
neighbouring countries which could provide a foothold for US military actions. These
two motivations determine that China will continue its diplomatic activism on the
resources-abundant region – Africa, and the neighbouring region – ASEAN. The
increasingly multi-faceted engagements of China in these two areas should be seen as an
important part of China’s growing global reach.
Moreover, on the pursuit of diplomatic activism on Africa and ASEAN, it is expected
that the Chinese government will continue the strategy of economic diplomacy. For
China, its intentions lie in energy security and a stable environment for economic growth,
and it will not subordinate the economic aims to other goals. To this end, it devises more
sophisticated means and swears by Deng’s 24-character strategy.71 Thus it should come
as little surprise that China tries to avoid taking tough actions against the pariah states
71 The 24-character strategies are to observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs
calmly, hide our capabilities and bide our time.
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and prefers soft powers to build diplomatic ties. In the two cases, the realisation of
China–ASEAN free trade agreement is on schedule and the economic promises to Africa
under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation are under construction.
Indeed, reconciling international economics and international politics is a constant
objective of economic diplomacy, and the political objectives of avoiding disputes and
promoting economic development stimulate the use of economic diplomacy. Both the
developed and developing countries are practising economic diplomacy in service for
national interests. However, while China is seen as having enough budgetary means to
extend economic diplomacy, its mode of economic diplomacy appears to be flawed and
needs to be revised.
First of all, China’s economic diplomacy towards Africa is problematic in two main ways:
Chinese national companies are criticised of pursuing self-interests, and the
government’s aid programs are accused of having no conditions attached. In the first
scenario, when Chinese businesses and manufactured goods flow into Africa, conflict
over differing labour practices and market strategies have arisen. Chinese firms rarely
employ local workers, which contributes little to local employment, and Chinese goods,
textile in particular, flood African markets, stifling the markets which Africa are
attempting to develop and set up factories across the continent. Also, Chinese companies
are accused of working longer hours, working during local holidays and working
overtime on weekend. These Chinese firms have already run into difficulties in countries
such as Nigeria and Zambia, where local labours have expressed resentment over
Chinese work practices and the resentment has caused small-scale riots against the
growing presence of the Chinese. This is the result of the conflicts between companies’
short-term commercial interests and state’s long-term strategic gains. Solving these
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situations has been difficult but includes communication between the conflicting parties
before escalating further. Actually, if China could export certain technologies to Africa,
such as practical agricultural bio-technologies, information infrastructure building and
general telecommunications services, it would help the African industries to raise the
standard of production, which in turn contributes to local economies and employment.
Furthermore, the soft loans from China without any restraint, being a financial
alternative to the West, are seen as assisting some African authoritarian regimes to
oppress the people, which cause failure in building African civil society. These financial
supports lend the African leaders legitimacy both at home and abroad, blunting pressure
on human rights and political transparency. In this scenario, Japan’s Official
Development Assistance Charter (ODA Charter) could be considered as a mode. 72Under
the Charter, Tokyo government must adopt positive economic diplomacy with the aim of
encouraging recipient countries to improve democratisation and restraint in military
ambitions, and it must use negative economic diplomacy when the political situation in
the recipient countries is questionable. The ODA Charter, to a great extent, restrains
Tokyo’s aid policy if the ‘universal value’ was contradicted with national commercial
interests. However, the charter would not affect the pursuit of commercial interests. If
the government had to take punitive measures to show their position, it could soften the
policy as soon as the situation improves, in order to avoid damaging bilateral relations
72 The ODA Charter was first approved by the Japanese cabinet in 1992 and revised in 2003.
Principles of ODA implementation include: full attention should be paid to trends in recipient
countries’ military expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., so as to maintain and
strengthen international peace and stability, including the prevention of terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; full attention should be paid to efforts for
promoting democratisation and the introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the
situation regarding the protection of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient
country.
327
and economic interests. For China, to establish a meaningful difference from the moral
failure of the European and the US predecessors on Africa, and to expect its economic
diplomacy to play larger role, it will have to abandon the ‘non-interference policy’, and
instead apply self-restraint on its current aid policy.73
Second, Beijing must acknowledge that economic diplomacy towards ASEAN should not
be an effective solution on the South China Sea issue. Multiple players involved are the
main reason: the United States, Japan, ASEAN and China. The parties can briefly be
separated as China confronting with the groups of the United States, Japan and ASEAN.
Any behaviour from China on this issue will immediately cause reactions from the
United States and Japan, not just the Southeast Asian states. Among the actors, ASEAN is
the most fragile in terms of influence although they are the direct claimants. Plus both the
United States and Japan never anticipant to see the ownership of the South China Sea to
China, a unilateral economic incentive to ASEAN certainly is not able to solve or even
undermine the disputes.
Therefore a transitional and provisional solution must be explored without affecting the
overall situation of the bilateral relations. Meanwhile, the solution should be in
accordance with the international laws and regulations including the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea concluded in 1982, which states that all claimant states
must settle the issue through peaceful means. However, when international law
recognises the ownership of certain disputed territory, mere discovery is not sufficient to
vest in the discoverer a valid title of ownership. Instead, the claim must be perfected by
73 After years of protecting the pariah states from international pressure, since 2006 China has
shown an increasing willingness to engage with the international community and has applied
pressure on these governments to change their behaviour. Beijing pressurised the Sudanese
government to accept peacekeepers from the AU and the UN, and it refused to allow
Zimbabwe’s president to take part in the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games.
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continuous and effective acts of permanent occupation and settlement. Under the
situation, Beijing should prevent the issue from deteriorating while increasing the
presence in the water field, in order to create conditions for permanent occupation and
settlement.
There are two-way approaches. First, the South China Sea is an economic ground, so the
government could make preferential policies to encourage fishing, exploration, and
scientific research. Fishery patrols should be followed to protect these civilian behaviours.
China has dispatched the most modern patrol ship to the South China Sea, conducting
patrols of the exclusive maritime zones in the water surrounding the Paracel and Spratly
Islands. Such fishery patrols must be intensified and executed regularly amid a recent
rising tide of disputes with neighbouring countries. An increasing number of civilian
activities in the area are certainly useful and necessary to insert a Chinese civilian
presence. Second, surging piracy off the Somali coast has increasingly threatened
international shipping, including the Chinese merchant ships passing through the Gulf of
Aden. A coalition of warships from eight nations, as well as from NATOand the US Navy,
has operated anti-piracy escorts. This January theChinese naval fleet arrived in the waters
off Somalia to carry out the escort mission against pirates, and to provide information and
necessary rescue services for the merchant ships passing through this area. Notably, the
patrolling route starts from the Hainan Island of China, goes through the Paracels Islands,
the Spratlys Islands, the Singapore Strait, the Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean, and heads
to the Gulf of Aden. Therefore it is expected that the unveiled goal of the Chinese mission
is to register themilitary presence of theChinese navy in the South China Sea, theMalacca
Strait and the Indian Ocean, apart from fighting pirates. Such navy operations, in
accordance with international law and the UN Security Council’s resolution, should be
made into a long-term action plan to increase Chinese military presence in the area.
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Appendix I: Summary of Economic Sanctions Mentioned in the Chapter Three
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Initial Sender Target Duration Objectives
UK andLeague of
Nations
Italy 1935-36 Withdraw Italian Troops From
Abyssinia
United States Japan 1940-41 Withdraw from Southeast Asia
USSR Yugoslavia 1948-55 Rejoin Soviet Camp;
Destabilize Tito Government
United States Dominican
Republic
1960-62 Cease Subversion in Venezuela;
Destabilize Trujillo Government
United States Cuba 1960-Present Destabilize Castro Government;
Settle Expropriation Claims
United Nations South Africa 1962-1994 End Apartheid;
Grant Independence to Namibia
United Nations Rhodesia 1865-79 Majority Rule by Black Africans
UK andUS Uganda 1972-79 Improve Human Rights
Destabilize Amin Government
United States South Africa 1973-77 Improve Human Rights
United States South Korea 1975-82 Adhere to Nuclear Safeguard;
Avert Explosion of NuclearDevice
United States Kampuchea 1975-79 Improve Human Rights;
Deter Vietnamese Expansionism
United States Nicaragua 1977-79 Destabilize Somoza Government;
Improve Human Rights
United States India 1978-82 Adhere to Nuclear Safeguard
United States USSR 1978-80 Liberalize Treatment ofDissident
United States Libya 1978-1999 Terminate Supports of International
Terrorism
United States Iraq 1980-2003 Terminate Supports of International
Terrorism;
Renounce ChemicalandNuclear
Weapons
United States USSR 1981-82 Lift Martial Law in Poland;
Cancel USSR-Europe Pipeline Project;
Impair Soviet Economic andMilitary
Potential
United States USSR 1983 Retaliation for Downing ofKorean
Airliner
United States Iran 1984-present End Warwith Iraq;
Halt Attacks onGolf Shipping
United States South Africa 1985 End Apartheid
United States Haiti 1987-90 Improve Human Rights
Initial Sender Target Duration Objectives
United States, Japan,W Burma 1988 Improve Human Rights
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Source: Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot, 1990:16-27.
est Germany
United States Somalia 1988 Improve Human Rights
United States China 1989-persent Retaliation for Tiananmen Square
United States Sudan 1989-present Improve Human Rights
United States and
Japan
India 1998 Preventing From NuclearTests
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Appendix II: Results of questionnaires:
The Author interviewed three groups of professionals: related Chinese scholars, related
Western scholars, and diplomats working on bilateral relations. They are: Chen Shaofeng
from the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Termsak Chalermpalanupap
from ASEAN Secretariats, Jorn Dosch from Leeds University, John Weiss from the University
of Bradford, John Ravenhill from Austrian National University, Liu Xuecheng from the China
Institution of International Studies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, and ten
officials from the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.
Part I: Six scholars and diplomats: Chen Shaofeng – CXF; Jorne Dosch – JD; John Weiss – JW;
John Ravenhill – JR; Termsak Chalerpalanupap – TC; Liu Xuecheng – LXC.
Q1 In your country’s elite
opinion, China’s image is
mainly?
CXF JD JW JR TC LXC
Positive x x x x
Negative
Neutrality x x
No opinion
Q2 In your opinion should
China’s rise be considered?
An opportunity x x x x x
A threat
A challenge x
No opinion
Q3 Where does ‘China Threat’
theory seem to you to be
evident in?
Economic sector x x
Military sector x x x
Cultural
None x x
Q4 Do you think China’s military
moderniza tion is motivated
mainly by?
The Taiwan issue x x x
The South China Sea x
The target internal separatism x x
To deter American hegemony x x x x
Reasonable self defence
Others (please specify) Japan
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Q5 Confronted with China’s
rapid economic development,
the dominating strategy for
ASEAN economies should be?
CXF JD JW JR TC LXC
Engage with China
economically
x x
Cooperate with China entirely x x x
Encircle China
Isolation
Others (please specify) Develop the
ASEAN-China
strategic
partnership for
mutualbenefit
Q6 Can you rank these countries
as stakeholders for the
Southeast Asian region?
America 4 1 4 4 5 X
ASEAN 1 3 1 1 1 X
China 2 2 2 2 2 X
India 5 6 5 5 6 X
Japan 3 4 3 3 3 X
Russia 7 7 6 6 7 x
Others(please specify) 6 5 4: EU
8: Australia
Q7 Which partners do you think
are reliable and capable to
lend supports when ASEAN
is in crisis?
America x x 2 3 X
China x x 3 2 X
India 5 6 X
Japan x x x 1 1 X
Other ASEAN members x 4 4 X
Russia 6 7 X
Others (please specify) EU 5: EU
Q8 Among these countries, which
do you think is more likely to
bring negative impacts on
regional stability in Southeast
Asian area?
CXF JD JW JR TC LXC
America x x 3 x
ASEAN x
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China x 4
India 2
Japan 5
Russia 1
None x
Q9 As far as you know, how is
America’s influence in
Southeast Asia?
Rising x
Declining x x
No change x x x
No opinion
Q 10 In your view, how relevance
does American military
presence to the security in
Southeast Asian region?
Positive relevance x x x x
Negative relevance x x
No relevance x
No opinion
Q11 In your view, to what extent
does the future of China-US
relations impact on the China-
ASEAN engagement?
Positive impact x x x 50% x
Negative impact x
No impact
No opinion x
Q12 What percentage of the
China-ASEAN partnership
has political, economic and
security motivation?
Political motivation 60% 40% 30% 50% 50% x
Economic incentive 35% 40% 70% 40% 40% x
Security consideration 5% 30% 10% 5% x
Others (please specify) Cultural: 5%
Q13 In your view, what
percentage of Chinese and
ASEAN economies are
competitive or
complementary?
CXF JD JW JR TC LXC
Competitive 50% x 30% 20% 60% x
Complementary 50% 70% 80% 40% x
No opinion
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Q14 In your view, to what extent
China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement may affect
ASEAN economies?
Highly benefit x x
Fairly benefit x x x x
Negative benefit
No opinion
Q15 What are the main factors that
may promote China-ASEAN
relations in the coming years?
Border stability, including
South China Sea
x
Economic mutual growth x x x x
Promotion of East Asian
Community
x x x
Others (please specify)
Q16 In your view, what could be
the biggest obstacles for
China-ASEAN cooperation?
Economic competitiveness
Border disputes, including
South China Sea
x x x x
Fear of ‘China Threat’ x x
American factor x
Others (please specify)
Q17 In your view, what is the
likelihood of a conflict over
the South China Sea between
China and other claimant
states in the coming years?
High likely
Fair likely x x
High unlikely x x
Unlikely x
No opinion x
Q18 In your view, what is the
likelihood of a conflict over
the struggle for the navigation
power in the Malacca Strait
between America and China
in coming years?
CXF JD JW JR TC LXC
High likely
Fair likely
High unlikely x x
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Part II: Ten officials from the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission
Unlikely x x x
No opinion x
If you have other comments, please specify blow:
TC: It can be pointed out that China has learned about regional cooperation and multilateralism from
engagingASEAN. China's engagement with ASEAN has formed part of the core of China's peaceful rise.
This we in ASEAN believe is beneficial to all in this region. Economic competitiveness is a fact of life .
And business people always know how to work with one another to cash in on new opportunities.
Trade, investment, tourism and economic cooperation are not zero-sum game. Everyone can all benefit.
Hence ASEAN tends to be optimistic and wants to intensify its engagement with China for mutual
benefit.
Q1 In your country’s elite
opinion, China’s image is
mainly?
A B C D E F G H I J
Positive x x x x x x x x
Negative x x
Neutrality
No opinion
Q2 In your opinion should
China’s rise be considered?
An opportunity x x x x x x x x
A threat
A challenge x x x
No opinion
Q3 Where does ‘China Threat’
theory seem to you to be
evident in?
Economic sector x x x
Military sector x x
Cultural x x x x x
None
Q4 Do you think China’s
military moderniza tion is
motivated mainly by?
A B C D E F G H I J
The Taiwan issue x x x x x
The South China Sea x x x
The target internal
separatism
x x x
To deter American
hegemony
x x x
Reasonable self defence x x x x x x x x
Others (please specify)
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Q5 Confronted with China’s
rapid economic
development, the
dominating strategy for
ASEAN economies should
be?
Engage with China
economically
Cooperate with China
entirely
x x x x x x x x x x
Encircle China
Isolation
Others (please specify)
Q6 Canyou rank these countries
as stakeholders for the
Southeast Asian region?
America x
ASEAN
China x x x x x x x x x
India
Japan
Russia
Others(please specify)
Q7 Which partners do you think
are reliable and capable to
lend supports when ASEAN
is in crisis?
America
China x x x x x x x x x x
India
Japan
Other ASEAN members
Russia
Others (please specify)
Q8 Among these countries,
which do you think is more
likely to bring negative
impacts on regional stability
in Southeast Asian area?
A B C D E F G H I J
America
ASEAN
China
India x x x x x
Japan x x x x x
Russia
338
None
Q9 As far as you know, how is
America’s influence in
Southeast Asia?
Rising
Declining x x x x x x
No change x x x x
No opinion
Q 10 In your view, how relevance
does American military
presence to the security in
Southeast Asian region?
Positive relevance x x x x x x x x
Negative relevance x
No relevance x
No opinion
Q11 In your view, to what extent
does the future of China-US
relations impact on the
China-ASEAN engagement?
Positive impact x x x x x x x x x x
Negative impact
No impact
No opinion
Q12 What percentage of the
China-ASEAN partnership
has political, economic and
security motivation?
Political motivation x
Economic incentive x x
Security consideration x x x x x x x x x x
Others (please specify)
Q13 In your view, what
percentage of Chinese and
ASEAN economies are
competitive or
complementary?
A B C D E F G H I J
Competitive x x x x
Complementary x x x x x x
No opinion
Q14 In your view, to what extent
China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement may affect
ASEAN economies?
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Highly benefit x x x x x
Fairly benefit x x x x x
Negative benefit
No opinion
Q15 What are the main factors
that may promote China-
ASEAN relations in the
coming years?
Border stability, including
South China Sea
Economic mutual growth x x x x x x x
Promotion of East Asian
Community
x x x x x
Others (please specify)
Q16 In your view, what could be
the biggest obstacles for
China-ASEAN cooperation?
Economic competitiveness
Border disputes, including
South China Sea
x x x x x x x x
Fear of ‘China Threat’
American factor x x
Others (please specify)
Q17 In your view, what is the
likelihood of a conflict over
the South China Sea between
China and other claimant
states in the coming years?
High likely x x x x x x
Fair likely x x x x
High unlikely
Unlikely
No opinion
Q18 In your view, what is the
likelihood of a conflict over
the struggle for the
navigation power in the
Malacca Strait between
America and China in
coming years?
A B C D E F G H I J
High likely x x x
Fair likely x x x x x x x
High unlikely
Unlikely
No opinion
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If you have other comments, please specify blow:
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